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This dissertation comprises three essays on the corporate sector and its relation-
ships with banking institutions, exploring detailed micro databases. The first Chap-
ter explores the relevance of information underlying working capital and turnover
indicators on the probability of default on a bank loan. The second Chapter inves-
tigates the main determinants of corporate funding. In addition to bank and trade
credit, the analysis also sheds light on loans granted by shareholders or intra-group
operations, and tax liabilities. The third Chapter explores firms’ decisions on invest-
ment and employment through the vulnerability of their lenders to financial market
developments, in the context of the euro area sovereign debt crisis.
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The three essays that comprise this dissertation focus on the corporate sector and its
interaction with the banking system, exploring corporate credit risk, different firms’
funding sources and constraints on firms’ decisions in the context of the recent euro
area sovereign debt crisis.
The first Chapter focuses on corporate credit risk regarding banking liabilities.
In this Chapter we investigate if a deeper analysis of liquidity and turnover in-
dicators contain additional insights regarding firms’ probability of default. These
variables are usually identified as relevant financial indicators in empirical literature.
However, they may reflect different firms’ operational activity and efficiency man-
agement. Therefore, we explore if the breakdown of working capital and turnover
into variables related with cash holdings, activity indicators, investment turnover,
and tax liabilities contains relevant information for determining a firm’s probability
of a bank credit default, controlling for other variables. According to the results, we
observe that firms that take longer to repay their suppliers have higher probabilities
of default. There is also evidence of a positive relationship between firms’ credit risk
and the share of tax liabilities. The results highlight the link between tax liabilities
and accounts payable with firm’s financial vulnerabilities, and their contribution in
corporate credit risk analysis.
The second Chapter is related to corporate funding. Funding is crucial for firms
xix
to invest but also to operate their daily business. Different types of debt have dif-
ferent characteristics and requirements for firms. Hence, it is important to improve
the knowledge of firms’ leverage, which is high in several European countries, and
consequently identify potential vulnerabilities of firms to financial and economic de-
velopments. Against this background, the analysis presented in the second Chapter
identifies the main determinants of the composition of corporate liabilities. In addi-
tion to bank and trade credit, two major external finance sources, we also include in
the analysis tax liabilities and loans granted by shareholders or intra-group opera-
tions. The analysis of these components is not so well documented in the literature,
but these sources seem to be particularly relevant in some firms’ segments. The
results obtained suggest that some firms’ characteristics present a similar impact on
the alternative funding sources, such as profitability, while others show a heteroge-
neous effects. Moreover, the results suggest the importance of variables related to
firms’ activity and business risk in their funding structures.
The third Chapter assesses empirically the interaction between firms’ real deci-
sions and the financial system. The recent financial and economic crises initiated
a new wave of discussion about real and financial linkages, within both academics
and policy-makers. The euro area sovereign debt crisis put the banking sector un-
der great pressure and imposed several challenges, notably in countries most af-
fected by the crisis. The sovereign-bank linkage, and the negative feedback loop,
could negatively affect the economic activity, especially when firms tend to be bank-
dependent. The analysis presented in this Chapter explores the heterogeneity across
banks in their funding structures, sovereign exposures, solvency positions, and col-
lateral availability to investigate the effect of the negative shock on firms’ investment
and employment decisions. This study uses detailed databases that cover virtually
all bank loans granted to Portuguese firms for the period 2007-2012. The evidence
suggests that firms whose lenders depend more heavily on interbank and financial
markets funding show higher adjustments in investment and employment. The re-
INTRODUCTION xxi
sults also stress the importance of assets eligible as collateral in monetary operations.
In turn, the exposures to sovereign debt securities and solvency positions provide
weaker explanations for firms’ outcomes. Broadly, the empirical results highlight
how a deterioration in sovereign creditworthiness and the deterioration in financial
markets may affect the real economy via the banking sector. Improved knowledge
of this framework is crucial to identify the transmission channels across sectors, and
consequently explore the potential impact of some political or institutional measures.

Chapter 1
Working capital and tax liabilities
as determinants of corporate
credit risk
Abstract: Liquidity and turnover indicators are usually mentioned as important dimen-
sions in the corporate credit risk literature. However, these variables may reflect different
firms’ operational activity and efficiency management. This study explores if the break-
down of working capital and turnover into variables related to cash, activity indicators,
investment, and tax liabilities contains relevant information in determining a firm’s prob-
ability of a bank credit default event, controlling for other variables. According to the
results, we observe that firms that take longer to repay their suppliers have higher prob-
abilities of a credit default event. Moreover, there is evidence of a positive relationship
between firms’ credit risk and the share of tax liabilities. These indicators seem to be a
signal about a firm’s financial fragilities.
JEL Classification: G21, G33, C25
Keywords: Credit risk, Default probability, Corporate loans, Logit Model
Chapter 1. Corporate credit risk
1.1 Introduction
Corporate credit risk has received great interest in the financial and banking litera-
ture. In the banking perspective, the asymmetric information in the credit market
between entrepreneurs and lenders is critical. For credit risk management, it is cru-
cial to assess a firm’s financial position and identify its vulnerabilities in order to
determine the price of a loan, or to decide even about its approval (Stiglitz & Weiss
(1981)). Afterwards, a careful monitoring of the firm’s financial developments is also
required, given the impact of default events on banks’ provision and impairment poli-
cies, as well as on regulatory capital requirements. Over the last decade, there has
been a renewed interest about credit risk management and measurement supported
by financial innovations, competition policies, and computational improvements.
Additionally, under the Basel II Capital framework, banks were allowed to use in-
ternal credit risk models in order to determine their capital requirements. Thus,
banks had developed several techniques to analyze firms’ financial positions, prob-
ability of default, and other credit risk parameters. More recently, the economic
and financial crises, and the significant increase in the materialization of credit risk,
reinforced the importance of a close monitoring of the firm’s financial position and
credit risk standards.
This study explores corporate credit default, investigating if some variables under-
lying liquidity indicators, such as working capital, and turnover contain additional
information regarding a firm’s financial health and its creditworthiness. Therefore,
apart from the standard financial variables applied in the empirical literature, related
to profitability, leverage, or firm size, we include variables directly related to firms’
activity, such as production cycle, cash holdings, and efficiency in determining the
probability of a bank loan default. We also explore the role of firms’ tax liabilities.
This analysis has in mind that working capital and turnover may have significant
2
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underlying differences related to firms’ operational cycle, efficiency, or even the man-
agement of inflows and outflows, and consequently potentially different assessments
of firms’ financial soundness.
In this analysis we combine micro data for Portuguese firms from the Central
Balance Sheet Database with information about credit status and banking rela-
tionships from the Central Credit Register, both databases available at Banco de
Portugal. As these databases are quite exhaustive, the data set allows a high cov-
erage of banks’ exposure to the corporate sector. It also allows exploring corporate
heterogeneity, analyzing different firms’ segments. In the econometric analysis we
apply a logit model for panel data to assess the relevance of firm’s characteristics in
its probability of default.
According to the results obtained, the breakdown of firms’ working capital and
turnover improves the analysis of the probability of default. In particular, the indi-
cators related to firm’s activity, such as management of inflows and outflows contain
additional information regarding firms’ financial positions. The results also highlight
the relevance of tax liabilities as an indicator of firms’ financial fragilities. Thus,
these results suggest the value of a close analysis of a firm’s activity as an indication
of that firm’s financial soundness. Moreover, the results suggest a relationship be-
tween tax liabilities and a firm’s financial fragility, and consequently this dimension
should be included in corporate credit risk analysis.
The remainder of this Chapter is organized as follows: Section 1.2 briefly re-
views related literature. Section 1.3 presents a description of the data sources and
variables under analysis, as well as some descriptive statistics. Section 1.4 presents
the econometric approach adopted. Section 1.5 shows the main econometric results,
including the analysis of different corporate segments. Section 1.6 includes some
robustness tests. Finally, Section 1.7 presents the main conclusions.
3
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1.2 Related literature
Credit risk is related to the possibility of losses due to changes in the credit quality
of the counterparts. Much of the literature on corporate credit risk is related to
modeling default events, i.e. the failure of a firm to meet the terms agreed in credit
contracts. Several quantitative models have emerged in this field.
For firms with publicly traded equity or debt, there are the structural or reduced-
form models (see Bielecki & Rutkowski (2002)), depending on the information avail-
able. Structural models focus on modeling and pricing credit risk of a firm, in
which the firm’s asset value assumes a crucial role. These models intend to link the
credit events, mainly default situations, to the firm’s fundamentals. One of the most
popular structural models was developed by Merton (1974). According to Merton’s
model, a firm’s equity value is similar to a call option on the value of its assets, where
the strike price is the value of the liabilities. In this framework, default occurs when
the firm’s asset value falls below the value of its liabilities at maturity date.1 In line
with this model, the credit risk of a firm is essentially driven by the dynamics of
the asset value and the respective volatility, taking the value of liabilities as given:
the greater the value of the firm, and the less its volatility, the lower the probability
of a default event.2 Several studies have explored this model in determining the
probability of default for firms. Moody’s - KMV model (Moody’s (2004)) is one
of the most well known. In turn, under reduced form models (suggested in Jarrow
1Note that default event is different from bankruptcy. The latter occurs when the firm is
liquidated, i.e. it is not able to pay own debts. Bankruptcy is based on a legal definition, and
so it is a country-specific concept. Default corresponds to a delay in payments according to the
pre-defined terms of credit contracts.
2The number of standard deviations that a firm’s asset value is away from the default point
is defined as distance-to-default. Generally, distance-to-default (DD) is the distance between the
firm’s asset value in one year E(V1) and the default point (DPT ), based on liabilities’ structure
maturity, expressed in standard deviations of assets’ value (assets’ volatility):
DD = (E(V1)−DTP )/σV1
4
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& Turnbull (1992)), the firm’s assets value is not modeled and default events are
specified exploring some exogenous process.
Despite the attractiveness of these approaches, and the forward looking perspec-
tive that market data incorporates, their implementation is limited by the availabil-
ity of these data. This is an important issue for several European countries, given
that the fraction of listed firms or firms with access to debt markets is quite limited.
This fraction is even lower for firms that are traded on a regular basis.3
Much of the empirical literature relies on more traditional approaches in order to
explore the firm’s idiosyncratic risk factors and its creditworthiness. In particular,
these studies intend to identify the contribution of firms’ financial indicators, mainly
based on accounting data, and other general firms’ characteristics in determining
the probability of a default event. Even though the limitations of accounting data
(lack of theoretical support, and the backward perspective), some studies, such as
Demirovic & Thomas (2007) and Agarwal & Taffler (2008), found evidence that
accounting-ratio approaches are also meaningful in credit risk analysis. Demirovic
& Thomas (2007) found evidence that accounting variables contain incremental
information when added to an approach with market measures. Agarwal & Taffler
(2008) found that traditional models are robust and not inferior to market-based
models.4
3Given the constraints related with market data availability, some analyses go back to market
information of comparable firms in order to estimate the market assets value of non-listed firms.
The market multiples approach allows to determine a firm’s value based on the market’s assessment
of its peers. This approach is based on public financial information of peers, on specialist analysis,
and/or information disclosed to the market. Thus, this approach allows estimating the market
value of a non-listed firm based on market’s assessment of other firms in the same business sector.
However, multiples are influenced by the conditions observed in the financial markets and by the
characteristics of firms included in the set of peers. Therefore, the criteria underlying the definition
of this set of firms is crucial. It should be selected in order to minimize the difference between
firms, taking into account operational activity, risk, economic and financial environment, as well as
the legal and competition framework. The disadvantage of the market multiples is also related to
its dependence on the cyclical evolution of the capital markets, as well as the general environment.
Across the several multiples approaches, the EBITDA multiple is often used, since it minimizes
differences between firms. In particular, it avoids differences in the fiscal system, amortization
policies, and capital structure.
4Actually, Agarwal & Taffler (2008) argued that despite some limitations, there are also some
5
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The empirical research explores corporate credit risk in different perspectives,
using different data and methodologies. The seminal empirical papers analyzing
the relevance of financial variables in identifying firms’ default go back to the 1960s
with Beaver (1966) and Altman (1968). Beaver (1966) found that several ratios
present significant differences between failed and viable firms. He also observed that
those differences increased as the time to a failure decreased. Using a set of some
financial variables, Altman developed a weighted linear indicator to identify distress
and non-distress firms. The Altman’s indicator, known as Z-score, has persisted as
a benchmark until the present day in corporate credit risk literature.5
Over the following decades, the empirical literature on corporate default was
extensive. Despite a lack of consensus in the literature regarding which firms’ char-
acteristics should be considered as more important in modeling default events, a
pattern among the variable selection suggests the importance of some categories of
indicators. Looking at financial indicators, measures related to profitability, lever-
age, and liquidity are within those typically found as relevant in determining firms’
default. Other firms’ characteristics, such as size, age, and business sector were also
highlighted in empirical research (see, for instance, Bunn & Redwood (2003), Benito
et al. (2004), Carling et al. (2007), Lacerda & Moro (2008), and Bonfim (2009)).
As a complement to firm-specific information, the macroeconomic and financial
environment has also been included in the credit risk empirical literature. This was
motivated by the fact that average default frequency and firm default probabilities
present some co-movements with macroeconomic and financial variables. This sug-
facts that justify that the account ratios should also be assessed in credit risk perspective. The
authors argued that corporate failure events are not a sudden episode. In general, failures occur
after some years with adverse performances, with impact on firms’ accounting financial state-
ments. They also highlighted that several loan covenants (in credit contracts) are defined based
on accounting indicators.
5The variables included in Altman’s Z-score index were: working capital/total assets, re-
tained earnings/total assets, ebitda/total assets, market-value-equity/book value total liabilities,
and sales/total assets.
6
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gests that aggregate shocks can be a driver of corporate default.6 Actually, Duffie
et al. (2007), Pesaran et al. (2006), Jacobson et al. (2013), and Bonfim (2009), for
instance, show that (in addition to the firm’s idiosyncratic characteristics) macroe-
conomic environment variables improve the prediction of the probability of default
models.
Some avenues of credit risk literature also explored the relevance of trade credit
in corporate default, as well as bank lending relationships. Actually, trade credit
plays an important role as external funding source for firms in several countries.
One of the main questions is related to a firm’s choice between bank and trade
credit, as trade credit is perceived as more expensive (based on implicit interest
rate). The literature presents several reasons for their coexistence. Some arguments
are related to financial factors, while others are related to the non-financial role of
trade credit, such as transaction costs, price discrimination, warranty of product
quality, or customer relationships, (e.g. Petersen & Rajan (1997)). On the financial
perspective, many studies emphasize that firms use trade credit because there are
bank credit constraints (e.g. Petersen & Rajan (1994), Nilsen (2002), and Cuñat
(2007)).7 These studies support the hypothesis that firms use other available forms
of credit before trade credit as a funding source. In this context, non-bank private
markets complement banks and public funding sources (financial markets) mainly
for lower credit quality firms. Nevertheless, according to Biais & Gollier (1997)
and Burkart & Ellingsen (2004), for instance, trade and bank credits can be either
complements or substitutes. This argument is based on the fact that the suppliers
may have a comparative advantage over banks in collecting information on firms,
in assessing their creditworthiness, and in monitoring their actions. Giannetti et al.
6See, for instance, the initial analysis presented in Bonfim (2009), or the Financial Stability
Reviews of European Central Bank or Banco de Portugal.
7For instance, Cuñat (2007), for a panel of UK firms, found that trade credit is used at the
margin, when other forms of credit have already been exhausted. The results also suggest that the
evolution of trade credit is related to the length of the commercial relationships, and that trade
credit seems to be more usual when firms have lower levels of liquidity.
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(2011) also supports the complementarity between trade and bank credit.
According to the bank lending relationship literature, the firm-bank relationship
is crucial in mitigating asymmetric information. This is especially important for
smaller and younger firms, for which information is scarcer. A lending relationship
may help to overcome this problem given that banks obtain firms’ private informa-
tion through repeated interactions (Diamond (1984)). Thus, the literature suggests
that firms that borrow from a small number of banks, or even concentrate a sub-
stantial part of their funding in a single relationship, tend to record lower financing
constraints and obtain more favorable credit conditions.8,9 However, a non-negligible
fraction of firms has more than a single lending relationship. The stability and effi-
ciency of lending relationships depend on several factors, both in banks’ and firms’
perspectives. For instance, there are hold-up issues (information rents), market
competition pressure, and banks’ portfolio diversification incentives (e.g. Sharpe
(1990), Rajan (1992), Detragiache et al. (2000), Von Thadden (2004), and Carletti
et al. (2007)). The link between the number of banking relationships and a firm’s
credit quality has also been explored, but the arguments are mixed. Some authors
argue that a single relationship may be driven by potential refusal of credit from
other banks. Hence, it may be a negative signal to the market, making exclusive
bank relationships undesirable. Other authors report evidence that firms with lower
credit quality tend to establish multiple lending relationships (e.g. Detragiache et al.
(2000), Degryse & Ongena (2001), Farinha & Santos (2002), and Fok et al. (2004)).
Looking at the Portuguese corporate sector, there are also some studies exploring
8For instance, an increase in the number of lending relationships decreases the amount of credit
(Petersen & Rajan (1994), Cole (1998), and Harhoff & Korting (1998)), while longer relationships
increase the availability of credit (Petersen & Rajan (1994), Harhoff & Korting (1998)), and con-
tribute to a decrease in collateral requirements (Harhoff & Korting (1998), and Berger & Udell
(1995)). Looking at interest rates, the empirical evidence is mixed (e.g. Berger & Udell (1995),
Petersen & Rajan (1994), and Bonfim et al. (2008)).
9Boot (2000) and Ongena & Smith (1998) review the first wave of the literature on banking
relationships, while Berger & Udell (2006) discuss the role of banking relationships in a more
recent financial framework, given the transformation observed in the financial industry since the
early 2000s.
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credit risk. Antunes et al. (2005) estimated the probability of default of non-financial
corporations using bank loan data, firms’ business sector, and macroeconomic vari-
ables. In turn, Soares (2006) and Bonfim (2009) based their analyses on micro data.
Soares (2006) intended to estimate a synthetic indicator to identify potential distress
events. In this study, based on discriminant analysis, the financial ratios selected
were related to leverage, funding structure, liquidity and profitability. According to
Bonfim (2009), profitability, solvency, liquidity, investment path, and sales were rel-
evant in determining the probability of default. Moreover, as mentioned above, the
inclusion of macroeconomic developments improved the econometric results. Lac-
erda & Moro (2008) analyzed Portuguese firms’ default exploring three alternative
techniques, namely logistic regressions, discriminant analysis and support vector
machine (SVM). They found that SVM was very good in capturing non-monotonic
dependence of the probability of default from some firms’ characteristics. However,
they also found that the three methods identified several important common vari-
ables. Indicators related to funding costs, liquidity, activity, leverage, as well as
interest over debt ratio, credit lines, accounts payable, and size played a role as
predictors of a firm’s default. Variables related to the number of banking relation-
ships and the length of time of employees in the firm also revealed to be important
in the analysis. Bhimani et al. (2010) also found the importance for some of the
above-mentioned indicators, and highlighted the relevance of non-financial variables
in determining a firm’s default. Finally, Antunes & Martinho (2012) developed a
scoring model for Portuguese firms. The variables selected were related to profitabil-
ity, turnover, leverage and liquidity. They also emphasized the heterogeneity across
firms’ business sectors regarding credit risk and bank credit default events.
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1.3 Data and variables
1.3.1 Data sources
The empirical analysis performed in this study is based on the information of the
Central Balance Sheet Database (CB) and the Central Credit Register (CRC), both
available at Banco de Portugal.10
The CB contains financial information, based on balance sheet and profit and
losses account, as well as other firm characteristics, such as the economic activity
sector, and the date of set up. Since 2006, instead of a voluntary survey, the annual
CB is based on Simplified Corporate Information (Informação Empresarial Simpli-
ficada - IES), which is a joint project of Bank de Portugal, Ministry of Justice,
Ministry of Finance, and the Portuguese Institute of Statistics. IES also contains
financial and non-financial data, as previously reported in the survey approach, but
it covers virtually the entire Portuguese corporate sector.11
The CRC contains information regarding the credit granted by financial institu-
tions operating in Portugal. This database, which is mandatory and reported on a
monthly basis to Banco de Portugal, contains the total outstanding amount of loans,
unused credit lines, and information for credit overdue, among other components.
Thus, due to the low threshold required for the report (loans above 50 euros), CRC
contains nearly all the credit exposures of the banking system to Portuguese firms.12
10Occasionally, Quadros de Pessoal database (QP) was also used to complement some informa-
tion regarding firm’s employees.
11IES is an electronic submission of information of accounting, fiscal and statistical nature that
firms have usually to submit to several Portuguese authorities, namely Ministry of Justice, Ministry
of Finance, Statistics of Portugal, and Banco de Portugal. Thus, instead of firms submitting nearly
the same information to the different entities, at different moments of time, and in different reports,
as occurred before 2006, with the IES system they do it once. As all firms are expected to submit
the report, IES allows a high coverage of the Portuguese corporate sector by the Central Balance
Sheet Database of Banco de Portugal.
12For further details on the CRC and IES databases, see Booklet Nr.5 of Banco de Portugal
(Banco de Portugal (2011a)), and Supplement of Statistical Bulletin (Banco de Portugal (2008)),
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In order to explore IES information, which has broad coverage of the Portuguese
corporate sector and simultaneously avoids the possible sample bias that voluntary
surveys may induce (especially toward firms with better financial position), the
period under analysis is limited to 2006 - 2009. The sample period ends in 2009,
given that some variables explored in the current analysis (and discussed in following
sections in this Chapter), were discontinued from 2010 on.13
Moreover, some selection criteria were imposed. First, the financial sector and
public administrations were excluded, as well as observations with misreported data
for total assets, business volume, number of employees, and age. Furthermore, firms
with fewer than five employees were also ruled out. Then, observations with extreme
values for some variables included in the analysis were excluded (1 per cent of the
tails of the respective distributions), which allows controlling for extreme outliers.
After these steps, given the purposes of this study, we restricted the sample to
firms that are simultaneously on the two databases, i.e. on both IES and CRC.
In other words, we restricted the sample to firms with relationships with the fi-
nancial system. Combining all the criteria, the data set comprises around 230,700
observations.
1.3.2 Determinants of firm default
This study analyzes if some components underlying working capital and turnover
contain relevant information for determining the probability of default of a firm.
Simultaneously, firm’s business risk is included in the analysis, in line with the struc-
respectively.
13As mentioned above, IES started in 2006, but for the main element in financial statements,
information for the previous year was also required. Given this fact, data for 2005 were also
collected to compute some indicators for 2006. In turn, in 2010 there were changes in IES data.
In parallel with the introduction of new accounting rules, there were also some changes in the IES
templates, creating a discontinuity in some variables.
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tural models, in which volatility is one of the key elements. Other firm characteristics
and macroeconomic developments were also controlled for, given their relevance in
determining a default event, as discussed in the literature section. Moreover, fol-
lowing the banking relationship literature, the firm’s relationships with the banking
system were also included in the analysis. In general, we have:
Prob(Defaulti,t) = f(working capital and turnover componentsi,t;
other characteristicsi,t; banking relationshipsi,t;
business riski; macroeconomic environmentt) (1.1)
where the left-hand side is the probability of default of firm i at the period t. The
right-hand side includes a set of several variables that may be underlying a firm’s
default.
A default event is defined when a firm has bank credit overdue for a period longer
than three consecutive months (flagged in the CRC), evaluated at the end of the
year, and greater than 500 euros.14
Looking at firm characteristics, working capital (WORKING CAPITAL), defined as
the ratio of current assets net of current liabilities over total assets, is a relevant in-
dicator in the financial analysis of a firm, given that it represents operating liquidity
and liabilities commitments in the short-run. Debt holders are usually concerned
with a firm’s liquidity, since they are concerned about the payment of the initial
loan, but also with the ongoing payments. Earlier studies identified liquidity as a
relevant variable in determining default events, with a negative relationship (e.g.
14Note that a default event corresponds to a delay in the payment of the installment and/or the
reimbursement of the principal at the debt maturity. It does not necessarily imply a bankruptcy
event. Moreover, it should be noted that the imposition of three consecutive months may be a
conservative criterion, as financial institutions should report overdue events after the 90 days. This
conservative rule implies that the default events may be underestimated in the data set, but it
avoids some potential misreporting records. The 500 euros threshold is also intended to exclude
misleading events.
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Altman (1968) and Bhimani et al. (2010)). However, working capital requires a
careful analysis. For instance, an increase in this indicator may reflect firms’ deci-
sions that might help to minimize stock-out events or even stimulate sales. However,
an increase in this ratio may also reflect a build up of inventories (and money is tied
up in inventories) or credit to customers. In these cases, the firm cannot use it to
pay off any of its commitments. Therefore, an increase in working capital may have
underlying negative developments in the firm’s financial health and increase its vul-
nerabilities. The turnover variable (TURNOVER), defined as sales over total assets, is
related to the firm’s efficiency, as it indicates how a firm uses assets in its business.
A high volume of sales into total assets means that the firm takes advantage of its
investments.
In this study, working capital and turnover indicators are decomposed into some
underlying components related to cash holdings, investment turnover, and activity
indicators, namely accounts receivable, accounts payable, and inventories, in order
to identify the firm’s operational fragilities that may induce default. Additionally,
we also include in the analysis the share of tax liabilities. Bernhardsen & Larsen
(2007) explored trade accounts payable and unpaid taxes in the extended version of
a model to analyze banks’ credit risk exposures to the corporate sector, in addition
to other financial ratios, age, size, and industry.
Looking at the other variables included in the analysis (equation 1.1), the compo-
nent “other firm characteristics” includes accounting and non-accounting indicators,
in line with the empirical finding discussed above. Concerning accounting data, the
analysis includes measures related to leverage (LEVERAGE), sales growth (SALES
GROWTH), interest coverage by earning before interest, depreciation, and amorti-
zation (ebitda) (INTEREST COVERAGE), as well as the coverage of total liabilities
(DEBT COVERAGE). These coverage indicators allow analyzing firms’ ability to repay
13
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capital and interest through the ongoing operational income.15 Note that according
to the ebitda multiple approach, a standard procedure adopted in the valuation of
firms, the coverage of firms’ liabilities by ebitda can be seen as a proxy for the cov-
erage of debt by the firm’s market value, for firms belonging to the same business
sector.16 The set of variables also includes firm size, based on the natural logarithm
of real total assets (SIZE). Concerning non-accounting data, age (AGE) and changes
in the number of total employees (CHANGE EMPLOYEES) were also included. Fur-
thermore, business sectors were controlled for, given that financial ratios should be
assessed in conjunction with the nature of the firm and the market in which the firm
operates. Moreover, the literature also highlights that there are relevant differences
in default by business sectors.
In turn, for business risk the proxy was the volatility of cashflow over total assets
(SD CASHFLOW). Banking relationships comprise the number of total relationships,
defined at the banking group level and taking into account the weight of each banking
group in the firm’s total bank debt (BANKING RELATIONSHIPS). The analysis also
includes the absolute change in the number of banking relationships over the year
(CHANGE BANK RELATIONSHIP), as well as the availability of unused credit lines
(CREDIT LINE).
Finally, in order to control for the economic and financial environment, time
dummies were included in the specification, or alternatively the GDP year-on-year
growth rate (GDP) and the average interest rate applied on loans to non-financial
corporations (INT RATE). Table I.1 in the Appendices Section of this Chapter sum-
marizes the definition of each variable. Table I.2 presents the correlation matrix
15In order to avoid potential collinearity in the regressors, a direct measure of profitability was
not included in the specifications. Indeed, in the correlation matrix included in the Appendices Sec-
tion of this Chapter, we can observe that DEBT COVERAGE and INTEREST COVERAGE are highly
correlated with the profitability indicator (PROFITABILITY), measured by operational returns over
total assets.
16Some considerations about the ebitda multiple approach are presented in the footnote 3, in
Section 1.2 Related Literature.
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between the variables.
1.3.3 Descriptive statistics
This sub-section presents some summary statistics of the data set used in this study,
including a breakdown by default and non-default firms and by firms’ size (based
on the recommendation of the European Commission).17 In Table 1.1 we see that
micro and small firms represent most of the data set (around 90 per cent). In turn,
in the sample period, the fraction of default events is small in the total sample,
as well as in each firm’s dimension class. Nonetheless, there is a gradual increase
of this fraction, in general, over the period under analysis, which is in line with
macroeconomic and financial developments, and supports the cyclicality of default
events.
Table 1.1: Sample summary statistics
Total Micro Small Medium Large
# % # % # % # % # %
Year Obs. default Obs. default Obs. default Obs. default Obs. default
2006 58,540 1.9 27,700 1.9 25,782 1.8 4,357 2.2 701 2.0
2007 59,627 2.1 27,923 2.0 26,472 2.1 4,489 2.3 743 3.9
2008 58,209 2.5 27,382 2.6 25,793 2.5 4,327 2.1 707 1.4
2009 54,354 3.0 25,629 2.9 24,068 3.0 4,014 3.1 643 3.0
Average 57,683 2.4 27,159 2.3 25,529 2.4 4,297 2.4 699 2.6
Total 230,730 108,634 102,115 17,187 2,794
The differences between default and non-default firms are illustrated in Table 1.2.
This table has some descriptive statistics of firm characteristics included in the two
groups of firms. It is noteworthy that the sample mean of firm characteristics for the
17According to the European Commission Recommendation of 6 May 2003 (2003/361/EC),
micro firms are defined as those with fewer than 10 employees and less than 2 million euro of
business volume or total assets; small firms are those with fewer than 50 employees and less than
10 million euro of business volume or total assets; medium firms are those with fewer than 250
employees and a business volume below 50 million euros or whose total assets are lower than 43
million euros. All remaining firms are defined as large firms.
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two groups are statistically different according to the Welch test.18 Thus, firms that
do not fulfill their credit commitments seem to present some particular features.
Default firms reveal lower levels of working capital and turnover in comparison
to non-default firms. They also show lower coverage of liabilities and interest by
ebitda, sales growth and employees changes. Moreover, these firms show lower
levels of cashflows and higher volatility. In turn, default firms have significantly
higher leverage ratios. Note that the leverage ratio of the percentile 25 of default
firms is close to the percentile 50 figure of non-default firms. Looking at bank lending
relationships variables, default firms show a lower concentration of total debt, which
means that these firms tend to establish more banking relationships than non-default
firms (or at least, tend to have greater dispersion of credit among their lenders).
Looking at some components underlying working capital and turnover indicators,
default firms have higher levels for the activity indicators, i.e. for accounts payable,
accounts receivable, and inventories indicators. Default firms show lower cash re-
serves, and investment turnover. These firms also present a significantly higher
proportion of tax liabilities over total assets.
Table 1.3 has the mean and median figures of some variables by firm size, given
the potential difference of some of these characteristics by firm dimension, in line
with diversified activity and information opaqueness of firms.
A positive relationship is broadly observed for working capital, while there is no
significant variation for assets turnover. Concerning activity indicators, there is a
negative relationship for inventories and accounts payable, while for accounts re-
ceivable the relationship is not monotonic. Investment turnover seems to present a
U-shape relationship. The same path applies, in general, for the coverage of interest
18The Welch test compares the mean figures between two groups, taking into account possible
differences in the variance of these groups.
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Table 1.2: Descriptive statistics: Non-default versus default firms
Panel A - Non-default firms
mean sd p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
WORKING CAPITAL 0.19 0.42 -0.32 -0.04 0.19 0.45 0.71
TURNOVER 1.42 0.99 0.50 0.78 1.18 1.77 2.59
ACCOUNTS PAYABLE 0.29 0.27 0.03 0.10 0.22 0.38 0.60
ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE 0.23 0.23 0.00 0.03 0.18 0.34 0.51
INVENTORIES 0.36 0.65 0.00 0.03 0.14 0.38 0.88
CASH & EQUIVALENTS 0.28 0.60 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.26 0.69
INVESTMENT TURNOVER 16.46 42.28 1.19 2.44 5.46 13.31 32.99
TAX LIABILITIES 0.05 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.11
SOCIAL SEC. LIABILITIES 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
DEBT COVERAGE 0.20 0.32 -0.03 0.06 0.13 0.26 0.50
INTEREST COVERAGE 105.9 827 -1.1 2.2 5.7 17.2 60.8
LEVERAGE 0.74 0.27 0.40 0.58 0.75 0.88 0.98
SALES GROWTH 0.01 0.27 -0.28 -0.12 0.00 0.12 0.30
CASHFLOW RATIO 0.07 0.12 -0.03 0.02 0.06 0.12 0.19
SD. CASHFLOW 0.06 0.07 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.14
CHANGE-EMPLOYEES 0.03 0.19 -0.17 -0.08 0.00 0.10 0.23
BANKING RELATIONSHIPS 0.71 0.27 0.34 0.49 0.72 1.00 1.00
CHANGE BANK RELATIONSHIP 0.21 0.84 -1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
CREDIT LINE 0.67 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
SIZE 13.32 1.42 11.64 12.34 13.19 14.14 15.17
AGE 2.48 0.84 1.39 1.95 2.56 3.09 3.47
Panel B - Default firms
mean sd p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
WORKING CAPITAL 0.03 0.45 -0.55 -0.23 0.04 0.30 0.61
TURNOVER 0.86 0.71 0.28 0.44 0.68 1.05 1.59
ACCOUNTS PAYABLE 0.58 0.45 0.08 0.25 0.49 0.80 1.22
ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE 0.33 0.31 0.00 0.06 0.26 0.49 0.78
INVENTORIES 0.51 0.91 0.00 0.02 0.17 0.56 1.41
CASH & EQUIVALENTS 0.12 0.29 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.09 0.33
INVESTMENT TURNOVER 11.93 37.94 0.63 1.25 2.86 7.64 21.50
TAX LIABILITIES 0.13 0.14 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.18 0.33
SOCIAL SEC. LIABILITIES 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.12
DEBT COVERAGE 0.07 0.20 -0.12 -0.02 0.06 0.13 0.23
INTEREST COVERAGE 25.41 447 -5.78 -0.58 1.91 5.04 14.39
LEVERAGE 0.92 0.28 0.62 0.76 0.88 1.00 1.25
SALES GROWTH -0.13 0.35 -0.57 -0.33 -0.12 0.05 0.26
CASHFLOW RATIO 0.00 0.14 -0.16 -0.05 0.02 0.06 0.13
SD. CASHFLOW 0.08 0.09 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.10 0.18
CHANGE-EMPLOYEES -0.05 0.21 -0.29 -0.17 -0.06 0.00 0.20
BANKING RELATIONSHIPS 0.58 0.25 0.28 0.38 0.52 0.80 1.00
CHANGE BANK RELATIONSHIP 0.02 0.99 -1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
CREDIT LINE 0.60 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
SIZE 13.60 1.37 12.05 12.68 13.42 14.37 15.43
AGE 2.45 0.78 1.39 1.95 2.48 3.00 3.43
Note: sd stands for standard deviation. p10, p25, p50, p75, and p90 stand for, respectively, the
percentiles 10, 25, 50, 75, and 90 of the distribution of each variable.
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by ebitda. In turn, a negative relationship is observed between firm size and lever-
age, tax liabilities, cashflow volatility (even though small), as well as weighted bank
relationships. Debt coverage and sales growth show a positive relationship with firm
size.
Table 1.3: General statistics description by firm dimension
Micro Small Medium Large
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
WORKING CAPITAL 0.16 0.17 0.21 0.20 0.22 0.20 0.20 0.18
TURNOVER 1.42 1.16 1.41 1.18 1.39 1.17 1.38 1.19
ACCOUNTS PAYABLE 0.30 0.21 0.30 0.24 0.27 0.23 0.23 0.20
ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE 0.21 0.15 0.25 0.21 0.24 0.22 0.21 0.19
INVENTORIES 0.42 0.16 0.32 0.13 0.25 0.14 0.21 0.12
CASH & EQUIVALENTS 0.30 0.09 0.26 0.08 0.21 0.05 0.23 0.04
INVESTMENT TURNOVER 18.51 5.68 14.49 5.27 13.48 4.64 18.22 5.03
TAX LIABILITIES 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.02
LEVERAGE 0.77 0.78 0.72 0.74 0.69 0.71 0.67 0.69
DEBT COVERAGE 0.19 0.12 0.21 0.13 0.23 0.14 0.28 0.16
INTEREST COVERAGE 106.4 5.7 94.9 5.6 122.9 5.2 223.3 6.2
SALES GROWTH -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02
CASHFLOW RATIO 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.07
SD CASHFLOW 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.03
CHANGE-EMPLOYEES 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.01
BANKING RELATIONSHIPS 0.78 0.89 0.67 0.63 0.52 0.46 0.50 0.42
Note: Firm size is defined according to the European Commission Recommendation of May 2003
(2003/361/EC). Mean and Median figures are based on the distribution of each variable.
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1.4 Econometric analysis
1.4.1 Econometric specification
The econometric approach adopted in this study relies on a logit model for panel
data. The dependent variable, di,t, is a dummy variable that takes the value one if
firm i, in period t, presents a credit default event and zero otherwise. This variable
is related to another latent unobserved random variable, d∗i,t, which can be defined
as:





where the error term, εi,t, conditional on xi,t, and zt, follows a logistic distribution.
xi,t is the set of time-varying specific characteristics of firm i, while zt is time specific
variables.
If we have di,t = 1 if d
∗
i,t > 0 and zero otherwise, we obtain:
Prob (di,t = 1 | xi,t; zt) = Prob
(
















where, Prob (di,t = 1|xi,t; zt) is the probability of default of firm i in period t, and
F (.) is the cumulative probability function of the error term, εi,t.
The variable d∗i,t can be seen as a function of the firm’s losses, such that if it
is greater than zero (or if the losses exceed a given threshold) the firm defaults.
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As shown above, the probability of default is defined as a function of the firm’s
characteristics (xi,t), and some factors common to all firms (zt).
The logit model uses the maximum likelihood methodology and the characteristics
of firms that have survived and failed to efficiently determine the optimal weight of
each explanatory variable in an index of likelihood of failure, which is then mapped
into a probability between 0 and 1. The model estimated was based on unbalanced
panel data, with random effects.19
1.5 Econometric Results
1.5.1 Do activity indicators and tax liabilities contain rele-
vant information?
The analysis carried out above shows a significant difference between default and
non-default firms. In particular, we observe differences regarding operational man-
agement. In this Section we intend to corroborate some of these findings through
econometric analysis. For this purpose we focus on new episodes of default, i.e. we
exclude from the data set observations that recorded default events in two consecu-
tive years.20 The underlying idea of this option is to identity the main characteristics
of firms that may justify transaction events, e.g. transaction from a regular position
to a default event.
We begin by presenting the results for a baseline specification that includes work-
19Note that it would not be possible to adopt a firm fixed-effect specification, as some variables
under analysis are constant at the firm level. Moreover, this approach would collapse the data set
to firms that changed their position in the sample period, excluding from the analysis firms that
did not record default events. It is important to include these firms in the analysis in order to
observe their characteristics, and so the main patterns of firms that default and those that do not.
20This demanded the exclusion of around of 1,500 observations.
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ing capital and turnover in the set of explanatory variables. The results are pre-
sented in Models 1 and 2 of Table 1.4. For each model, the first column presents the
estimated coefficient, while the second column shows the average marginal effects.
We observe that WORKING CAPITAL is statistically significant with a negative
coefficient, meaning that firms with higher liquidity tend to present lower proba-
bilities of default. TURNOVER also presents a negative and statistically significant
coefficient. Thus, firms with higher operational efficiency have lower default proba-
bilities.
Looking at the other firm characteristics included in the analysis, LEVERAGE
shows a positive coefficient, in line with the results reported in the literature (e.g.
Bonfim (2009), Bhimani et al. (2010), Bunn & Redwood (2003), and Benito et al.
(2004)). This suggests that firms whose assets are highly financed by external fund-
ing sources have a higher probability of default. This indicates that these firms are
more vulnerable, i.e. they have lower ability to overcome a negative shock, such as
lower profits (or even losses). DEBT COVERAGE shows a negative and statistically
significant relationship with default probability, while INTEREST COVERAGE is not
statistically significant. These results suggest that the higher the ability of a firm
to generate funds internally, ceteris paribus, the probability of default is lower.21 A
negative coefficient was found for SALES GROWTH, which seeks to capture corpo-
rate potential growth.22 CHANGE EMPLOYEES, which may be more deeply related
21Lacerda & Moro (2008) found some evidence supporting a non-monotonic effect for the interest
coverage variable. However, the results of the specifications with dummy variables based on the
quartiles of the interest coverage’s distribution do not support this fact. We found a monotonic
impact, i.e. the probability of default decreases as interest coverage ratio increases. Additionally,
due to the low coefficients obtained, and the sample distribution, namely the tails’ levels, we
redefined the interest coverage variable, winsorizing the observations below/above the percentile
10/90 at these figures. The magnitude of the coefficient obtained for this variable increased, as
expected. However, the conclusions of the analysis continued to hold. Given these findings, in
the remaining analysis in this Chapter, we preserve the initial definition of the interest coverage
variable.
22As mentioned, sales growth is related with a firm’s growth opportunities. However, high
growth rates may reflect excessive risk taking. This argument suggests that strong sales growth
rates can be positively related with firms distress. However, the analysis of the impact of different
percentiles of the sales growth distribution does not suggest this situation, i.e. we find a monotonic
21
Chapter 1. Corporate credit risk
with a firm’s growth, shows a similar relationship. These results suggest that firms
with higher growth opportunities have lower probability of default.23 AGE shows
a negative and statistically significant coefficient, which means that younger firms
have higher probability of default. Corporate size, measured by real total assets,
shows a positive and statistically significant coefficient. As larger firms are typically
perceived with lower risk, this result is somewhat counterintuitive.24 However, some
studies also found a positive relationship between default and firm size (e.g. Bonfim
(2009), Bhimani et al. (2010), and Benito et al. (2004)).
As far as bank lending relationships variables are concerned, BANKING RELA-
TIONSHIPS have a negative coefficient, which suggests that firms with a higher con-
centration of bank debt also present lower default probability. These findings are
in line with empirical studies that argue that firms with higher credit quality tend
to establish fewer lending relationships or, at least, preserve a main relationship, as
discussed in Farinha & Santos (2002). However, regarding the dynamics of the total
number of lending relationships in each year (CHANGE BANK REL), the estimated
coefficient is negative. Thus, firms that increase the number of relationships tend to
show lower probability of default. It should be mentioned that the two results are
not contradictory. A firm may increase the number of banking relationships without
major changes in the importance of its main lenders (and then without sizable effect
on the concentration index). Firms with unused credit lines (CREDIT LINES) tend
to present lower default probabilities. This result suggests that firms have available
funds to overcome unfavorable events (that could lead to default). However, the
bank lending relationship variables may be related to a firm’s creditworthiness, in
the sense that it is expected that banks provide credit (or credit lines) to firms that
impact of sales growth on default probability.
23It should be noted that even though sales growth and employees changes may both be related
to firm’s growth opportunities, the correlation between these variables is not high, as can be seen
in the correlation matrix presented in the Appendices Section of this Chapter.
24AGE may also be capturing part of the firm’s credit quality, and its estimates are in line with
a priori expectations, i.e. it shows a negative relationship with a firm’s probability of default.
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are assessed as “good credit quality” firms. This potential relationship is addressed
in the robustness section of this Chapter.
The business risk, measured by the volatility of cashflow over total assets, shows
a positive and statistically significant coefficient. Firms whose cash flows are more
volatile, as expected, have higher probabilities of default.
Following the literature that highlights the relevance of global developments, time
dummies were also included (Model 1). These variables are all statistically signifi-
cant and jointly relevant, supporting the contribution of global factors in determin-
ing default events. According to these variables, the progressive deterioration in
the macroeconomic and financial environment observed in the sample period had a
negative impact on default probability. Therefore, common factors related to the
global conditions affect the probability of default in addition to the firm’s idiosyn-
cratic components. If we try to disentangle the time dummies in some economic
drivers, despite the very short period under analysis, we find that the probability of
default decreases with the GDP growth but increases with the average interest rate
applied on bank credit granted to non-financial corporations (Model 2).25
Finally, as mentioned above, all the specifications include business sector dum-
mies, given the structural differences between economic activity sectors. For simplic-
ity, the coefficients of these variables are not presented in the tables. Even though
they were not all individually statistically significant, the relevance of their inclusion
in the econometric regressions was confirmed by the statistical tests.26 This result
is in line with the findings highlighted in Antunes & Martinho (2012), namely the
25The hypothesis of equality of GDP growth and average interest rate coefficients was rejected
by statistical tests.
26Note that the objective of the current study is to identify the relevance of some firm charac-
teristics in determining the probability of default. The goal was not to estimate the probability
of default firm by firm. If this were the case, and given the relevance of business sectors in deter-
mining firm’s specific features, it would be relevant, for instance, to perform the analysis sector by
sector in order to obtain specific coefficients for each variable in each business sector.
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heterogeneity across business sectors regarding credit quality.
Models 3 and 4 of Table 1.5 present the results of the specifications in which
working capital and turnover are replaced by the variables related with cash reserves,
accounts receivable, accounts payable, inventories, investment turnover, and tax
liabilities.
The activity indicators, namely accounts payable, accounts receivable, and inven-
tories, have positive and statistically significant coefficients. These results suggest
that firms that take longer to repay their suppliers, firms that wait longer to be paid
by their customers, and firms that build up inventories for longer periods present
higher probabilities of default. In turn, firms with more cash reserves present lower
probability of default. The result is in line with the empirical literature on credit
default (such as Benito et al. (2004), and Lacerda & Moro (2008)).27 Investment
turnover also presents a negative and statistically significant coefficient. Finally, the
share of tax liabilities has a positive and statistically significant coefficient. There-
fore, firms with higher shares of those liabilities tend to have higher probabilities of
default.
Looking at the average marginal effects, accounts payable and tax liabilities are
worthy of mention, with greater impacts on the firm’s probability of default (based
on a one standard-deviation increase). The results suggest that these variables are
closely related to a firm’s financial fragility, and consequently firm’s creditworthiness.
The remaining variables included as regressors preserve the results discussed
above. Table I.3 in the Appendices Section of this Chapter presents the estimated
coefficients for all variables (in line with the structure presented in Table 1.4).
27Nevertheless, it should be noted that Acharya et al. (2012) argue that an increase in cash
holdings may induce higher risk in medium/long run. The authors claim that riskier firms may
choose to hold higher cash reserves as a buffer against possible cashflow shortfalls in the future.
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Finally, note that the inclusion of the breakdown of working capital and turnover
improves the general performance of the regressions in comparison to the baseline
models (Models 1 and 2).
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Table 1.4: Logit regression - Dependent variable: default
Model 1 Model 2
Coef. Marg. Eff. Coef. Marg. Eff.
WORKING CAPITAL -0.3298*** -0.0030*** -0.2999*** -0.0028***
(-5.68) (-5.43) (-5.21) (-5.00)
TURNOVER -1.2003*** -0.0111*** -1.1995*** -0.0113***
(-26.62) (-15.14) (-26.70) (-15.29)
LEVERAGE 1.6575*** 0.0153*** 1.6717*** 0.0157***
(18.13) (14.48) (18.39) (14.75)
DEBT COVERAGE -0.5434*** -0.0050*** -0.5478*** -0.0051***
(-4.04) (-3.90) (-4.08) (-3.94)
INTEREST COVERAGE 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.38) (0.38) (0.39) (0.39)
SD CASHFLOW 2.1177*** 0.0195*** 2.1026*** 0.0198***
(8.55) (7.93) (8.54) (7.94)
SALES GROWTH -0.8297*** -0.0076*** -0.8203*** -0.0077***
(-12.35) (-10.43) (-12.25) (-10.40)
SIZE 0.0744*** 0.0007*** 0.0730*** 0.0007***
(4.17) (4.14) (4.11) (4.09)
AGE -0.3929*** -0.0036*** -0.3961*** -0.0037***
(-12.67) (-10.32) (-12.81) (-10.46)
CHANGE EMPLOYEES -1.2849*** -0.0118*** -1.2848*** -0.0121***
(-11.63) (-9.75) (-11.65) (-9.81)
CREDIT LINES -0.6156*** -0.0057*** -0.6092*** -0.0057***
(-13.23) (-12.69) (-13.16) (-12.69)
BANKING RELATIONSHIPS -2.6191*** -0.0241*** -2.6129*** -0.0245***
(-28.46) (-16.39) (-28.57) (-16.55)
CHANGE BANK REL -0.2494*** -0.0023*** -0.2477*** -0.0023***
(-11.89) (-9.93) (-11.81) (-9.92)
Time dummies yes
Macroeconomic controls yes
Nr. of Observations 195,329 195,329
Nr. of Firms 72,649 72,649
Log likelihood -14,043.2 -14,054.6
Pseudo-R2 0.158 0.158
Wald Chi2 2,960.2 3,004.9




Note: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance levels at 1, 5, and 10 per cent, respectively. All models estimated
using a random-effects logit estimator, where the dependent variable, default, is a binary variable related to credit
overdue. Z-scores are presented in parentheses. The first column of each Model presents the estimated coefficients,
while the second column shows the marginal effects, namely the average marginal effects, assuming as baseline firms
with credit lines. In all regressions a constant and business sector dummies were included. The Pseudo-R2 is a
measure of goodness of the fit, being computed as function of the models log-likelihood and of the log-likelihood of
the constant-only model, for the sub-sample used in each estimation. The Wald test evaluates the overall statistical
significance of the estimated coefficients. Rho measures the proportion of the total variance resulting from the
panel-level variance component. If Rho is zero, the panel-level variance is not relevant and the panel estimator is
not different from the pooled estimator. BIC stands for the Schwarz’s Bayesian Information Criterion, while AIC
stands for the Akaike Information Criterion.
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Table 1.5: Logit regression - Dependent variable: default - Activity indicators
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Coef. Marg. Eff. Coef. Marg. Eff. Coef. Marg. Eff. Coef. Marg. Eff.
WORKING CAPITAL -0.3298*** -0.0030*** -0.2999*** -0.0028***
(-5.68) (-5.43) (-5.21) (-5.00)
TURNOVER -1.2003*** -0.0111*** -1.1995*** -0.0113***
(-26.62) (-15.14) (-26.70) (-15.29)
ACCOUNTS PAYABLE 1.7279*** 0.0141*** 1.7189*** 0.0143***
(28.23) (18.14) (28.36) (18.34)
ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE 0.3068*** 0.0025*** 0.3023*** 0.0025***
(3.63) (3.58) (3.59) (3.55)
INVENTORIES 0.0995*** 0.0008*** 0.0985*** 0.0008***
(4.00) (3.94) (3.99) (3.93)
CASH & EQUIVALENTS -0.3139*** -0.0026*** -0.3107*** -0.0026***
(-3.08) (-3.04) (-3.06) (-3.02)
INVESTMENT TURNOVER -0.0034*** -0.0000*** -0.0034*** -0.0000***
(-4.61) (-4.48) (-4.59) (-4.46)
TAX LIABILITIES 6.5032*** 0.0530*** 6.4309*** 0.0536***
(32.61) (19.80) (32.75) (20.00)
Other firm controls yes yes yes yes
Sectoral dummies yes yes yes yes
Time dummies yes no yes no
Macroeconomic controls no yes no yes
Nr. of Observations 195,329 195,329 195,329 195,329
Nr. of Firms 72,649 72,649 72,649 72,649
Log-likelihood -14,043.2 -14,054.6 -13,353.2 -13,367.7
Pseudo-R2 0.158 0.158 0.200 0.199
Wald Chi2 2,960.2 3,004.9 2,981.6 3,053.8
Prob > Chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Rho 0.24 0.23 0.31 0.30
BIC 28,452 28,463 27,121 27,137
AIC 28,146 28,167 26,774 26,801
Note: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance levels at 1, 5, and 10 per cent, respectively. All models estimated
using a random-effects logit estimator, where the dependent variable, default, is a binary variable related to credit
overdue. Z-scores are presented in parentheses. The first column of each Model presents the estimated coefficients,
while the second column shows the marginal effects, namely the average marginal effects, assuming as baseline firms
with credit lines. In all regressions a constant and business sector dummies were included. The Pseudo-R2 is a
measure of goodness of the fit, being computed as function of the models log-likelihood and of the log-likelihood of
the constant-only model, for the sub-sample used in each estimation. The Wald test evaluates the overall statistical
significance of the estimated coefficients. Rho measures the proportion of the total variance resulting from the
panel-level variance component. If Rho is zero, the panel-level variance is not relevant and the panel estimator is
not different from the pooled estimator. BIC stands for the Schwarz’s Bayesian Information Criterion, while AIC
stands for the Akaike Information Criterion.
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1.5.2 Heterogeneity by firm size
Firm size has usually been associated with activity diversification, which may affect
the firm’s ability to react to idiosyncratic and external shocks. Moreover, it is also
related to the available information, and is therefore a proxy for firm’s information
opaqueness to general economic agents. The uniqueness of the data set used in this
study allows a deeper analysis of corporate segments. Against this background we
ran the previous specifications partitioning the sample by firm dimension.28 Table
1.6 presents the main results under this set up (the estimates for all variables are
presented in Table I.4 in the Appendices Section).
In general, the results described for the full sample apply for micro and small
firms, as illustrated in Panel A, even though with some exceptions. Looking at
the specification that includes the decomposition of working capital and turnover
(Model 2 for each size cohorts), the activity indicators and tax liabilities are relevant
variables in determining the probability of a default event. However, for micro firms
accounts receivable and cash reserves are not statistically significant. Comparing
the two models, the specifications with the breakdown improve the performance of
the baseline specifications.
For firms classified in the medium and large classes, presented in Panel B, some
variables lost statistical significance, notably in the case of larger firms. For medium
firms, and as far as decomposition of working capital and turnover is concerned,
accounts payable and tax liabilities are statistically significant, with positive coef-
ficients. However, unlike the results in the other regressions, accounts receivable
shows a negative and statistically significant coefficient. For large firms, fewer vari-
ables are statistically significant. Given the specificities of these firms, the results
28In this analysis only regressions with the time dummies are presented, since the coefficients
of the variables under analysis were very similar to those obtained in specifications with macroe-
conomic variables (due to short-time dimension of the data set), and the overall performance of
the two models did not present sizeable differences.
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suggest that accounting data are less informative among large firms. This fact may
be underlying the weak statistics properties recorded in these specifications.
The results obtained by the firm’s size class confirm the heterogeneity between
firms, since the relevance of some variables changes across size cohorts. The informa-
tion underlying the working capital and turnover indicators, notably the accounts
payable and the share of tax liabilities seem to be especially relevant for default
probabilities in the segment of smaller firms.
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Table 1.6: Logit regression by firm dimension - Dependent variable: default
(Continues)
Panel A - Micro and small firms
Micro Small
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Coef. Mar.Eff Coef. Mar.Eff Coef. Mar.Eff Coef. Mar.Eff
WORKING CAPITAL -0.2815*** -0.0026*** -0.4038*** -0.004***
(-3.38) (-3.23) (-4.64) (-4.39)
TURNOVER -0.9336*** -0.0085*** -1.3256*** -0.0130***
(-13.64) (-8.24) (-18.33) (-10.44)
ACCOUNTS PAYABLE 1.2460*** 0.0094*** 1.9002*** 0.0159***
(14.17) (9.89) (20.24) (12.94)
ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE 0.0801 0.0006 0.2598** 0.0022**
(0.65) (0.65) (2.08) (2.05)
INVENTORIES 0.0671* 0.0005* 0.1102*** 0.0009***
(1.91) (1.90) (2.98) (2.95)
CASH & EQUIVALENTS -0.1281 -0.0010 -0.9161*** -0.0077***
(-1.05) (-1.05) (-4.60) (-4.38)
INVESTMENT TURNOVER -0.0030*** -0.0000*** -0.0040*** -0.0000***
(-3.08) (-2.98) (-3.28) (-3.17)
TAX LIABILITIES 7.2637*** 0.0550*** 6.6968*** 0.0562***
(22.49) (12.34) (21.82) (13.83)
Other firm controls yes yes yes yes
Sectoral dummies yes yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes yes yes
Nr. of Observations 83,562 83,562 92,953 92,953
Nr. of Firms 38,969 38,969 35,995 35,995
Log-likelihood -6,063.7 -5,700.8 -6,624.8 -6,262.2
Pseudo-R2 0.155 0.206 0.171 0.216
Wald Chi2 1,248.6 1,161.7 1,374.7 1,330.0
Prob > Chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Rho 0.22 0.32 0.23 0.32
BIC 12,467 11,787 13,593 12,913
AIC 12,187 11,470 13,310 12,592
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(Table 1.6 Continued)
Panel B - Medium and large firms
Medium Large
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Coef. Mar.Eff Coef. Mar.Eff Coef. Mar.Eff Coef. Mar.Eff
WORKING CAPITAL -1.1330*** -0.0116*** 0.7042 0.0072
(-4.41) (-3.92) (1.07) (0.97)
TURNOVER -1.9127*** -0.0196*** -1.0691** -0.0109*
(-8.78) (-5.66) (-2.53) (-1.87)
ACCOUNTS PAYABLE 3.2408*** 0.0307*** 2.3131*** 0.0219***
(10.06) (7.07) (2.69) (2.67)
ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE -0.7111* -0.0067* 2.4170** 0.0229
(-1.82) (-1.76) (2.17) (1.60)
INVENTORIES -0.1671 -0.0016 0.2420 0.0023
(-0.99) (-0.99) (0.48) (0.48)
CASH & EQUIVALENTS -0.7762 -0.0073 0.5171 0.0049
(-0.99) (-0.98) (1.51) (1.25)
INVESTMENT TURNOVER -0.0034 -0.0000 -0.0032 -0.0000
(-0.88) (-0.86) (-0.54) (-0.53)
TAX LIABILITIES 6.5764*** 0.0622*** 1.7118 0.0162
(8.16) (6.23) (0.35) (0.35)
Other firm controls yes yes yes yes
Sectoral dummies yes yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes yes yes
Nr. of Observations 16,204 16,204 2,610 2,610
Nr. of Firms 5,951 5,951 906 906
Log-likelihood -986.0 -946.4 -139.6 -132.5
Pseudo-R2 0.258 0.288 0.289 0.325
Wald Chi2 287.1 270.3 67.4 67.3
Prob > Chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Rho 0.21 0.25 0.05 0.10
BIC 2,263 2,222 515 533
AIC 2,032 1,961 339 333
Note: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance levels at 1, 5, and 10 per cent, respectively. All models estimated
using a random-effects logit estimator, where the dependent variable, default, is a binary variable related to credit
overdue. Z-scores are presented in parentheses. The first column of each Model presents the estimated coefficients,
while the second column shows the marginal effects, namely the average marginal effects, assuming as baseline firms
with credit lines. In all regressions a constant and business sector dummies were included. The Pseudo-R2 is a
measure of goodness of the fit, being computed as function of the models log-likelihood and of the log-likelihood of
the constant-only model, for the sub-sample used in each estimation. The Wald test evaluates the overall statistical
significance of the estimated coefficients. Rho measures the proportion of the total variance resulting from the
panel-level variance component. If Rho is zero, the panel-level variance is not relevant and the panel estimator is
not different from the pooled estimator. BIC stands for the Schwarz’s Bayesian Information Criterion, while AIC
stands for the Akaike Information Criterion.
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1.5.3 Determinants versus predictors of default
The previous results highlight the relevance of activity indicators, investment turnover,
cash reserves, and tax liabilities in estimating a firm’s probability of default. In this
sub-section we re-estimate the specifications presented above, but now including as
regressors the firm-specific variables with a lag instead of the contemporaneous ones
(with exception of age).
This approach allows us to check if these variables play a role as predictors of
default events. In other words, in this specification we investigate if a default event
can be influenced by the characteristics of firms at the end of the previous year,
t− 1. This specification may also be useful, as accounting data are obtained with a
significant delay. Even though a close banking relationship may minimize the lack of
updated information about the firm’s performance, some data are not disclosed in a
timely way (there is a considerable delay in obtaining accounting data). Moreover,
this approach allows us to minimize potential contemporaneous issues in the previ-
ous specifications related with a firm’s creditworthiness and the respective financial
position at the end of each year. The main results of this approach are presented in
Table 1.7.
According to the results obtained, the general conclusions already discussed re-
main valid in terms of statistical significance and the relationship of each variable
with the firm’s default probability. Nevertheless, there are some exceptions. Looking
at the specification with the decomposition of working capital and turnover (Model
2), accounts receivable is not significant. Accounts payable and inventories vari-
ables, those activity indicators that can be deeply related to a firm’s decisions, show
positive and significant coefficients. Therefore, firms with higher levels for these
variables tend to have higher probability of default in the following year. Cash re-
serves and investment turnover continue to present a negative relationship with the
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probability of default. In turn, the share of tax liabilities retains a positive and
statistically significant coefficient. Thus, firms with higher shares of tax liabilities
have a higher probability of default in the following year.
Looking at the impacts of each variable on a firm’s probability of default (based
on an increase of one standard-deviation), cash reserves and investment turnover
reinforced their relevance, in comparison to the previous specifications. This analysis
also confirms the importance of accounts payable and the share of tax liabilities on
a firm’s probability of default. Thus, these variables seem to be relevant indicators
of a firm’s financial vulnerabilities, and its credit risk.
For the remaining explanatory variables, there are also some differences. In these
specifications changes in the number of banking relationships shows a positive and
statistically significant coefficient. This result suggests that firms that changed the
number of lending relationships have higher probabilities of default in the following
year. It thus seems that firms look for other lenders when they face some financial
challenges. For simplicity, the estimates for these variables are presented in Table
I.5, in the Appendices Section.
It is noteworthy that the variable related to tax liabilities, as it is assessed at
the end of each year, could reflect the firm’s activity and the regular (and allowed)
schedule of tax payments. However, the results of this specification, which takes a
lag for the explanatory variables, minimize this argument to some extent. Indeed,
the coefficient is positive and statistically significant even with a lag. Moreover, it is
worth noticing again that in the econometric analysis we include only new default
episodes. Therefore, we do not have in the analysis firms with high shares of tax
liabilities and already a bank credit default event.
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Tax liabilities
In the previous specifications, tax liabilities over total assets showed to be a
relevant indicator in the analysis. Against this background we explore more deeply
the role of this component.
We decompose tax liabilities in tax related with Social Security (at overdue) and
the remaining taxes (TLSS, and TLOTHER, respectively), having in mind that the
failure of commitments in Social Security taxes may be related to financial difficulties
for a firm (in particular if employees’ contributions are involved). Model 3 in Table
1.7 presents the results under this conjecture.29
In this specification the new variables are statistically significant and both show
positive coefficients, especially the variable related with Social Security taxes. For
the remanning explanatory variables the results described above continue to hold.
Thus, firms with higher levels of Social Security taxes over total assets have higher
probabilities of default in the following year.
29In this specification we used total liabilities instead of short-term, given that the breakdown
by debt maturity was not available for the tax components under analysis. However, this procedure
should not have any great impact on the analysis, given that a high share of total tax liabilities
has short-term maturity.
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Table 1.7: Logit regression - Dependent variable: default - with lag regressors
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coef. Marg. Eff. Coef. Marg. Eff. Coef. Marg. Eff.




ACCOUNTS PAYABLEt−1 1.4550*** 0.0177*** 1.4223*** 0.0174***
(17.89) (11.76) (17.46) (11.72)
ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLEt−1 -0.1537 -0.0019 -0.1546 -0.0019
(-1.32) (-1.32) (-1.33) (-1.32)
INVENTORIESt−1 0.1239*** 0.0015*** 0.1247*** 0.0015***
(3.69) (3.61) (3.71) (3.63)
CASH & EQUIVALENTSt−1 -0.5727*** -0.0070*** -0.5219*** -0.0064***
(-3.91) (-3.74) (-3.60) (-3.47)
INVESTMENT TURNOVERt−1 -0.0045*** -0.0001*** -0.0045*** -0.0001***
(-3.65) (-3.50) (-3.66) (-3.52)
TAX LIABILITIESt−1 5.5371*** 0.0673***
(20.40) (13.19)
SOCIAL SEC. LIABILITIESt−1 9.6421*** 0.1178***
(16.17) (11.94)
OTHER TAXESt−1 4.5341*** 0.0554***
(14.71) (11.34)
Other firm controls yes yes yes
Sectoral dummies yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes yes
Nr. of Observations 119,553 119,553 119,553
Nr. of Firms 54,003 54,003 54,003
Log-likelihood -8,731.5 -8,615.9 -8,587
Pseudo-R2 0.129 0.141 0.143
Wald Chi2 1,666.5 1,645.6 1,675.9
Prob > Chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00
Rho 0.05 0.14 0.14
BIC 17,802 17,618 17,572
AIC 17,521 17,298 17,243
Note: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance levels at 1, 5, and 10 per cent, respectively. All models estimated
using a random-effects logit estimator, where the dependent variable, default, is a binary variable related to credit
overdue. Z-scores are presented in parentheses. The first column of each Model presents the estimated coefficients,
while the second column shows the marginal effects, namely the average marginal effects, assuming as baseline firms
with credit lines. In all regressions a constant and business sector dummies were included. The Pseudo-R2 is a
measure of goodness of the fit, being computed as function of the models log-likelihood and of the log-likelihood of
the constant-only model, for the sub-sample used in each estimation. The Wald test evaluates the overall statistical
significance of the estimated coefficients. Rho measures the proportion of the total variance resulting from the
panel-level variance component. If Rho is zero, the panel-level variance is not relevant and the panel estimator is
not different from the pooled estimator. BIC stands for the Schwarz’s Bayesian Information Criterion, while AIC
stands for the Akaike Information Criterion.
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1.6 Robustness tests
In this section we performed some robustness tests in order to check how the previous
results were influenced by some of the hypotheses adopted.
First, we tested the impact of bank lending relationship variables on the results.
Namely we ran an alternative set of regressions in which the direct firm-bank vari-
ables were not included as explanatory variables, i.e. variables related with credit
lines, number of banking relationships and its dynamics over time. As mentioned
above, this test is related to the possible link between banks’ decisions (reflected in
the firm-bank variables) and the firm’s financial position. The results obtained for
the core variables under analysis remained valid in this framework. Tables I.6 and
I.7 in the Appendices Section present the results for this approach.
In another robustness exercise we re-estimate the specifications including the cash
conversion cycle (CASH CYCLE), defined as accounts receivable (days) + inventories
(days) - accounts payable (days), instead of the three activity indicators individually,
i.e. accounts receivable, accounts payable, and inventories. According to the esti-
mates this variable was not statistically significant. We also ran some specifications
that included general government in net terms (GOVERNMENT NET POSITION), de-
fined as liabilities net of assets position over total assets, i.e. taking into account
assets and liabilities components simultaneously. The results remained unchanged
overall. The results of these robustness tests are presented in Tables I.8 and I.9 in
the Appendices Section.
Finally, and as far as the econometric method is concerned, all the regressions
presented in previous sections were re-estimated, applying the logit model with stan-
dard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity (robust errors) and clustered at the firm
level, instead of the panel data approach. The conclusions discussed before remained
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broadly valid. Namely, the effect of the core variables under analysis in this study
retained the sign and statistical significance regarding the probability of default.
Moreover, the performance of the econometric specifications also improved with
the decomposition of working capital and turnover indicators. The results of this
econometric approach are presented in Tables I.10 to I.12, in the Appendices Section.
1.7 Final Remarks
In this study we analyzed the relationship of several firm characteristics and the
respective credit risk. We sought to identify the potential impact of a firm’s opera-
tional management and efficiency on its probability of default, controlling for other
variables. We performed this analysis on a large data set for firm-bank registers,
based on Central Balance Sheet and Central Credit Register databases, which al-
lows for a high coverage of the exposures of the Portuguese banking system to the
corporate sector. The sample period is from 2006 to 2009.
Liquidity indicators and turnover are usually identified as relevant variables in
the credit risk literature. However, they can reflect different firms’ production man-
agement and efficiency. According to the results obtained, the decomposition of
these variables into variables related directly with cash reserves, activity indicators,
investment turnover, and tax liabilities contains additional information regarding
firms’ financial fragilities. In particular, firms that take longer to repay their suppli-
ers, firms that wait longer to be paid by their customers, and firms whose purchases
stay longer as inventories have higher probabilities of default. We also found a
positive relationship between a firm’s credit risk and the share of tax liabilities.
Therefore, based on these results, the operational cycle of a firm and especially the
share of tax liabilities are relevant indicators in the analysis of the probability of
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bank credit default. The results obtained also broadly highlight the impact of other
financial and non-financial firm characteristics on the probability of default, in line
with earlier studies on corporate credit risk.
This analysis was based on ex post credit risk, i.e. situations in which we observe
if firms had indeed defaulted or not. This allows us to characterize the financial
position and other characteristics of firms that defaulted. Nevertheless, the specifi-
cations that include as explanatory variables firm’s characteristics with a lag period
confirmed the relevance of some firm’s characteristics on its probability of default.
The variables related to accounts payable and tax liabilities should be highlighted.
Furthermore, the breakdown of tax liabilities allowed us to verify that Social Security
taxes also seem to be a relevant indicator related with firms’ financial fragility.
Broadly, the results suggest that the firm’s operational cycle is an important
component related to corporate financial health. Moreover, the results stress the
relationship between tax liabilities measures and financial soundness/vulnerability
of firms. Therefore, based on these findings, the analysis of corporate credit risk
should also take into account these indicators.
Moreover, the analysis and results presented in this Chapter raise several ques-
tions in corporate finance and credit risk. For instance, how do firms decide on their
default events? In which lenders do firms default more often or at first stage? Based
on the “pecking order” theory, which establishes a hierarchy in a firm’s funding
sources (Myers (1984)), can we talk about a kind of “pecking order” in default? The
relevance of these questions for credit risk assessment, and also for policy decisions
(with a focus on the corporate sector), suggests that these topics should be on the
agenda for further work, even though there may be considerable constraints, as the
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Table I.1: Variables definition
Variable Definition
Dependent variable
DEFAULT Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm has payments in delay
at least longer than 3 months in bank credit
Firm’s characteristics
WORKING CAPITAL Current assets net of short-term liabilities over total assets
TURNOVER Sales over total assets
DEBT COVERAGE Earning before interest, depreciation, and amortization over total debt
INTEREST COVERAGE Earning before interests, depreciation, and amortization over interest paid
LEVERAGE Total debt over total assets
SD CASHFLOW Standard deviation of cashflow over total assets
SALES GROWTH Sales growth defined as the difference of the natural logarithm of real sales
SIZE Natural logarithm of real total assets
AGE Natural logarithm of (1 + age in years)
CHANGE EMPLOYEES Change of the number of employees in the year
CASH AND EQUIVALENTS Cash and equivalents over total debt
ACCOUNTS PAYABLE Total trade credit over (purchases of goods for resale, raw materials,
secondary and consumable supplies & external services)
ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE Total trade credits to customers over sales
INVENTORIES Inventories over cost of goods sold
INVESTMENT TURNOVER Sales over investment
TAX LIABILITIES Short-term tax liabilities over total assets
SOCIAL SECURITY TAXES Social security liabilities (overdue) over total assets
OTHER TAXES Other taxes rather Social security liabilities (overdue) over total assets
BUSINESS SECTORS Dummy variables for business sectors (13 sectors)
Banking relationships
BANKING RELATIONSHIPS Number of banking relationships defined at the banking group level, based
on the relevance of each group in firm’s total banking debt
CHANGE BANK REL Changes in the number of independent banking relationships in the year
CREDIT LINE Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm has unused credit lines
Macroeconomic variables
GDP Annual growth rate of GDP
INT RATE Average interest rate applied on loans granted to the non-financial corporations
41
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Table I.3: Logit regression - Dependent variable: default - Activity indicators
Coef. Marg. Eff. Coef. Marg. Eff. Coef. Marg. Eff. Coef. Marg. Eff.
WORKING CAPITAL -0.3298*** -0.0030*** -0.2999*** -0.0028***
(-5.68) (-5.43) (-5.21) (-5.00)
TURNOVER -1.2003*** -0.0111*** -1.1995*** -0.0113***
(-26.62) (-15.14) (-26.70) (-15.29)
CASH & EQUIVALENTS -0.3139*** -0.0026*** -0.3107*** -0.0026***
(-3.08) (-3.04) (-3.06) (-3.02)
ACCOUNTS PAYABLE 1.7279*** 0.0141*** 1.7189*** 0.0143***
(28.23) (18.14) (28.36) (18.34)
ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE 0.3068*** 0.0025*** 0.3023*** 0.0025***
(3.63) (3.58) (3.59) (3.55)
INVENTORIES 0.0995*** 0.0008*** 0.0985*** 0.0008***
(4.00) (3.94) (3.99) (3.93)
TAX LIABILITIES 6.5032*** 0.0530*** 6.4309*** 0.0536***
(32.61) (19.80) (32.75) (20.00)
INVESTMENT TURNOVER -0.0034*** -0.0000*** -0.0034*** -0.0000***
(-4.61) (-4.48) (-4.59) (-4.46)
LEVERAGE 1.6575*** 0.0153*** 1.6717*** 0.0157*** 0.8964*** 0.0073*** 0.8963*** 0.0075***
(18.13) (14.48) (18.39) (14.75) (9.68) (9.09) (9.75) (9.16)
DEBT COVERAGE -0.5434*** -0.0050*** -0.5478*** -0.0051*** -1.2083*** -0.0098*** -1.2077*** -0.0101***
(-4.04) (-3.90) (-4.08) (-3.94) (-8.37) (-7.62) (-8.40) (-7.65)
INTEREST COVERAGE 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.38) (0.38) (0.39) (0.39) (0.18) (0.18) (0.21) (0.21)
SD CASHFLOW 2.1177*** 0.0195*** 2.1026*** 0.0198*** 0.5320* 0.0043* 0.5186* 0.0043*
(8.55) (7.93) (8.54) (7.94) (1.94) (1.93) (1.90) (1.90)
SALES GROWTH -0.8297*** -0.0076*** -0.8203*** -0.0077*** -0.8976*** -0.0073*** -0.8884*** -0.0074***
(-12.35) (-10.43) (-12.25) (-10.40) (-12.26) (-10.56) (-12.18) (-10.54)
SIZE 0.0744*** 0.0007*** 0.0730*** 0.0007*** 0.2998*** 0.0024*** 0.2968*** 0.0025***
(4.17) (4.14) (4.11) (4.09) (16.02) (13.47) (15.99) (13.50)
AGE -0.3929*** -0.0036*** -0.3961*** -0.0037*** -0.4034*** -0.0033*** -0.4052*** -0.0034***
(-12.67) (-10.32) (-12.81) (-10.46) (-12.35) (-10.44) (-12.47) (-10.55)
CHANGE-EMPLOYEES -1.2849*** -0.0118*** -1.2848*** -0.0121*** -1.1728*** -0.0096*** -1.1725*** -0.0098***
(-11.63) (-9.75) (-11.65) (-9.81) (-10.22) (-9.06) (-10.25) (-9.10)
CREDIT LINES -0.6156*** -0.0057*** -0.6092*** -0.0057*** -0.5330*** -0.0043*** -0.5272*** -0.0044***
(-13.23) (-12.69) (-13.16) (-12.69) (-10.74) (-10.88) (-10.70) (-10.86)
BANKING RELATIONSHIPS -2.6191*** -0.0241*** -2.6129*** -0.0245*** -2.5193*** -0.0205*** -2.5119*** -0.0209***
(-28.46) (-16.39) (-28.57) (-16.55) (-25.71) (-16.96) (-25.83) (-17.12)
CHANGE_BANK_REL -0.2494*** -0.0023*** -0.2477*** -0.0023*** -0.1934*** -0.0016*** -0.1913*** -0.0016***
(-11.89) (-9.93) (-11.81) (-9.92) (-8.96) (-8.16) (-8.88) (-8.11)
2007 0.2812*** 0.0026*** 0.3825*** 0.0031***
(4.70) (4.61) (6.06) (5.92)
2008 0.5593*** 0.0052*** 0.7216*** 0.0059***
(9.61) (8.93) (11.72) (10.62)
2009 0.6945*** 0.0064*** 0.7567*** 0.0062***
(11.25) (10.42) (12.10) (11.18)
GDP -0.1467*** -0.0014*** -0.1679*** -0.0014***
(-11.60) (-10.60) (-12.86) (-11.59)
INT_RATE 0.1799*** 0.0017*** 0.2590*** 0.0022***
(6.34) (6.10) (8.80) (8.22)
Nr. Observations 195,329 195,329 195,329 195,329
Nr.  Firms 72,649 72,649 72,649 72,649
Log-likelihood -14,043.2 -14,054.6 -13,353.2 -13,367.7
Log-likelihood constant -16,682.8 -16,682.8 -16,682.8 -16,682.8
Pseudo-R2 0.158 0.158 0.200 0.199
Wald Chi2 2,960.2 3,004.9 2,981.6 3,053.8
Prob > Chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
sigma_u 1.02 0.99 1.23 1.20
rho 0.24 0.23 0.31 0.30
Chi2_c 55.95 51.87 117.45 110.73
BIC 28,452 28,463 27,121 27,137
AIC 28,146 28,167 26,774 26,801
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Note: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance levels at 1, 5, and 10 per cent, respectively. All models estimated
using a random-effects logit estimator, where the dependent variable, default, is a binary variable related to credit
overdue. Z-scores are presented in parentheses. The first column of each Model presents the estimated coefficients,
while the second column shows the marginal effects. The marginal effects correspond to the average effects, assuming
as baseline firms with credit lines and changes in the number of bank lending relationships. In all regressions a
constant and business sector dummies were included. The Pseudo-R2 is a measure of goodness of the fit, being
computed as function of the models log-likelihood and of the log-likelihood of the constant-only model, for the
sub-sample used in each estimation. The Wald test evaluates the overall statistical significance of the estimated
coefficients. Rho measures the proportion of the total variance resulting from the panel-level variance component. If
rho is zero, the panel-level variance is not relevant and the panel estimator is not different from the pooled estimator.
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Table I.4: Logit regression by firm dimension - Dependent variable: default
(Continues)
Panel A - Micro and small firms
Coef. Marg. Eff. Coef. Marg. Eff. Coef. Marg. Eff. Coef. Marg. Eff.
WORKING CAPITAL -0.2815*** -0.0026*** -0.4038*** -0.0040***
(-3.38) (-3.23) (-4.64) (-4.39)
TURNOVER -0.9336*** -0.0085*** -1.3256*** -0.0130***
(-13.64) (-8.24) (-18.33) (-10.44)
CASH & EQUIVALENTS -0.1281 -0.0010 -0.9161*** -0.0077***
(-1.05) (-1.05) (-4.60) (-4.38)
ACCOUNTS PAYABLE 1.2460*** 0.0094*** 1.9002*** 0.0159***
(14.17) (9.89) (20.24) (12.94)
ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE 0.0801 0.0006 0.2598** 0.0022**
(0.65) (0.65) (2.08) (2.05)
INVENTORIES 0.0671* 0.0005* 0.1102*** 0.0009***
(1.91) (1.90) (2.98) (2.95)
TAX LIABILITIES 7.2637*** 0.0550*** 6.6968*** 0.0562***
(22.49) (12.34) (21.82) (13.83)
INVESTMENT TURNOVER -0.0030*** -0.0000*** -0.0040*** -0.0000***
(-3.08) (-2.98) (-3.28) (-3.17)
LEVERAGE 1.3297*** 0.0121*** 0.8424*** 0.0064*** 2.1218*** 0.0208*** 1.1471*** 0.0096***
(10.29) (8.14) (6.36) (5.85) (14.41) (11.02) (7.59) (7.06)
DEBT COVERAGE -0.1038 -0.0009 -0.6175*** -0.0047*** -0.4764** -0.0047** -1.0620*** -0.0089***
(-0.57) (-0.57) (-2.99) (-2.87) (-2.30) (-2.24) (-4.67) (-4.37)
INTEREST COVERAGE 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0000
(1.35) (1.34) (1.04) (1.04) (-0.92) (-0.92) (-0.93) (-0.93)
SD CASHFLOW 2.5959*** 0.0236*** 1.4896*** 0.0113*** 1.7038*** 0.0167*** 0.5380 0.0045
(7.40) (6.29) (3.79) (3.65) (4.54) (4.33) (1.29) (1.29)
SALES GROWTH -0.8992*** -0.0082*** -0.9243*** -0.0070*** -0.7293*** -0.0071*** -0.7909*** -0.0066***
(-9.29) (-7.20) (-8.85) (-7.32) (-7.41) (-6.51) (-7.45) (-6.63)
SIZE 0.2581*** 0.0023*** 0.7114*** 0.0054*** 0.0934*** 0.0009*** 0.5104*** 0.0043***
(5.84) (5.36) (15.23) (10.23) (2.66) (2.64) (13.61) (10.52)
AGE -0.3062*** -0.0028*** -0.3609*** -0.0027*** -0.4455*** -0.0044*** -0.4323*** -0.0036***
(-6.55) (-5.53) (-7.13) (-6.10) (-9.80) (-7.66) (-8.90) (-7.41)
CHANGE-EMPLOYEES -1.2362*** -0.0112*** -0.9620*** -0.0073*** -1.3624*** -0.0133*** -1.0189*** -0.0085***
(-7.35) (-5.88) (-5.54) (-4.91) (-8.76) (-7.21) (-6.27) (-5.77)
CREDIT LINES -0.6258*** -0.0057*** -0.5637*** -0.0043*** -0.6359*** -0.0062*** -0.5577*** -0.0047***
(-9.75) (-8.71) (-8.18) (-8.00) (-9.14) (-8.63) (-7.41) (-7.42)
BANKING RELATIONSHIPS -3.0289*** -0.0275*** -3.0214*** -0.0229*** -2.3605*** -0.0231*** -2.2961*** -0.0193***
(-21.88) (-10.15) (-19.91) (-11.06) (-17.58) (-10.89) (-15.90) (-11.17)
CHANGE_BANK_REL -0.3704*** -0.0034*** -0.3038*** -0.0023*** -0.1976*** -0.0019*** -0.1453*** -0.0012***
(-10.26) (-7.40) (-8.05) (-6.71) (-6.66) (-5.84) (-4.73) (-4.44)
2007 0.2451*** 0.0022*** 0.3230*** 0.0024*** 0.3269*** 0.0032*** 0.4357*** 0.0037***
(2.65) (2.60) (3.28) (3.20) (3.76) (3.67) (4.72) (4.58)
2008 0.5812*** 0.0053*** 0.7614*** 0.0058*** 0.6173*** 0.0060*** 0.7926*** 0.0066***
(6.59) (5.80) (8.04) (6.90) (7.28) (6.66) (8.74) (7.84)
2009 0.6071*** 0.0055*** 0.7232*** 0.0055*** 0.8148*** 0.0080*** 0.8867*** 0.0074***
(6.55) (5.89) (7.52) (6.67) (8.91) (8.01) (9.56) (8.62)
Nr. Observations 83,562 83,562 92,953 92,953
Nr.  Firms 38,969 38,969 35,995 35,995
Log-likelihood -6,063.7 -5,700.8 -6,624.8 -6,262.2
Log-likelihood constant -7,179.5 -7,179.5 -7,987.2 -7,987.2
Pseudo-R2 0.155 0.206 0.171 0.216
Wald Chi2 1,248.6 1,161.7 1,374.7 1,330.0
Prob > Chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
sigma_u 0.95 1.26 0.98 1.23
rho 0.22 0.32 0.23 0.32
Chi2_c 13.99 43.41 21.23 53.08
BIC 12,467 11,787 13,593 12,913





Model 1 Model 2
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(Table I.4 Continued)
Panel B - Medium and large firms
Coef. Marg. Eff. Coef. Marg. Eff. Coef. Marg. Eff. Coef. Marg. Eff.
WORKING CAPITAL -1.1330*** -0.0116*** 0.7042 0.0072
(-4.41) (-3.92) (1.07) (0.97)
TURNOVER -1.9127*** -0.0196*** -1.0691** -0.0109*
(-8.78) (-5.66) (-2.53) (-1.87)
CASH & EQUIVALENTS -0.7762 -0.0073 0.5171 0.0049
(-0.99) (-0.98) (1.51) (1.25)
ACCOUNTS PAYABLE 3.2408*** 0.0307*** 2.3131*** 0.0219***
(10.06) (7.07) (2.69) (2.67)
ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE -0.7111* -0.0067* 2.4170** 0.0229
(-1.82) (-1.76) (2.17) (1.60)
INVENTORIES -0.1671 -0.0016 0.2420 0.0023
(-0.99) (-0.99) (0.48) (0.48)
TAX LIABILITIES 6.5764*** 0.0622*** 1.7118 0.0162
(8.16) (6.23) (0.35) (0.35)
INVESTMENT TURNOVER -0.0034 -0.0000 -0.0032 -0.0000
(-0.88) (-0.86) (-0.54) (-0.53)
LEVERAGE 3.0376*** 0.0312*** 2.0214*** 0.0191*** 1.6623** 0.0169* 0.8887 0.0084
(7.62) (6.01) (5.31) (4.70) (2.23) (1.88) (0.93) (0.90)
DEBT COVERAGE -2.1594*** -0.0222*** -3.4483*** -0.0326*** -2.8603** -0.0291* -3.0081** -0.0285*
(-3.42) (-3.12) (-5.30) (-4.32) (-2.32) (-1.72) (-2.29) (-1.66)
INTEREST COVERAGE -0.0016** -0.0000** -0.0009 -0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
(-2.09) (-2.03) (-0.97) (-0.96) (0.81) (0.77) (0.35) (0.34)
SD CASHFLOW 2.1967** 0.0226** 1.3678 0.0129 -1.0587 -0.0108 -1.6972 -0.0161
(2.08) (2.02) (1.17) (1.17) (-0.24) (-0.24) (-0.36) (-0.36)
SALES GROWTH -0.5541* -0.0057* -0.8586*** -0.0081** -1.5966* -0.0162 -1.0226 -0.0097
(-1.87) (-1.82) (-2.70) (-2.52) (-1.72) (-1.42) (-1.01) (-0.96)
SIZE -0.2011** -0.0021** 0.3653*** 0.0035*** 0.0030 0.0000 0.0930 0.0009
(-2.28) (-2.17) (4.07) (3.68) (0.01) (0.01) (0.42) (0.42)
AGE -0.1024 -0.0011 -0.0334 -0.0003 -0.2242 -0.0023 -0.1894 -0.0018
(-0.88) (-0.87) (-0.28) (-0.28) (-0.86) (-0.76) (-0.68) (-0.62)
CHANGE-EMPLOYEES -1.6962*** -0.0174*** -1.2318** -0.0117** 0.7051 0.0072 0.1911 0.0018
(-3.35) (-3.07) (-2.40) (-2.28) (0.65) (0.65) (0.17) (0.17)
CREDIT LINES -0.4765* -0.0049* 0.0411 0.0004 -1.5594** -0.0159** -0.8517 -0.0081
(-1.69) (-1.71) (0.13) (0.13) (-2.01) (-2.11) (-1.01) (-1.05)
BANKING RELATIONSHIPS -2.0131*** -0.0207*** -2.2131*** -0.0209*** -0.2355 -0.0024 -0.4260 -0.0040
(-5.47) (-4.42) (-5.54) (-4.58) (-0.30) (-0.29) (-0.51) (-0.48)
CHANGE_BANK_REL -0.1241** -0.0013* -0.0829 -0.0008 -0.1292 -0.0013 -0.1587 -0.0015
(-1.99) (-1.94) (-1.29) (-1.29) (-0.92) (-0.86) (-1.07) (-0.98)
2007 0.1697 0.0017 0.2648 0.0025 1.4191** 0.0144** 1.4988** 0.0142**
(0.82) (0.82) (1.21) (1.21) (2.41) (1.97) (2.41) (1.99)
2008 0.0935 0.0010 0.2194 0.0021 -0.4756 -0.0048 -0.2268 -0.0021
(0.44) (0.44) (0.98) (0.99) (-0.65) (-0.62) (-0.29) (-0.29)
2009 0.8110*** 0.0083*** 0.5588** 0.0053*** 0.5690 0.0058 0.9925 0.0094
(3.60) (3.65) (2.54) (2.60) (0.92) (0.94) (1.58) (1.46)
Nr. Observations 16,204 16,204 2,610 2,610
Nr.  Firms 5,951 5,951 906 906
Log-likelihood -986.0 -946.4 -139.6 -132.5
Log-likelihood constant -1,328.7 -1,328.7 -196.3 -196.3
Pseudo-R2 0.258 0.288 0.289 0.325
Wald Chi2 287.1 270.3 67.4 67.3
Prob > Chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
sigma_u 0.93 1.05 0.43 0.59
rho 0.21 0.25 0.05 0.10
Chi2_c 4.40 5.77 0.04 0.17
BIC 2,263 2,222 515 533
AIC 2,032 1,961 339 333
Medium Large
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Note: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance levels at 1, 5, and 10 per cent, respectively. All models estimated
using a random-effects logit estimator, where the dependent variable, default, is a binary variable related to credit
overdue. Z-scores are presented in parentheses. The first column of each Model presents the estimated coefficients,
while the second column shows the marginal effects. The marginal effects correspond to the average effects, assuming
as baseline firms with credit lines and changes in the number of bank lending relationships. In all regressions a
constant and business sector dummies were included. The Pseudo-R2 is a measure of goodness of the fit, being
computed as function of the models log-likelihood and of the log-likelihood of the constant-only model, for the
sub-sample used in each estimation. The Wald test evaluates the overall statistical significance of the estimated
coefficients. Rho measures the proportion of the total variance resulting from the panel-level variance component. If
rho is zero, the panel-level variance is not relevant and the panel estimator is not different from the pooled estimator.
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Table I.5: Logit regression - Dependent variable: default - with lag regressors
Coef. Marg. Eff. Coef. Marg. Eff. Coef. Marg. Eff.




CASH & EQUIVALENTSt-1 -0.5727*** -0.0070*** -0.5219*** -0.0064***
(-3.91) (-3.74) (-3.60) (-3.47)
ACCOUNTS PAYABLEt-1 1.4550*** 0.0177*** 1.4223*** 0.0174***
(17.89) (11.76) (17.46) (11.72)
ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLEt-1 -0.1537 -0.0019 -0.1546 -0.0019
(-1.32) (-1.32) (-1.33) (-1.32)
INVENTORIESt-1 0.1239*** 0.0015*** 0.1247*** 0.0015***
(3.69) (3.61) (3.71) (3.63)
TAX LIABILITIESt-1 5.5371*** 0.0673***
(20.40) (13.19)
INVESTMENT TURNOVERt-1 -0.0045*** -0.0001*** -0.0045*** -0.0001***
(-3.65) (-3.50) (-3.66) (-3.52)
SOCIAL SEC. LIABILITIESt-1 9.6421*** 0.1178***
(16.17) (11.94)
OTHER TAXESt-1 4.5341*** 0.0554***
(14.71) (11.34)
LEVERAGEt-1 1.3440*** 0.0189*** 0.7078*** 0.0086*** 0.7064*** 0.0086***
(10.47) (9.18) (5.61) (5.38) (5.58) (5.35)
DEBT COVERAGEt-1 -1.0915*** -0.0153*** -1.8201*** -0.0221*** -1.7671*** -0.0216***
(-6.05) (-5.45) (-9.97) (-8.06) (-9.64) (-7.91)
INTEREST COVERAGEt-1 -0.0004** -0.0000** -0.0005** -0.0000** -0.0005** -0.0000**
(-2.08) (-2.05) (-2.30) (-2.27) (-2.28) (-2.25)
SD CASHFLOWt-1 3.6358*** 0.0511*** 2.5948*** 0.0315*** 2.6409*** 0.0323***
(12.10) (9.57) (8.14) (7.23) (8.27) (7.34)
SALES GROWTHt-1 -0.2315*** -0.0033** -0.3534*** -0.0043*** -0.3571*** -0.0044***
(-2.61) (-2.56) (-3.74) (-3.60) (-3.78) (-3.64)
SIZEt-1 0.0599*** 0.0008*** 0.2329*** 0.0028*** 0.2286*** 0.0028***
(2.86) (2.84) (10.97) (9.20) (10.76) (9.10)
AGE -0.3823*** -0.0054*** -0.4116*** -0.0050*** -0.4130*** -0.0050***
(-9.20) (-7.52) (-9.68) (-7.86) (-9.71) (-7.90)
CHANGE-EMPLOYEESt-1 -0.5788*** -0.0081*** -0.5653*** -0.0069*** -0.5587*** -0.0068***
(-4.46) (-4.23) (-4.23) (-4.03) (-4.18) (-3.99)
CREDIT LINESt-1 -0.1533*** -0.0022*** -0.1402** -0.0017** -0.1384** -0.0017**
(-2.63) (-2.69) (-2.32) (-2.38) (-2.29) (-2.34)
BANKING RELATIONSHIPSt-1 -2.4250*** -0.0341*** -2.3297*** -0.0283*** -2.3152*** -0.0283***
(-21.59) (-11.82) (-20.02) (-11.92) (-19.92) (-11.99)
CHANGE_BANK_RELt-1 0.0710*** 0.0010*** 0.0940*** 0.0011*** 0.0943*** 0.0012***
(2.81) (2.72) (3.70) (3.54) (3.70) (3.55)
2007 -0.5294*** -0.0074*** -0.6506*** -0.0079*** -0.6510*** -0.0080***
(-8.67) (-7.77) (-10.27) (-8.91) (-10.27) (-8.93)
2008 -0.1477*** -0.0021*** -0.1799*** -0.0022*** -0.1757*** -0.0021***
(-2.72) (-2.72) (-3.26) (-3.23) (-3.18) (-3.16)
Nr. Observations 119,553 119,553 119,553
Nr.  Firms 54,003 54,003 54,003
Log-likelihood -8,731.5 -8,615.9 -8,587.3
Log-likelihood constant -10,024.5 -10,024.5 -10,024.5
Pseudo-R2 0.129 0.141 0.143
Wald Chi2 1,666.5 1,645.6 1,675.9
Prob > Chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00
sigma_u 0.42 0.73 0.72
rho 0.05 0.14 0.14
Chi2_c 0.83 8.17 7.75
BIC 17,802 17,618 17,572
AIC 17,521 17,298 17,243
Model 1 Model 3Model 2
Note: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance levels at 1, 5, and 10 per cent, respectively. All models estimated
using a random-effects logit estimator, where the dependent variable, default, is a binary variable related to credit
overdue. Z-scores are presented in parentheses. The first column of each Model presents the estimated coefficients,
while the second column shows the marginal effects. The marginal effects correspond to the average effects, assuming
as baseline firms with credit lines and changes in the number of bank lending relationships. In all regressions a
constant and business sector dummies were included. The Pseudo-R2 is a measure of goodness of the fit, being
computed as function of the models log-likelihood and of the log-likelihood of the constant-only model, for the
sub-sample used in each estimation. The Wald test evaluates the overall statistical significance of the estimated
coefficients. Rho measures the proportion of the total variance resulting from the panel-level variance component. If
rho is zero, the panel-level variance is not relevant and the panel estimator is not different from the pooled estimator.
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Table I.6: Dependent variable: default - Without bank lending variables
Coef. Marg. Eff. Coef. Marg. Eff. Coef. Marg. Eff. Coef. Marg. Eff.
WORKING CAPITAL -0.3369*** -0.0033*** -0.3072*** -0.0031***
(-5.86) (-5.57) (-5.39) (-5.15)
TURNOVER -1.1006*** -0.0108*** -1.0999*** -0.0110***
(-25.52) (-14.75) (-25.61) (-14.93)
CASH & EQUIVALENTS -0.4591*** -0.0040*** -0.4572*** -0.0040***
(-4.45) (-4.32) (-4.45) (-4.32)
ACCOUNTS PAYABLE 1.6890*** 0.0146*** 1.6796*** 0.0148***
(27.81) (18.25) (27.94) -18.47
ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE 0.4011*** 0.0035*** 0.3957*** 0.0035***
(4.8) (4.69) (4.76) (4.66)
INVENTORIES 0.0899*** 0.0008*** 0.0885*** 0.0008***
(3.62) (3.58) (3.59) (3.55)
TAX LIABILITIES 6.6665*** 0.0576*** 6.5876*** 0.0581***
(33.07) (20.28) (33.22) (20.51)
INVESTMENT TURNOVER -0.0047*** -0.0000*** -0.0046*** -0.0000***
(-6.03) (-5.73) (-6.02) (-5.73)
LEVERAGE 1.7293*** 0.0169*** 1.7409*** 0.0174*** 0.9644*** 0.0083*** 0.9630*** 0.0085***
(19.11) (14.87) (19.36) (15.17) (10.62) (9.85) (10.68) (9.93
DEBT COVERAGE -0.4771*** -0.0047*** -0.4817*** -0.0048*** -1.0265*** -0.0089*** -1.0259*** -0.0091***
(-3.73) (-3.60) (-3.77) (-3.64) (-7.35) (-6.81) (-7.38) (-6.85)
INTEREST COVERAGE -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000
(-1.35) (-1.34) (-1.33) (-1.33) (-1.28) (-1.28) (-1.26) (-1.25)
SD CASHFLOW 2.1600*** 0.0211*** 2.1485*** 0.0214*** 0.6249** 0.0054** 0.6156** 0.0054**
(8.72) (8.00) (8.73) (8.03) (2.29) (2.28) (2.20) (2.26)
SALES GROWTH -0.9141*** -0.0089*** -0.9045*** -0.0090*** -0.9587*** -0.0083*** -0.9493*** -0.0084***
(-13.75) (-11.10) (-13.65) (-11.11) (-13.26) (-11.15) (-13.18) (-11.15)
SIZE 0.1876*** 0.0018*** 0.1863*** 0.0019*** 0.4025*** 0.0035*** 0.3993*** 0.0035***
(11.52) (9.94) (11.51) (9.97) (22.72) (16.14) (22.77) (16.26)
AGE -0.3627*** -0.0035*** -0.3661*** -0.0037*** -0.3805*** -0.0033*** -0.3826*** -0.0034***
(-11.91) (-9.88) (-12.07) (-10.03) (-11.88) (-10.19) (-12.00) (-10.31)
CHANGE-EMPLOYEES -1.3491*** -0.0132*** -1.3493*** -0.0135*** -1.1965*** -0.0103*** -1.1959*** -0.0106***
(-12.13) (-9.87) (-12.16) (-9.94) (-10.40) (-9.13) (-10.42) (-9.18)
2007 0.2943*** 0.0029*** 0.3973*** 0.0034***
(4.92) (4.81) (6.3) (6.12)
2008 0.5560*** 0.0054*** 0.7315*** 0.0063***
(9.58) (8.84) (11.91) (10.7)
2009 0.6835*** 0.0067*** 0.7734*** 0.0067***
(11.18) (10.3) (12.46) (11.37)
GDP -0.1428*** -0.0014*** -0.1698*** -0.0015***
(-11.39) (-10.38) (-13.11) (-11.68)
INT_RATE 0.1792*** 0.0018*** 0.2602*** 0.0023***
(6.34) (6.08) (8.87) (8.26
Nr. Observations 195,329 195,329 195,329 195,329
Nr.  Firms 72,649 72,649 72,649 72,649
Log-likelihood -14,550.5 -14,562.8 -13,353.2 -13,367.7
Pseudo-R2 0.128 0.127 0.200 0.199
Wald Chi2 2,577.1 2,616.2 2,981.6 3,053.8
Prob > Chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Rho 0.29 0.28 0.31 0.30
Chi2_c 81.52 76.82 117.45 110.73
BIC 29,430 29,442 27,121 27,137
AIC 29,155 29,178 26,774 26,801
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Note: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance levels at 1, 5, and 10 per cent, respectively. All models estimated
using a random-effects logit estimator, where the dependent variable, default, is a binary variable related to credit
overdue. Z-scores are presented in parentheses. The first column of each Model presents the estimated coefficients,
while the second column shows the marginal effects. The marginal effects correspond to the average effects, assuming
as baseline firms with credit lines and changes in the number of bank lending relationships. In all regressions a
constant and business sector dummies were included. The Pseudo-R2 is a measure of goodness of the fit, being
computed as function of the models log-likelihood and of the log-likelihood of the constant-only model, for the
sub-sample used in each estimation. The Wald test evaluates the overall statistical significance of the estimated
coefficients. Rho measures the proportion of the total variance resulting from the panel-level variance component. If
rho is zero, the panel-level variance is not relevant and the panel estimator is not different from the pooled estimator.
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Table I.7: Dependent variable: default - Without bank lending variables - lag regressors
Coef. Marg. Eff. Coef. Marg. Eff. Coef. Marg. Eff.




CASH & EQUIVALENTSt-1 -0.7642*** -0.0090*** -0.7076*** -0.0084***
(-5.19) (-4.75) (-4.85) (-4.49)
ACCOUNTS PAYABLEt-1 1.3450*** 0.0158*** 1.3124*** 0.0155***
(16.76) (11.26) (16.32) (11.22)
ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLEt-1 -0.0235 -0.0003 -0.027 -0.0003
(-0.21) (-0.21) (-0.24) (-0.24)
INVENTORIESt-1 0.1154*** 0.0014*** 0.1164*** 0.0014***
(3.48) (3.40) (3.51) (3.43)
TAX LIABILITIESt-1 5.4797*** 0.0645***
(20.17) (12.72)
INVESTMENT TURNOVERt-1 -0.0061*** -0.0001*** -0.0060*** -0.0001***
(-4.78) (-4.43) (-4.74) (-4.42)
SOCIAL SEC. LIABILITIESt-1 9.8454*** 0.1165***
(16.33) (11.69)
OTHER TAXESt-1 4.4245*** 0.0524***
(14.36) (10.95)
LEVERAGEt-1 1.4001*** 0.0183*** 0.7920*** 0.0093*** 0.7897*** 0.0093***
(11.13) (9.30) (6.50) (6.08) (6.47) (6.06)
DEBT COVERAGEt-1 -0.9784*** -0.0128*** -1.5794*** -0.0186*** -1.5252*** -0.0180***
(-5.68) (-5.06) (-8.94) (-7.37) (-8.60) (-7.20)
INTEREST COVERAGEt-1 -0.0006*** -0.0000*** -0.0006*** -0.0000*** -0.0006*** -0.0000***
(-2.97) (-2.90) (-3.14) (-3.07) (-3.12) (-3.05)
SD CASHFLOWt-1 3.6616*** 0.0479*** 2.6447*** 0.0311*** 2.6973*** 0.0319***
(11.96) (9.14) (8.27) (7.23) (8.42) (7.35)
SALES GROWTHt-1 -0.2432*** -0.0032*** -0.3422*** -0.0040*** -0.3477*** -0.0041***
(-2.77) (-2.70) (-3.68) (-3.53) (-3.74) (-3.59)
SIZEt-1 0.2288*** 0.0030*** 0.3757*** 0.0044*** 0.3703*** 0.0044***
(12.2 (8.93) (19.11) (11.52) (18.82) (11.55)
AGE -0.3596*** -0.0047*** -0.3911*** -0.0046*** -0.3924*** -0.0046***
(-8.81) (-7.12) (-9.40) (-7.60) (-9.42) (-7.65)
CHANGE-EMPLOYEESt-1 -0.4944*** -0.0065*** -0.4492*** -0.0053*** -0.4431*** -0.0052***
(-3.79) (-3.61) (-3.37) (-3.25) (-3.32) (-3.21)
2007 -0.5539*** -0.0072*** -0.6759*** -0.0080*** -0.6776*** -0.0080***
(-9.02) (-7.81) (-10.69) (-8.91) (-10.70) (-8.95)
2008 -0.1620*** -0.0021*** -0.1976*** -0.0023*** -0.1920*** -0.0023***
(-2.98) (-2.97) (-3.59) (-3.53) (-3.49) (-3.43)
Nr. Observations 119,553 119,553 119,553
Nr.  Firms 54,003 54,003 54,003
Log-likelihood -9,037.2 -8,890.2 -8,858.5
Pseudo-R2 0.098 0.113 0.116
Wald Chi2 1,318.9 1,403.6 1,437.8
Prob > Chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00
rho 0.12 0.18 0.17
Chi2_c 4.71 12.66 12.28
BIC 18,378 18,131 18,080
AIC 18,126 17,840 17,779
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Note: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance levels at 1, 5, and 10 per cent, respectively. All models estimated
using a random-effects logit estimator, where the dependent variable, default, is a binary variable related to credit
overdue. Z-scores are presented in parentheses. The first column of each Model presents the estimated coefficients,
while the second column shows the marginal effects. The marginal effects correspond to the average effects, assuming
as baseline firms with credit lines and changes in the number of bank lending relationships. In all regressions a
constant and business sector dummies were included. The Pseudo-R2 is a measure of goodness of the fit, being
computed as function of the models log-likelihood and of the log-likelihood of the constant-only model, for the
sub-sample used in each estimation. The Wald test evaluates the overall statistical significance of the estimated
coefficients. Rho measures the proportion of the total variance resulting from the panel-level variance component. If
rho is zero, the panel-level variance is not relevant and the panel estimator is not different from the pooled estimator.
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Table I.8: Dependent variable: default - Cash cycle and Government net position
Coef. Marg. Eff. Coef. Marg. Eff. Coef. Marg. Eff. Coef. Marg. Eff.




CASH & EQUIVALENTS -0.3139*** -0.0026*** -0.4716*** -0.0037*** -0.3013*** -0.0025***
(-3.08) (-3.04) (-4.54) (-4.39) (-2.98) (-2.94)
ACCOUNTS PAYABLE 1.7279*** 0.0141*** 1.6938*** 0.0140***
(28.23) (18.14) (27.92) (18.06)
ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE 0.3068*** 0.0025*** 0.2841*** 0.0024***
(3.63) (3.58) (3.38) (3.34)
INVENTORIES 0.0995*** 0.0008*** 0.0881*** 0.0007***
(4.00) (3.94) (3.55) (3.51)
TAX LIABILITIES 6.5032*** 0.0530*** 6.3315*** 0.0492***
(32.61) (19.80) (32.23) (18.39)
INVESTMENT TURNOVER -0.0034*** -0.0000*** -0.0039*** -0.0000*** -0.0031*** -0.0000***
(-4.61) (-4.48) (-5.16) (-4.92) (-4.25) (-4.15)
CASH CYCLE -0.0001 0.0000
(-0.86) (-0.86)
GOVERNMENT NET POSITION 6.2856*** 0.0521***
(32.51) (19.62)
LEVERAGE 1.6575*** 0.0153*** 0.8964*** 0.0073*** 1.2496*** 0.0097*** 1.0031*** 0.0083***
(18.13) (14.48) (9.68) (9.09) (14.33) (12.13) (10.84) (10.02)
DEBT COVERAGE -0.5434*** -0.0050*** -1.2083*** -0.0098*** -1.7061*** -0.0133*** -1.1489*** -0.0095***
(-4.04) (-3.90) (-8.37) (-7.62) (-12.21) (-10.00) (-7.94) (-7.27)
INTEREST COVERAGE 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.38) (0.38) (0.18) (0.18) (0.43) (0.43) (0.28) (0.28)
SD CASHFLOW 2.1177*** 0.0195*** 0.5320* 0.0043* -0.4730* -0.0037* 0.7215*** 0.0060***
(8.55) (7.93) (1.94) (1.93) (-1.70) (-1.69) (2.65) (2.64)
SALES GROWTH -0.8297*** -0.0076*** -0.8976*** -0.0073*** -1.2206*** -0.0095*** -0.9094*** -0.0075***
(-12.35) (-10.43) (-12.26) (-10.56) (-16.79) (-12.39) (-12.47) (-10.69)
SIZE 0.0744*** 0.0007*** 0.2998*** 0.0024*** 0.3174*** 0.0025*** 0.2703*** 0.0022***
(4.17) (4.14) (16.02) (13.47) (-17.43) (13.91) (14.59) -12.53
AGE -0.3929*** -0.0036*** -0.4034*** -0.0033*** -0.3909*** -0.0030*** -0.3901*** -0.0032***
(-12.67) (-10.32) (-12.35) (-10.44) (-12.25) (-10.05) (-11.98) (-10.20)
CHANGE-EMPLOYEES -1.2849*** -0.0118*** -1.1728*** -0.0096*** -1.3076*** -0.0102*** -1.1575*** -0.0096***
(-11.63) (-9.75) (-10.22) (-9.06) (-11.40) (-9.54) (-10.11) (-8.97)
CREDIT LINES -0.6156*** -0.0057*** -0.5330*** -0.0043*** -0.6116*** -0.0048*** -0.5292*** -0.0044***
(-13.23) (-12.69) (-10.74) (-10.88) (-12.46) (-11.89) (-10.71) (-10.88)
BANKING RELATIONSHIPS -2.6191*** -0.0241*** -2.5193*** -0.0205*** -2.4255*** -0.0189*** -2.4833*** -0.0206***
(-28.46) (-16.39) (-25.71) (-16.96) (-25.33) (-15.77) (-25.51) (-16.91)
CHANGE_BANK_REL -0.2494*** -0.0023*** -0.1934*** -0.0016*** -0.2097*** -0.0016*** -0.1910*** -0.0016***
(-11.89) (-9.93) (-8.96) (-8.16) (-9.90) (-8.65) (-8.86) (-8.08)
2007 0.2812*** 0.0026*** 0.3825*** 0.0031*** 0.3674*** 0.0029*** 0.4038*** 0.0033***
(4.70) (4.61) (6.06) (5.92) (5.92) (5.74) (6.41) (6.23)
2008 0.5593*** 0.0052*** 0.7216*** 0.0059*** 0.6751*** 0.0052*** 0.7525*** 0.0062***
(9.61) (8.93) (11.72) (10.62) (11.13) (10.04) (12.22) (10.98)
2009 0.6945*** 0.0064*** 0.7567*** 0.0062*** 0.7341*** 0.0057*** 0.7745*** 0.0064***
(11.25) (10.42) (12.10) (11.18) (11.86) (10.89) (12.39) (11.4)
Nr. Observations 195,329 195,329 195,329 195,329
Nr.  Firms 72,649 72,649 72,649 72,649
Log-likelihood -14,043.2 -13,353.2 -13,932.6 -13,358.5
Log-likelihood constant -16,682.8 -16,682.8 -16,682.8 -16,682.8
Pseudo-R2 0.158 0.200 0.165 0.199
Wald Chi2 2,960.2 2,981.6 2,798.8 3,011.3
Prob > Chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
sigma_u 1.02 1.23 1.25 1.21
rho 0.24 0.31 0.32 0.31
Chi2_c 55.95 117.45 117.41 110.11
BIC 28,452 27,121 28,255 27,131
AIC 28,146 26,774 27,929 26,785
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Note: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance levels at 1, 5, and 10 per cent, respectively. All models estimated
using a random-effects logit estimator, where the dependent variable, default, is a binary variable related to credit
overdue. Z-scores are presented in parentheses. The first column of each Model presents the estimated coefficients,
while the second column shows the marginal effects. The marginal effects correspond to the average effects, assuming
as baseline firms with credit lines and changes in the number of bank lending relationships. In all regressions a
constant and business sector dummies were included. The Pseudo-R2 is a measure of goodness of the fit, being
computed as function of the models log-likelihood and of the log-likelihood of the constant-only model, for the
sub-sample used in each estimation. The Wald test evaluates the overall statistical significance of the estimated
coefficients. Rho measures the proportion of the total variance resulting from the panel-level variance component. If
rho is zero, the panel-level variance is not relevant and the panel estimator is not different from the pooled estimator.
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Table I.9: Dependent variable: default - Cash cycle and Government net position - lag regressors
Coef. Marg. Eff. Coef. Marg. Eff. Coef. Marg. Eff. Coef. Marg. Eff.




CASH & EQUIVALENTSt-1 -0.5727*** -0.0070*** -0.6631*** -0.0076*** -0.5463*** -0.0068***
(-3.91) (-3.74) (-4.47) (-4.18) (-3.77) (-3.62)
ACCOUNTS PAYABLEt-1 1.4550*** 0.0177*** 1.4248*** 0.0178***
(17.89) (11.76) (17.7) (11.78)
ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLEt-1 -0.1537 -0.0019 -0.1799 -0.0022
(-1.32) (-1.32) (-1.56) (-1.55)
INVENTORIESt-1 0.1239*** 0.0015*** 0.1099*** 0.0014***
(3.69) (3.61) (3.28) (3.22)
TAX LIABILITIESt-1 5.5371*** 0.0673*** 10.1983*** 0.1185***
(20.40) (13.19) (17.00) (-11.72)
INVESTMENT TURNOVERt-1 -0.0045*** -0.0001*** -0.0056*** -0.0001*** -0.0041*** -0.0001***
(-3.65) (-3.50) (-4.30) (-4.04) (-3.42) (-3.29)
CASH CYCLEt-1 0.0001 0.0000
(0.68) (0.68)
GOVERNMENT NET POSITIONt-1 5.2900*** 0.0661***
(0.27) (13.03)
LEVERAGEt-1 1.3440*** 0.0189*** 0.7078*** 0.0086*** 0.9981*** 0.0116*** 0.8044*** 0.0101***
(10.47) (9.18) (5.61) (5.38) (8.27) (7.37) (6.41) (6.08)
DEBT COVERAGEt-1 -1.0915*** -0.0153*** -1.8201*** -0.0221*** -2.1101*** -0.0245*** -1.7814*** -0.0223***
(-6.05) (-5.45) (-9.97) (-8.06) (-11.81) (-8.81) (-9.72) (-7.94)
INTEREST COVERAGEt-1 -0.0004** -0.0000** -0.0005** -0.0000** -0.0004** -0.0000** -0.0005** -0.0000**
(-2.08) (-2.05) (-2.30) (-2.27) (-1.98) (-1.96) (-2.29) (-2.26)
SD CASHFLOWt-1 3.6358*** 0.0511*** 2.5948*** 0.0315*** 2.0598*** 0.0239*** 2.7615*** 0.0345***
(12.10) (9.57) (8.14) (7.23) (6.25) (5.80) (8.75) (7.71)
SALES GROWTHt-1 -0.2315*** -0.0033** -0.3534*** -0.0043*** -0.5213*** -0.0061*** -0.3583*** -0.0045***
(-2.61) (-2.56) (-3.74) (-3.60) (-5.51) (-5.06) (-3.80) (-3.66)
SIZEt-1 0.0599*** 0.0008*** 0.2329*** 0.0028*** 0.2306*** 0.0027*** 0.2122*** 0.0027***
(2.86) (2.84) (10.97) (9.20) (10.98) (9.06) (10.1) (8.66)
AGE -0.3823*** -0.0054*** -0.4116*** -0.0050*** -0.4159*** -0.0048*** -0.4012*** -0.0050***
(-9.20) (-7.52) (-9.68) (-7.86) (-9.84) (-7.74) (-9.47) (-7.77)
CHANGE-EMPLOYEESt-1 -0.5788*** -0.0081*** -0.5653*** -0.0069*** -0.6018*** -0.0070*** -0.5478*** -0.0068***
(-4.46) (-4.23) (-4.23) (-4.03) (-4.48) (-4.21) (-4.11) (-3.92)
CREDIT LINESt-1 -0.1533*** -0.0022*** -0.1402** -0.0017** -0.1895*** -0.0022*** -0.1324** -0.0017**
(-2.63) (-2.69) (-2.32) (-2.38) (-3.14) (-3.18) (-2.21) (-2.26)
BANKING RELATIONSHIPSt-1 -2.4250*** -0.0341*** -2.3297*** -0.0283*** -2.2490*** -0.0261*** -2.3021*** -0.0288***
(-21.59) (-11.82) (-20.02) (-11.92) (-19.42) (-11.34) (-19.94) (-11.98)
CHANGE_BANK_RELt-1 0.0710*** 0.0010*** 0.0940*** 0.0011*** 0.0865*** 0.0010*** 0.0956*** 0.0012***
(2.81) (2.72) (3.70) (3.54) (3.41) (3.28) (3.77) (3.61)
2007 -0.5294*** -0.0074*** -0.6506*** -0.0079*** -0.6101*** -0.0071*** -0.6738*** -0.0084***
(-8.67) (-7.77) (-10.27) (-8.91) (-9.65) (-8.42) (-10.64) (-9.14)
2008 -0.1477*** -0.0021*** -0.1799*** -0.0022*** -0.1479*** -0.0017*** -0.1845*** -0.0023***
(-2.72) (-2.72) (-3.26) (-3.23) (-2.68) (-2.68) (-3.35) (-3.32)
Nr. Observations 119,553 119,553 119,553 119,553
Nr.  Firms 54,003 54,003 54,003 54,003
Log-likelihood -8,731.5 -8,615.9 -8,805.8 -8,618.4
Log-likelihood constant -10,024.5 -10,024.5 -10,024.5 -10,024.5
Pseudo-R2 0.129 0.141 0.122 0.140268135
Wald Chi2 1,666.5 1,645.6 1,460.3 1,680.4
Prob > Chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0
sigma_u 0.42 0.73 0.82 0.6851
rho 0.05 0.14 0.17 0.1249
Chi2_c 0.83 8.17 11.09 6.39
BIC 17,802 17,618 17,974 17,623
AIC 17,521 17,298 17,674 17,303
Model 1 Model 3Model 2 Model 4
Note: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance levels at 1, 5, and 10 per cent, respectively. All models estimated
using a random-effects logit estimator, where the dependent variable, default, is a binary variable related to credit
overdue. Z-scores are presented in parentheses. The first column of each Model presents the estimated coefficients,
while the second column shows the marginal effects. The marginal effects correspond to the average effects, assuming
as baseline firms with credit lines and changes in the number of bank lending relationships. In all regressions a
constant and business sector dummies were included. The Pseudo-R2 is a measure of goodness of the fit, being
computed as function of the models log-likelihood and of the log-likelihood of the constant-only model, for the
sub-sample used in each estimation. The Wald test evaluates the overall statistical significance of the estimated
coefficients. Rho measures the proportion of the total variance resulting from the panel-level variance component. If
rho is zero, the panel-level variance is not relevant and the panel estimator is not different from the pooled estimator.
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Table I.10: Alternative econometric approach - Dependent variable: default
Coef. Marg. Eff. Coef. Marg. Eff. Coef. Marg. Eff. Coef. Marg. Eff.
WORKING CAPITAL -0.3115*** -0.0042*** -0.2893*** -0.0039***
(-5.88) (-5.82) (-5.45) (-5.41)
TURNOVER -1.1453*** -0.0156*** -1.1474*** -0.0156***
(-18.75) (-17.55) (-18.78) (-17.58)
CASH & EQUIVALENTS -0.3002** -0.0040** -0.2983** -0.0040**
(-2.27) (-2.26) (-2.25) (-2.25)
ACCOUNTS PAYABLE 1.4881*** 0.0200*** 1.4892*** 0.0201***
(31.46) (26.30) (31.50) (26.33)
ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE 0.2810*** 0.0038*** 0.2783*** 0.0038***
(3.39) (3.39) (3.36) (3.35)
INVENTORIES 0.0861*** 0.0012*** 0.0859*** 0.0012***
(3.76) (3.74) (3.76) (3.74)
TAX LIABILITIES 5.3884*** 0.0725*** 5.3703*** 0.0724***
(36.59) (29.13) (36.58) (29.14)
INVESTMENT TURNOVER -0.0033*** -0.0000*** -0.0033*** -0.0000***
(-3.24) (-3.24) (-3.24) (-3.23)
LEVERAGE 1.4505*** 0.0197*** 1.4693*** 0.0200*** 0.7990*** 0.0108*** 0.8032*** 0.0108***
(19.04) (17.49) (19.33) (17.74) (10.06) (9.83) (10.14) (9.90)
DEBT COVERAGE -0.5797*** -0.0079*** -0.5825*** -0.0079*** -1.1694*** -0.0157*** -1.1720*** -0.0158***
(-4.07) (-4.06) (-4.08) (-4.07) (-8.05) (-7.96) (-8.06) (-7.97)
INTEREST COVERAGE 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.30) (0.30) (0.31) (0.31) (0.10) (0.10) (0.12) (0.12)
SD CASHFLOW 1.9325*** 0.0263*** 1.9277*** 0.0262*** 0.4737* 0.0064* 0.4656* 0.0063*
(8.63) (8.53) (8.62) (8.52) (1.85) (1.85) (1.83) (1.83)
SALES GROWTH -0.7818*** -0.0106*** -0.7763*** -0.0106*** -0.8455*** -0.0114*** -0.8407*** -0.0113***
(-11.01) (-10.83) (-10.92) (-10.74) (-10.73) (-10.60) (-10.66) (-10.53)
SIZE 0.0661*** 0.0009*** 0.0654*** 0.0009*** 0.2623*** 0.0035*** 0.2616*** 0.0035***
(3.84) (3.86) (3.80) (3.82) (16.94) (16.59) (16.90) (16.56)
AGE -0.3788*** -0.0052*** -0.3825*** -0.0052*** -0.3715*** -0.0050*** -0.3744*** -0.0050***
(-12.58) (-12.25) (-12.67) (-12.34) (-12.37) (-12.02) (-12.45) (-12.09)
CHANGE-EMPLOYEES -1.2479*** -0.0170*** -1.2495*** -0.0170*** -1.1373*** -0.0153*** -1.1392*** -0.0154***
(-9.64) (-9.47) (-9.65) (-9.47) (-8.72) (-8.60) (-8.74) (-8.61)
CREDIT LINES -0.5715*** -0.0078*** -0.5681*** -0.0077*** -0.4884*** -0.0066*** -0.4861*** -0.0066***
(-12.84) (-14.86) (-12.78) (-14.79) (-10.51) (-11.85) (-10.48) (-11.81)
BANKING RELATIONSHIPS -2.4638*** -0.0335*** -2.4667*** -0.0336*** -2.2803*** -0.0307*** -2.2850*** -0.0308***
(-28.69) (-26.74) (-28.75) (-26.78) (-25.65) (-24.45) (-25.72) (-24.51)
CHANGE_BANK_REL -0.2402*** -0.0033*** -0.2391*** -0.0033*** -0.1844*** -0.0025*** -0.1829*** -0.0025***
(-11.30) (-11.05) (-11.21) (-10.96) (-8.81) (-8.70) (-8.70) (-8.60)
2007 0.2503*** 0.0034*** 0.3187*** 0.0043***
(4.32) (4.31) (5.29) (5.27)
2008 0.5020*** 0.0068*** 0.6203*** 0.0084***
(9.26) (9.13) (11.00) (10.77)
2009 0.6087*** 0.0083*** 0.6267*** 0.0084***
(10.87) (10.76) (10.90) (10.78)
GDP -0.1311*** -0.0018*** -0.1439*** -0.0019***
(-11.46) (-11.26) (-12.19) (-11.94)
INT_RATE 0.1655*** 0.0023*** 0.2307*** 0.0031***
(6.25) (6.19) (8.50) (8.36)
Nr. Observations 195,329 195,329 195,329 195,329
Pseudo R2 0.160 0.160 0.197 0.196
BIC 28,496 28,502 27,329 27,338
AIC 28,200 28,217 26,993 27,012
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Note: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance levels at 1, 5, and 10 per cent, respectively. All models estimated
using a logit estimator, where the dependent variable, default, is a binary variable related to credit overdue. The
standard errors are robust and clustered at the firm level. t-statistics are presented in parentheses. The first column
of each Model presents the estimated coefficients, while the second column shows the marginal effects. The marginal
effects correspond to the average, assuming as baseline firms with credit lines and changes in the number of bank
lending relationships. In all regressions a constant and business sector dummies were included.
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Table I.11: Alternative econometric approach - Dependent variable: default - by firm size
(Continues)
Panel A - Micro and small firms
Coef. Marg. Eff. Coef. Marg. Eff. Coef. Marg. Eff. Coef. Marg. Eff.
WORKING CAPITAL -0.2654*** -0.0034*** -0.3803*** -0.0053***
(-3.48) (-3.46) (-4.79) (-4.74)
TURNOVER -0.9023*** -0.0116*** -1.2642*** -0.0176***
(-9.83) (-9.29) (-12.11) (-11.57)
CASH & EQUIVALENTS -0.1269 -0.0016 -0.8144*** -0.0112***
(-1.02) (-1.02) (-3.52) (-3.50)
ACCOUNTS PAYABLE 1.0701*** 0.0136*** 1.6249*** 0.0223***
(15.47) (13.65) (22.58) (19.09)
ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE 0.0591 0.0008 0.2604** 0.0036**
(0.49) (0.49) (2.17) (2.18)
INVENTORIES 0.0565* 0.0007* 0.0910*** 0.0012***
(1.79) (1.78) (2.71) (2.70)
TAX LIABILITIES 6.0110*** 0.0766*** 5.4859*** 0.0752***
(28.01) (20.23) (24.72) (20.16)
INVESTMENT TURNOVER -0.0029** -0.0000** -0.0039** -0.0001**
(-2.27) (-2.26) (-2.27) (-2.27)
LEVERAGE 1.1970*** 0.0154*** 0.7657*** 0.0098*** 1.8711*** 0.0261*** 1.0075*** 0.0138***
(11.46) (10.52) (6.74) (6.52) (15.63) (14.24) (7.80) (7.65)
DEBT COVERAGE -0.1463 -0.0019 -0.6287*** -0.0080*** -0.5122** -0.0071** -1.0454*** -0.0143***
(-0.81) (-0.81) (-3.17) (-3.16) (-2.24) (-2.23) (-4.34) (-4.31)
INTEREST COVERAGE 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0000
(1.28) (1.28) (1.22) (1.22) (-1.25) (-1.25) (-1.13) (-1.13)
SD CASHFLOW 2.4031*** 0.0310*** 1.2819*** 0.0163*** 1.5668*** 0.0219*** 0.4665 0.0064
(7.68) (7.46) (3.62) (3.59) (4.42) (4.40) (1.19) (1.19)
SALES GROWTH -0.8495*** -0.0109*** -0.8477*** -0.0108*** -0.6855*** -0.0096*** -0.7414*** -0.0102***
(-8.28) (-8.08) (-7.86) (-7.71) (-6.57) (-6.46) (-6.68) (-6.61)
SIZE 0.2374*** 0.0031*** 0.6214*** 0.0079*** 0.0856** 0.0012** 0.4444*** 0.0061***
(5.69) (5.67) (16.57) (14.91) (2.47) (2.48) (14.02) (13.58)
AGE -0.2962*** -0.0038*** -0.3288*** -0.0042*** -0.4309*** -0.0060*** -0.4019*** -0.0055***
(-6.55) (-6.41) (-7.02) (-6.84) (-10.10) (-9.76) (-9.21) (-8.91)
CHANGE-EMPLOYEES -1.2224*** -0.0158*** -0.9724*** -0.0124*** -1.3124*** -0.0183*** -0.9759*** -0.0134***
(-6.50) (-6.34) (-5.30) (-5.21) (-7.12) (-7.00) (-5.27) (-5.23)
CREDIT LINES -0.5892*** -0.0076*** -0.5233*** -0.0067*** -0.5885*** -0.0082*** -0.5019*** -0.0069***
(-9.77) (-12.15) (-8.35) (-10.08) (-8.91) (-10.03) (-7.13) (-7.84)
BANKING RELATIONSHIPS -2.8683*** -0.0370*** -2.7215*** -0.0347*** -2.2262*** -0.0311*** -2.0655*** -0.0283***
(-23.17) (-19.60) (-20.91) (-18.46) (-17.95) (-17.17) (-15.96) (-15.43)
CHANGE_BANK_REL -0.3543*** -0.0046*** -0.2823*** -0.0036*** -0.1922*** -0.0027*** -0.1411*** -0.0019***
(-10.16) (-9.59) (-8.11) (-7.81) (-6.22) (-6.15) (-4.59) (-4.57)
2007 0.2228** 0.0029** 0.2724*** 0.0035*** 0.2965*** 0.0041*** 0.3681*** 0.0050***
(2.49) (2.48) (2.91) (2.90) (3.53) (3.53) (4.20) (4.18)
2008 0.5425*** 0.0070*** 0.6754*** 0.0086*** 0.5607*** 0.0078*** 0.6846*** 0.0094***
(6.49) (6.36) (7.69) (7.49) (7.11) (7.00) (8.29) (8.11)
2009 0.5575*** 0.0072*** 0.6275*** 0.0080*** 0.7274*** 0.0101*** 0.7428*** 0.0102***
(6.45) (6.41) (7.02) (6.96) (8.81) (8.69) (8.70) (8.58)
Nr. Observations 83,562 83,562 92,953 92,953
Pseudo R2 0.158 0.203 0.172 0.212
BIC 12,470 11,866 13,603 13,009
AIC 12,199 11,558 13,329 12,697
Micro Small
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
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(Table I.11 Continued)
Panel B - Medium and large firms
Coef. Marg. Eff. Coef. Marg. Eff. Coef. Marg. Eff. Coef. Marg. Eff.
WORKING CAPITAL -1.0421*** -0.0144*** 0.7122 0.0089
(-4.38) (-4.27) (1.06) (1.03)
TURNOVER -1.8217*** -0.0251*** -1.0634 -0.0132*
(-7.40) (-7.03) (-1.63) (-1.70)
CASH & EQUIVALENTS -0.8716 -0.0117 0.5335 0.0066
(-0.86) (-0.86) (1.35) (1.29)
ACCOUNTS PAYABLE 2.9095*** 0.0389*** 2.2281*** 0.0274***
(11.48) (9.93) (2.80) (2.92)
ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE -0.7178* -0.0096* 2.4080** 0.0296**
(-1.73) (-1.73) (2.05) (1.99)
INVENTORIES -0.1448 -0.0019 0.2686 0.0033
(-1.05) (-1.05) (0.76) (0.77)
TAX LIABILITIES 6.2034*** 0.0829*** -2.3994 -0.0295
(8.68) (7.80) (-0.41) (-0.41)
INVESTMENT TURNOVER -0.0046 -0.0001 -0.0032 -0.0000
(-0.52) (-0.53) (-0.52) (-0.51)
LEVERAGE 2.7572*** 0.0380*** 1.8015*** 0.0241*** 1.6308*** 0.0203*** 0.8686 0.0107
(7.81) (7.22) (5.51) (5.34) (2.90) (2.70) (1.20) (1.19)
DEBT COVERAGE -2.0447*** -0.0282*** -3.0807*** -0.0412*** -2.8537** -0.0355* -2.9362** -0.0361**
(-3.45) (-3.39) (-5.17) (-4.97) (-2.17) (-1.95) (-2.27) (-2.03)
INTEREST COVERAGE -0.0015* -0.0000* -0.0010* -0.0000* 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
(-1.92) (-1.91) (-1.74) (-1.74) (1.45) (1.47) (0.90) (0.91)
SD CASHFLOW 2.0807** 0.0287** 1.4207 0.0190 -1.0861 -0.0135 -0.9633 -0.0118
(2.33) (2.33) (1.34) (1.34) (-0.29) (-0.29) (-0.29) (-0.29)
SALES GROWTH -0.5342** -0.0074** -0.8392*** -0.0112*** -1.5988** -0.0199** -0.9427 -0.0116
(-2.03) (-2.03) (-2.75) (-2.75) (-2.30) (-2.43) (-1.21) (-1.28)
SIZE -0.1881** -0.0026** 0.3544*** 0.0047*** 0.0021 0.0000 0.0463 0.0006
(-2.34) (-2.31) (4.66) (4.63) (0.01) (0.01) (0.24) (0.24)
AGE -0.1036 -0.0014 -0.0064 -0.0001 -0.2346 -0.0029 -0.2243 -0.0028
(-0.92) (-0.92) (-0.06) (-0.06) (-0.92) (-0.92) (-0.81) (-0.81)
CHANGE-EMPLOYEES -1.6056*** -0.0221*** -1.1781** -0.0158** 0.6837 0.0085 0.0867 0.0011
(-2.93) (-2.92) (-2.14) (-2.14) (0.49) (0.49) (0.06) (0.06)
CREDIT LINES -0.4369 -0.0060 0.0348 0.0005 -1.5089* -0.0188* -0.7932 -0.0097
(-1.53) (-1.57) (0.11) (0.11) (-1.79) (-1.96) (-0.80) (-0.84)
BANKING RELATIONSHIPS -1.9407*** -0.0267*** -2.0307*** -0.0272*** -0.2644 -0.0033 -0.4919 -0.0060
(-4.92) (-5.06) (-5.09) (-5.19) (-0.36) (-0.36) (-0.61) (-0.61)
CHANGE_BANK_REL -0.1161* -0.0016* -0.0714 -0.0010 -0.1300 -0.0016 -0.1637 -0.0020
(-1.89) (-1.89) (-1.16) (-1.16) (-0.98) (-0.97) (-1.17) (-1.16)
2007 0.1342 0.0018 0.2300 0.0031 1.3932*** 0.0173** 1.4360** 0.0176**
(0.66) (0.66) (1.03) (1.04) (2.58) (2.33) (2.41) (2.12)
2008 0.0442 0.0006 0.1469 0.0020 -0.4825 -0.0060 -0.2649 -0.0033
(0.23) (0.23) (0.72) (0.72) (-0.64) (-0.64) (-0.33) (-0.34)
2009 0.6761*** 0.0093*** 0.4200** 0.0056** 0.5363 0.0067 0.9591* 0.0118
(3.52) (3.45) (2.05) (2.04) (0.94) (0.91) (1.73) (1.55)
Nr. Observations 15,987 15,987 2,293 2,293
Pseudo R2 0.259 0.288 0.293 0.329
BIC 2,247 2,209 457 474
AIC 2,032 1,963 325 319
Model 1 Model 2
Medium Large
Model 1 Model 2
Note: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance levels at 1, 5, and 10 per cent, respectively. All models estimated
using a logit estimator, where the dependent variable, default, is a binary variable related to credit overdue. The
standard errors are robust and clustered at the firm level. t-statistics are presented in parentheses. The first column
of each Model presents the estimated coefficients, while the second column shows the marginal effects. The marginal
effects correspond to the average, assuming as baseline firms with credit lines and changes in the number of bank
lending relationships. In all regressions a constant and business sector dummies were included.
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Table I.12: Alternative econometric approach - Dependent variable: default - with lag regressors
Coef. Marg. Eff. Coef. Marg. Eff. Coef. Marg. Eff.




CASH & EQUIVALENTSt-1 -0.5635*** -0.0084*** -0.5205*** -0.0078***
(-3.31) (-3.30) (-3.15) (-3.14)
ACCOUNTS PAYABLEt-1 1.3873*** 0.0208*** 1.3646*** 0.0204***
(20.24) (17.98) (19.75) (17.63)
ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLEt-1 -0.1450 -0.0022 -0.1492 -0.0022
(-1.20) (-1.20) (-1.23) (-1.23)
INVENTORIESt-1 0.1170*** 0.0018*** 0.1177*** 0.0018***
(3.72) (3.69) (3.73) (3.70)
TAX LIABILITIESt-1 5.0907*** 0.0763***
(21.78) (19.21)
INVESTMENT TURNOVERt-1 -0.0045** -0.0001** -0.0044** -0.0001**
(-2.27) (-2.26) (-2.31) (-2.30)
SOCIAL SEC. LIABILITIESt-1 9.1100*** 0.1360***
(17.49) (16.09)
OTHER TAXESt-1 4.2757*** 0.0638***
(15.12) (14.15)
LEVERAGEt-1 1.3133*** 0.0198*** 0.6928*** 0.0104*** 0.6638*** 0.0099***
(11.67) (11.15) (6.20) (6.12) (5.95) (5.87)
DEBT COVERAGEt-1 -1.0898*** -0.0164*** -1.7684*** -0.0265*** -1.7343*** -0.0259***
(-5.83) (-5.78) (-9.56) (-9.32) (-9.29) (-9.07)
INTEREST COVERAGEt-1 -0.0004** -0.0000** -0.0005*** -0.0000*** -0.0005*** -0.0000***
(-2.47) (-2.47) (-2.68) (-2.67) (-2.62) (-2.61)
SD CASHFLOWt-1 3.5823*** 0.0540*** 2.4991*** 0.0375*** 2.5343*** 0.0378***
(12.86) (12.24) (8.32) (8.13) (8.49) (8.29)
SALES GROWTHt-1 -0.2308** -0.0035** -0.3506*** -0.0053*** -0.3515*** -0.0052***
(-2.51) (-2.50) (-3.50) (-3.48) (-3.51) (-3.49)
SIZEt-1 0.0588*** 0.0009*** 0.2215*** 0.0033*** 0.2196*** 0.0033***
(2.71) (2.72) (11.51) (11.41) (11.32) (11.23)
AGE -0.3804*** -0.0057*** -0.3969*** -0.0059*** -0.4065*** -0.0061***
(-8.91) (-8.69) (-9.46) (-9.18) (-9.69) (-9.39)
CHANGE-EMPLOYEESt-1 -0.5751*** -0.0087*** -0.5648*** -0.0085*** -0.5532*** -0.0083***
(-3.93) (-3.91) (-3.75) (-3.73) (-3.67) (-3.66)
CREDIT LINESt-1 -0.1509** -0.0023*** -0.1342** -0.0020** -0.1329** -0.0020**
(-2.57) (-2.66) (-2.25) (-2.32) (-2.23) (-2.29)
BANKING RELATIONSHIPSt-1 -2.4056*** -0.0363*** -2.2520*** -0.0337*** -2.2526*** -0.0336***
(-21.19) (-19.62) (-19.84) (-18.50) (-19.84) (-18.52)
CHANGE_BANK_RELt-1 0.0716** 0.0011** 0.0942*** 0.0014*** 0.0945*** 0.0014***
(2.49) (2.49) (3.33) (3.32) (3.35) (3.34)
2007 -0.5197*** -0.0078*** -0.6085*** -0.0091*** -0.6177*** -0.0092***
(-8.82) (-8.64) (-10.06) (-9.80) (-10.17) (-9.90)
2008 -0.1427*** -0.0022*** -0.1628*** -0.0024*** -0.1628*** -0.0024***
(-2.64) (-2.63) (-2.96) (-2.96) (-2.95) (-2.95)
Nr. Observations 119,553 119,553 119,553
Pseudo R2 0.129 0.138 0.143
BIC 17,791 17,655 17,568
AIC 17,520 17,345 17,248
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Note: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance levels at 1, 5, and 10 per cent, respectively. All models estimated
using a logit estimator, where the dependent variable, default, is a binary variable related to credit overdue. The
standard errors are robust and clustered at the firm level. t-statistics are presented in parentheses. The first column
of each Model presents the estimated coefficients, while the second column shows the marginal effects. The marginal
effects correspond to the average, assuming as baseline firms with credit lines and changes in the number of bank
lending relationships. In all regressions a constant and business sector dummies were included.
54
Chapter 2
Structure of corporate funding
Abstract: Funding is crucial for firms to invest, but also to operate their daily business.
Different types of debt have different characteristics and requirements for firms. This study
identifies the main determinants of the composition of corporate funding. In addition
to bank and trade credit, two major funding sources, we also include in the analysis
tax liabilities and loans granted by shareholders or intra-group operations. The results
suggest that some firms’ characteristics, such as profitability, present a similar relationship
across the alternative funding sources under analysis, while others show a heterogeneous
relationship. The results also suggest the relevance of variables related to firms’ activity
and business risk in the funding structure, and their heterogeneity across firms.
JEL Classification: G21, G32
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2.1 Introduction
Funding is crucial for firms to invest and to expand, but also to operate their daily
business. Some firms rely more intensively on internal funds, while others rely
mainly on external funding. What determines a firm’s capital structure and the
heterogeneity across firms are important topics for corporate finance, but also for
the real economy. The level of corporate indebtedness of some countries, such as
Portugal, and its implications for the economic recovery have often been discussed
over the last years, especially during the most recent economic and financial crises.
The literature on corporate capital structure is vast. This literature explores the
advantages and disadvantages of capital and debt for firms, driven by market fric-
tions, conflict of interest between shareholders and managers, and tax benefits. The
trade-off theory (in which leverage reflects the balance between debt’s advantages
and costs) and the pecking order theory (the hierarchy of funding sources) are two
of the most discussed theories in this field. However, it is also important to look
carefully at the composition of corporate debt. Indeed, even for firms that have
relatively stable leverage ratios, a non-negligible share of these firms may change
the composition of their liabilities, as discussed by Rauh & Sufi (2010).
Different types of debt have different characteristics and requirements for firms.
For instance, each type of debt has a distinct market function, different sensitivity
to firm’s information, and different payments schemes. Thus, it is also important
to analyze firms’ debt components. Along these lines, some studies explore the
composition of firm’s liabilities, as well as firm’s access to financial markets. Due to
their magnitude in total external funding in several countries, bank and trade credit
are two debt components that have received extensive interest in the literature.
This study explores the composition of corporate debt. In addition to the analysis
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of bank and trade credit, we also analyze debt components related to tax liabilities
and shareholder or intra-group operations. Tax liabilities can be a relevant com-
ponent for liquidity and working capital management. In turn, loans granted by
shareholders or intra-group operations raise several important issues due to their
nature, i.e. firm’s owners provide funds to firms thought debt instruments rather
than own equity. The purpose of this study is to identify the main determinants
of bank and trade credit, but also of tax liabilities and shareholder or intra-group
loans.
This study contributes to the empirical literature on corporate funding as it ex-
plores different debt components that have different characteristics, thereby possibly
exposing firms to different shocks. Moreover, a particular contribution is related to
the analysis of some debt components that are not usually documented in the litera-
ture of corporate funding or liquidity management, namely loans from shareholders
or intra-group operations and tax liabilities. In order to perform the analysis we
use a unique and detailed micro database for Portuguese firms, namely the Central
Balance Sheet Database, which covers virtually the entire Portuguese corporate sec-
tor. Thus, this study explores a large set of non-public firms, dominated by small
and medium sized enterprises, which are important segments for economic activity
and employment in several countries. These firms are also more dependent on the
funding components under analysis, as the access to financial public debt markets
is limited (usually available to larger firms).
According to the results obtained, firms’ profitability is negatively related to all
of the funding sources included in the analysis. Variables related to the activity
of firms also play a role in determining the funding sources. Furthermore, a firm’s
business risk seems to be an important feature, especially for tax liabilities and
shareholder or intra-group loans.
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The remainder of this Chapter proceeds as follows: Section 2.2 briefly reviews
part of the literature on corporate funding. Section 2.3 describes the data sources
and presents some descriptive statistics. Section 2.4 presents the econometric ap-
proach. Section 2.5 shows the empirical results, while Section 2.6 explores hetero-
geneity across firms. Section 2.7 presents some robustness tests. Finally, Section 2.8
concludes.
2.2 Related literature
According to Modigliani & Miller (1958), under some assumptions, notably in the
absence of taxes, a firm’s capital structure (equity versus debt) is irrelevant in
determining its value. However, as discussed in Modigliani & Miller (1963), the
existence of corporate taxes and the possibility of recognizing interest payments as
a cost (creating tax shields) change considerably the earlier Modigliani and Miller’s
paradigm (i.e. the Capital structure irrelevance proposition). The authors showed
there are some benefits for firms by holding debt, but holding debt also has costs,
such as the costs associated with financial distress.
Following these seminal papers, there was a considerable increase of research
(both theoretical and empirical) on capital structure. Most of the empirical research
has focused on testing the implications of two main views of capital structure: the
trade-off theory and the pecking order theory (Myers (1984) and Myers & Majluf
(1984)). According to the former, firms have targets for the leverage ratios that
balance several debt costs (e.g. financial distress costs, such as explored in Kraus &
Litzenberger (1973), or the stockholders-bondholders agency conflicts, as discussed
in Jensen & Meckling (1976)) and debt benefits (e.g. tax shields or mitigating
manager-shareholder agency costs). According to the pecking order theory, firms
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follow an optimal financing hierarchy in order to minimize adverse selection costs
due to market imperfections in financial/credit markets. Under this theory, firms
first use internal funds, then use debt, and issue equity only once their debt capacity
is exhausted. Even though these theories identified relevant facts related to firm’s
capital structure, some unexplained empirical facts remain. For instance, neither of
these theories is able to explain the diversity observed in debt structure of firms.
More recently, other theories have been added that complement this field, seeking to
introduce alternative explanations for firm’s capital structure decisions, such as the
dynamic trade-off theory (related to adjustment costs or endogenous investment),
and the equity market timing theory.1
Understanding firms’ choices between internal and external funding is an impor-
tant issue. However, it is also important to look carefully at the composition of
corporate debt. Indeed, even within firms that have relatively stable leverage ra-
tios, a non-negligible share of firms also present changes in the composition of their
liabilities, as shown in Rauh & Sufi (2010).
Looking at financial debt, empirical studies such as Barclay & Smith (1995),
Gomes & Phillips (2012), Houston & James (1996), Houston & James (2001), John-
son (1997), Cantillo & Wright (2000), and Hadlock & James (2002) investigate the
relationship between the use of public or private debt (for instance, wholesale debt
market or bank credit, respectively) and firms’ characteristics. In general, these
studies confirm the positive relationship between public debt and some firms’ char-
acteristics such as size, leverage, age, and the amount issued. Denis & Mihov (2003)
also analyzed the differences between debt types, exploring the determinants of new
debt issues.2 They found that one of the main determinants is a firm’s credit qual-
ity. Their results suggest that firms with the highest credit quality obtain credit
1Frank M, Goyal V. (2008) and Graham & Leary (2011) present a survey of the literature on
capital structure.
2The authors explored profitability, probability of default (based on Altman’s Z-score), and
credit rating variables as proxies for firms’ “project and credit quality”.
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in financial markets, firms with medium credit quality obtain funding from banks,
while firms with the lowest credit quality borrow from non-bank private lenders.
More recently, Rauh & Sufi (2010) adopted a different perspective in analyzing
capital structure decisions and debt components. They found that the standard cor-
relation between determinants and leverage ratios can be quite different depending
upon the debt instrument under analysis. Moreover, they show that the reliance on
several debt instruments depends on the firm’s credit quality. Colla et al. (2013) ex-
tended the data set used by Rauh & Sufi (2010) by including unrated public firms.
Unlike Rauh & Sufi (2010), in this data set they found a tendency toward debt
specialization, i.e. the concentration in one type of debt. Despite the differences
in their findings (related to the data set), both studies highlight that a deeper look
into debt components would reveal relevant information about corporate funding.
Due to the importance of bank credit as an external funding source to firms, as
many firms do not have access to the wholesale debt markets in several countries,
an important avenue of research explores bank debt and, in particular, the bank
lending relationships. This literature is quite extensive and suggests an impact of
these relationships on firms’ access to external finance and on contract conditions.
According to the literature, firm-bank relationships play a critical role in mitigat-
ing asymmetric information, which is especially important for smaller and younger
firms. The literature suggests that a borrower should benefit from few and longer
bank lending relationships. However, the empirical results on this topic are mixed.3
Actually, many firms have more than a single bank lending relationship. The num-
ber of lending relationships may be influenced by several factors: for both firms
and banks there is a trade-off between the benefits of a closer lending relationship
3For instance, an increase in the number of lending relationships decreases the amount of credit
(Petersen & Rajan (1994), Cole (1998) and Harhoff & Korting (1998)), while longer relationships
increase the availability of credit (Petersen & Rajan (1994) and Harhoff & Korting (1998)), and
decrease collateral requirements (Harhoff & Korting (1998) and Berger & Udell (1995)). However,
regarding interest rates, the empirical evidence is mixed (e.g. Berger & Udell (1995), Houston &
James (1996), Petersen & Rajan (1994), and Bonfim et al. (2008)).
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and the benefits of a broader diversification of lenders/borrowers, such as the firm’s
hold-up problems, market competition or banks’ portfolio diversification (e.g. Car-
letti et al. (2007)). The relationship between the number of credit relationships and
a firm’s credit quality has also been investigated, but the arguments in this topic
are divergent (e.g. Degryse & Ongena (2001), Farinha & Santos (2002), and Fok
et al. (2004)).
Beyond financial debt markets and bank credit, there is some literature look-
ing into other funding sources, namely non-financial funding such as trade credit.
This is motivated by the fact that trade credit is widely used and represents an im-
portant funding component for several firms. In the traditional perspective, trade
credit plays a non-financial role for firms, such as the reduction of transaction costs,
price discrimination, warranty of product quality, or fostering relationships with
customers (e.g. Ferris (1981), Petersen & Rajan (1997)). Financial literature has
complemented this analysis, showing that trade credit also plays a role as a funding
source for firms. One of the main questions under discussion is the relationship
between trade credit and other funding sources (perceived as cheaper), especially
bank credit. The predominant idea is that firms use trade credit because they are
bank credit constraints, i.e. firms use alternative forms of credit before trade credit
(e.g. Petersen & Rajan (1994), Nilsen (2002), Cuñat (2007), and Atanasova & Wil-
son (2004)). Nevertheless, according to Biais & Gollier (1997), Burkart & Ellingsen
(2004), and Fabbri & Menichini (2010) trade credit can also play a role as a com-
plement to bank credit. A firm’s suppliers may have a comparative advantage over
financial institutions in collecting information, assessing the firm’s creditworthiness,
and monitoring its decisions. Thus, due to suppliers’ ability to discriminate be-
tween “good” and “bad” firms, trade credit may be also a signal about a firm’s
credit quality (as already identified in Schwartz (1974)).
This study explores the differences of funding components, as highlighted in Rauh
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& Sufi (2010) and Colla et al. (2013). However, while they focus on financial debt
instruments, we analyze firms’ liabilities in a broader perspective. Hence, the anal-
ysis presented in this Chapter is related to the literature that explores bank and
trade credit, two of the main components of a firm’s liabilities, but it explores ad-
ditional debt components, namely tax liabilities and loans granted by shareholders
or intra-group operations. To the best of our knowledge, these debt components are
not well documented in the empirical literature of corporate funding.
Tax liabilities may be related to the possibility that firms exploit the payment
schedule of these liabilities, e.g. allowing firms to overcome/manage liquidity needs.
In turn, shareholder or intra-group loans are a topic that raises several questions,
given the holders of these loans and the relationship with own equity. Depending
on the contracts, these loans can be perceived as capital by the other debt holders.
Indeed, in some jurisdictions, these loans are treated as capital when insolvency
events occur. Moreover, there are also some specificities in the remuneration of these
loans that may contribute to their attractiveness to firms. For firms, the interest
paid on these loans, under some circumstances, can be treated as a cost. Thus, these
loans may generate some benefits for firms. Furthermore, since in Europe equity
decreases are seriously constrained, shareholder loans or intra-group operations are
a more flexible way to finance firms than equity. The reimbursement of these loans
is limited by covenants and terms defined in debt contracts instead of the general
equity law. Additionally, from the shareholders’ perspective, there may also exist
some heterogeneous fiscal treatment on income earned by interests or dividends
(loans versus capital remuneration). This too may have an impact on shareholders’
incentives between the two options to “invest” in firms.
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2.3 Data and variables
2.3.1 Data sources
The main data source used in this analysis is the annual information from the
Central Balance Sheet Database (CB) for the Portuguese corporate sector, available
at Banco de Portugal. The CB contains information from the financial statements,
and some additional firm characteristics, such as the industry sector and the start-
up date. Since 2006 the annual CB has been based on the Simplified Corporate
Information (Informação Empresarial Simplificada - IES) instead of on a voluntary
survey.4 In order to use IES, which has almost universal coverage of the Portuguese
corporate sector, the sample period begins in 2006 and goes up to 2012.
It is noteworthy that in 2010 there were some changes that affected the use of
IES. On one hand, there was a change in the accounting rules. On the other, a new
template was implemented. These events required adjustments in the information
available in IES. Against this background, some variables should be interpreted with
special care given the need to reconcile the two reports and establish a link between
the two accounting schemes.5
In part of the analysis performed in this study, we complement the IES data
with the information available at the Central Credit Register (CRC). The CRC
contains data on credit granted by financial institutions operating in Portugal for
contracts above 50 euros. This database includes the total outstanding amount of
4IES is an electronic submission of information of accounting, fiscal, and statistical nature that
firms usually have to submit to several Portuguese authorities, namely Ministry of Justice, Ministry
of Finance, Statistics of Portugal, and Banco de Portugal. Thus, instead of firms submitting nearly
the same information to the different public entities, at different moments in time and different
reports, as occurred before 2006, with IES firms do it once through the electronic system. As all
firms have to submit the report, IES allows a high coverage of the Portuguese corporate sector by
the Central Balance Sheet Database of Banco de Portugal.
5This topic will be explored in more detail whenever relevant in the following sections.
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loans, and unused credit lines among other components.6 CRC is mandatory and
is reported on a monthly basis to Banco de Portugal. This database also allows
matching firm-banks at each moment in time.
We impose some criteria in the definition of the data set. First, the financial sector
and public administrations were excluded, as well as observations with misreported
data for total assets, business volume, number of employees, or age. Moreover, firms
with fewer than five employees were also ruled out. In addition, in order to remove
outliers, we winsorize the variables at the top and bottom two per cent levels of
their distribution.
After these steps, the data set comprises more than 655,000 observations, which
corresponds to an unbalanced panel covering the period 2006 to 2012 and around
147,000 firms.7
2.3.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 2.1 displays some descriptive statistics on the capital structure and debt com-
position for firms included in the data set. Table 2.2 presents the mean and median
figures of the distribution of these variables in each year.
At the aggregate level, Table 2.1, bank debt is the main external funding source for
firms included in the data set. Despite this fact, a considerable share of firms in the
sample does not have any bank linkage (around 30 per cent). For Portuguese firms,
bank credit corresponds to the main component of financial debt. Debt securities
represent a small fraction of financial debt, given that few firms have access to the
6For further details on the CRC and IES databases, see Booklet Nr.5 of Banco de Portugal
(Banco de Portugal (2011a)), and Supplement of Statistical Bulletin (Banco de Portugal (2008)),
respectively.
7However, due to lack of available data for some variables under analysis for all observations,
the econometric analysis performed in next sections may include a smaller set of firms.
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wholesale debt market. Therefore, in this analysis, debt securities are included in
the component “other funding”, the omitted category in the analysis. The two
other sizable categories in firms’ funding structures are trade credit and shareholder
or intra-group loans. Tax liabilities amount to a smaller fraction of funding, but all
firms use or manage the payment schedule of these liabilities.
When we observe the figures related to the distribution of these variables in
the sample, Table 2.2, there are notable differences. Total indebtedness levels are
higher, in terms of both the mean and the median figures. This means that several
smaller firms have higher leverage ratios than larger firms. The structure of funding
sources is also different between aggregate figures and the respective distribution.
The share of trade credit increases significantly, while the bank credit decreases.
Shareholder or intra-group loans also increase considerably in the first years of the
sample period, but decrease thereafter. However this break should be interpreted
carefully, since it may be related to the changes in the accounting schemes and IES’s
reports introduced in 2010. Note that these events seem to affect the share of bank
credit too, but to a lesser extent.8
The results of the two approaches highlight the importance of complementing the
analysis of the corporate sector at aggregate level with additional analysis based on
microdata, due to the significant differences in firms’ funding structure.
Table 2.3 presents some summary statistics looking at the funding structure by
firms’ size and age.9 The empirical literature suggests that there are differences in
8The effect of the changes introduced in 2010 were not so evident at the aggregate level (i.e.
with weighted figures). The impact of these events are taken into account in the analysis presented
in the next sections. Moreover, it should be mentioned that the change in accounting schemes and
reports avoids the distinction between loans from shareholders and loans from firms in the same
economic group (defined as “intra-group operations” in this analysis), which was possible for the
period before 2010.
9Firms’ size is defined according to the European Commission Recommendation of 6 May 2003
(2003/361/EC). Thus, micro firms are defined as those with fewer than 10 employees and less
than 2 million euro of business volume or total assets; small firms are those with fewer than 50
employees and less than 10 million euro of business volume or total assets; medium firms are those
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the access to external finance based on firm size and age, which are usually proxies
for asymmetric information, information opaqueness, and the firm’s credit quality
(for instance, as discussed in Carey et al. (1993), and Denis & Mihov (2003)).
By firm size, we observe that larger firms are more capitalized. Looking at the
external funding sources, bank credit is more important for small and medium sized
firms, while the share of trade credit is relatively stable across cohorts. Tax liabilities
and loans from shareholders or intra-group operations are especially important in
the funding structure of micro and small firms.
By firm age, we see that younger firms are relatively less capitalized. They also
present differences in their debt structure, with higher shares of tax liabilities and
loans from shareholders or intra-group operations than the other firms.
Table 2.1: Funding sources at the aggregate level - Weighted average
Nr. of Equity Total Bank Trade Tax Shareholder
firms Funding Credit Credit Liabilities & Intra Group
2006 100,355 0.303 0.598 0.188 0.138 0.027 0.078
2007 102,375 0.303 0.596 0.179 0.132 0.024 0.090
2008 100,662 0.283 0.617 0.194 0.129 0.020 0.095
2009 94,743 0.286 0.605 0.189 0.124 0.021 0.101
2010 93,620 0.301 0.645 0.200 0.124 0.019 0.113
2011 86,148 0.293 0.655 0.181 0.123 0.017 0.141
2012 77,283 0.287 0.661 0.168 0.114 0.018 0.148
Share of observations 0.86 1.00 0.69 0.94 1.00 0.41
with positive values
Note: All the variables are scaled by total assets and defined at book value. Total funding corresponds to the ratio
of total debt (excluding Accruals and deferrals, and provisions) over total assets. Thus, Total funding and Equity,
as presented, are not complements, i.e. the sum of the two variables may be different from one.
As far as firm characteristics are concerned, we start the analysis by exploring the
standard variables discussed in the capital structure literature, i.e. variables related
to internal funding, agency costs, bankruptcy costs, and asymmetric information.
with fewer than 250 employees and a business volume below 50 million euros or whose total assets
is lower than 43 million euros. The remaining firms are considered large firms.
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Table 2.2: Funding sources - Distribution in the dataset
Nr. of Equity Total Bank Trade Tax Shareholder
firms Funding Credit Credit Liabilities & Intra Group
2006 100,355 0.238 0.722 0.128 0.208 0.083 0.112
0.226 0.710 0.045 0.156 0.040 0.002
2007 102,373 0.226 0.717 0.133 0.205 0.077 0.107
0.243 0.703 0.051 0.152 0.036 0.001
2008 100,660 0.227 0.715 0.139 0.199 0.073 0.106
0.247 0.697 0.055 0.145 0.034 0.000
2009 94,741 0.237 0.705 0.150 0.191 0.070 0.102
0.259 0.686 0.076 0.137 0.033 0.000
2010 93,620 0.236 0.747 0.198 0.195 0.071 0.040
0.268 0.717 0.137 0.140 0.033 0.000
2011 86,148 0.241 0.744 0.184 0.190 0.070 0.058
0.283 0.702 0.118 0.135 0.032 0.000
2012 77,283 0.245 0.739 0.174 0.188 0.072 0.062
0.300 0.685 0.104 0.132 0.033 0.000
Note: All the variables are scaled by total assets and defined at book value. Total funding corresponds to the ratio
of total debt, excluding (excluding accruals and deferrals, and provisions) over total assets. Thus, Total funding
and Equity, as presented, are not complements, i.e. the sum of the two variables may be different from one. In each
year, the first row shows the mean figures, while the second row shows the median figures (in italics).
Thus, in line with Rajan & Zingales (1995) for instance, we consider profitability,
growth opportunities, tangibility, and size.
Profitability (PROFITABILITY) is defined as net earnings before provisions and
depreciations over total assets. It thus measures firm’s internal generation of funds.
Sales growth (SALES GROWTH) is the year-on-year change of real sales, and it controls
for the firm’s growth opportunities.10 Tangibility (TANGIBILITY) corresponds to the
share of tangible assets over total assets, and is used to control for assets that a
firm can pledge as collateral in credit operations, which contributes to a decrease
in agency costs. These assets should retain more value in case of liquidation and
thus they also contribute to a decrease in bankruptcy costs. Moreover, tangibility
gives some insights about the assets structure of each firm. Firm’s size (SIZE) is
included in the analysis as the logarithm of total real assets. Size is usually related
10Firm’s growth opportunities are usually controlled in the literature through measures related
with firm’s market value. However, this approach is not suitable to the Portuguese case, given the
small share of quoted firms.
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Table 2.3: Funding sources by firm size and age
Panel A - Firm size
Micro Small Medium Large
mean median mean median mean median mean median
Total funding 0.76 0.72 0.70 0.69 0.65 0.65 0.61 0.61
Equity 0.21 0.25 0.26 0.27 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.30
Bank credit 0.14 0.05 0.17 0.11 0.19 0.15 0.14 0.05
Trade credit 0.19 0.13 0.20 0.16 0.20 0.16 0.18 0.14
Tax liabilities 0.08 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.05 0.02
Shareholder & Intra Group 0.11 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.07 0.00
Share of each class 52.39 40.35 6.19 1.07
Panel B - Firm age
Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 4
mean median mean median mean median mean median
Total funding 0.85 0.81 0.74 0.72 0.67 0.66 0.63 0.60
Equity 0.10 0.15 0.22 0.24 0.29 0.31 0.33 0.37
Bank credit 0.15 0.05 0.16 0.09 0.16 0.10 0.15 0.08
Trade credit 0.22 0.16 0.20 0.15 0.19 0.14 0.17 0.13
Tax liabilities 0.10 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.03
Shareholder & Intra Group 0.10 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.08 0.00
Share of each class 26.59 25.03 24.31 24.07
Note: All the variables are scaled by total assets and defined at book value. Total funding corresponds to the ratio
of total debt, defined as total liabilities (excluding accruals and deferrals, and provisions) over total assets. Thus,
Total funding and Equity, as presented, are not complements. Firm age classes were defined based on the quartiles
of the distribution. Class 1: age ≤ 6 years; Class 2: 6< age ≤ 12 years; Class 3: 12 < age ≤ 21 years; Class 4:
age>21 years.
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to asymmetric information and the firm’s credit quality. In the same line, age (AGE)
is also included: older firms have established track records that lenders can evaluate.
Additionally, age is also related to the firm’s life cycle: financial needs are usually
higher in the initial years of firms.
As we intend to investigate corporate funding in more detail, instead of the to-
tal leverage ratio, it is also important to control for additional factors that can be
underlying the use of different funding sources by firms (and thereby minimize po-
tential “omitted variable bias”). As some of funding sources considered are related
to a firm’s activity, variables related to this dimension are also explored. There-
fore, we include variables directly related to firm’s operational activity and working
capital. Namely, we also look into the share of inventories over assets, (INVENTO-
RIES), credit granted to customers (ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE), and the turnover ratio
(TURNOVER). A measure related to the business risk of firms is also included, using
as proxy the volatility of the cashflow ratio (SD CASHFLOW).
Following the bank lending relationship literature, and the effect of those rela-
tionships on firm’s access to funding, some variables related with firm-bank lending
relationships are also investigated. We include as explanatory variables the num-
ber of banking relationships, defined at the banking group level, and taking into
account the weight of each banking group on the firm’s total bank debt (BANKING
RELATIONSHIP), as well as the duration of the longest banking relationship (LENGTH
BANKREL). The availability of unused credit lines (CREDIT LINE) is also considered.
Finally, the set of firm characteristics includes a dummy variable that controls if
the firm belongs to an economic group (EC. GROUP). The inclusion of this control
variable is motivated by the fact that the balance sheet data are not reported on
a consolidated basis. This implies that the share of some funding sources may be
affected by funds transactions at the group level.11
11For instance, a firm can borrow from the banking system and provide the loan to another firm
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Table 2.4 has some summary descriptive statistics of these firms’ variables in the
data set. Table II.1 in the Appendices Section of this Chapter briefly summarizes
all variables. Table II.2 presents the correlation matrix.
Table 2.4: Summary statistics - Firm characteristics
Nr. mean sd p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
PROFITABILITY 655,187 0.04 0.17 -0.11 0.01 0.05 0.11 0.20
SALES GROWTH 568,450 -0.03 0.32 -0.38 -0.16 -0.02 0.11 0.30
TANGIBILITY 655,187 0.27 0.24 0.02 0.07 0.20 0.41 0.64
SIZE 655,149 13.07 1.57 11.23 12.02 12.95 13.97 15.07
AGE 655,187 2.49 0.84 1.39 1.95 2.56 3.09 3.50
ASSET TURNOVER 655,187 1.48 1.20 0.38 0.70 1.16 1.86 2.93
INVENTORIES 655,187 0.18 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.28 0.54
ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE 655,187 0.25 0.23 0.00 0.02 0.20 0.42 0.60
CASHFLOW VOLATILITY 638,929 0.11 0.14 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.12 0.25
BANKING RELATIONSHIP 655,187 0.60 0.36 0.00 0.34 0.59 1.00 1.00
LENGTH BANKREL. 655,187 1.61 0.95 0.00 1.10 1.95 2.40 2.56
CREDIT LINE 655,187 0.59 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Note: sd stands for standard deviation. p10, p25, p50, p75, and p90 stand for, respectively, the percentiles 10, 25,
50, 75, and 90 of the distribution of each variable.
2.4 Econometric approach
2.4.1 Empirical specification
As mentioned above, we are interested in analyzing firms’ funding sources, namely
bank credit, trade credit, loans granted by shareholders or intra-group operations,
and tax liabilities. The econometric analysis is based on seemingly unrelated regres-
sions (SUR), as a firm’s alternative funding sources may be related. Therefore, each
that belongs to same economic group. In this case, for the latter firm, the share of bank credit
would be underestimated.
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equation in the system has the following specification:
Fundingji,t
Asseti,t
= c+ βXi,t−1 + δzi + ϕwt + µ
j
i,t (2.1)
where j stands for each funding source under analysis, i is the firm’s identification,
and t corresponds to the time dimension. Therefore, the dependent variable cor-
responds to funding source j of firm i in period t, scaled by total assets. Xi,t−1 is
a vector of firm i time-varying variables, which may affect the firm’s debt compo-
nents, evaluated at t− 1. Additionally, zi and wt correspond to industry sector and
time effects, respectively. The industry sector dummies control for differences in the
market in which the firm operates, while time effects, represented by year dummies,
control for changes that affect all firms simultaneously. Finally, µji,t corresponds to
the error term of each equation.
The SUR approach estimates the four equations simultaneously and takes into
account the possible relationship between the error terms of each equation. More-
over, due to the specificities of the data set, in the regression set up, the standard
errors are robust and clustered at the firm level, controlling for the heteroscedasticity
issues and the longitudinal dimension at firm level.
2.5 Determinants of firms funding sources
2.5.1 Capital structure variables
As a starting point for the econometric analysis, the choice of the firm characteristics
included as explanatory variables is motivated by the capital structure literature. As
such, the specifications include variables related to profitability, sales growth, size,
and tangibility. Firm’s age is also included as it is a proxy for firm’s information
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opaqueness and life cycle. Additionally, the specifications include a dummy variable
that controls if a firm belongs to an economic group.
Table 2.5 contains the results under the SUR approach.12 Model 1 includes
the above mentioned firm characteristics only as regressors. An overview of the
results allows us to conclude that these variables are broadly statistically significant.
Moreover, we also observe that some variables show a heterogeneous impact across
the funding sources under analysis.
PROFITABILITY has a negative coefficient in all equations, suggesting that firms
with more internal funds use less external funding than other firms, which is in line
with some findings in the literature (e.g. Fama & French (2002), Frank & Goyal
(2003), and Antão & Bonfim (2012)). The comparison of the coefficients across the
funding sources allows us to observe that profitability seems to have a greater impact
on the trade credit component. The negative relationship between internal funds
and external funding is usually presented as evidence supporting the pecking order
theory (i.e. due to asymmetric information, firms use internal funds before external
funding sources), in opposition to the trade-off theory. Following the latter theory,
profitability should be positively related with leverage, as it helps to decrease the
bankruptcy costs and allows tax shields.13
SIZE is always statistically significant, but has a heterogeneous impact on funding
sources: a positive coefficient in bank and trade credit and the opposite sign in the
remaining funding sources. The positive sign for bank and trade credit should be
related to asymmetric information and firm’s credit quality. Indeed, larger firms
12As the set of regressors is the same in the four equations in the system, the coefficients
estimated under the SUR approach coincide with those estimated with Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS). However, as the SUR controls for the correlation between the residuals of the equations
included in the system, the t-statistics and consequently the significance of the coefficients can be
different under the two econometric approaches.
13Nevertheless, as described in Section 2.2, a recent research avenue in this field presents alterna-
tive explanations for the negative coefficient of profitability that are not necessarily in contradiction
to the trade-off theory.
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tend to have more information available and usually have higher credit quality, as
they are usually more diversified (as discussed in Fama & French (2002) and Frank
& Goyal (2003)). Therefore, the access to financial debt, in particular bank credit,
should be easier for these firms (which is in line with the positive coefficient). A
possible reason underlying the positive relationship between size and trade credit
is that larger firms may have more offers of credit from their suppliers, as they
are usually firms with high credit quality. Moreover, large firms may also have
some bargaining power with suppliers and, consequently, negotiate better contract
conditions (which may be reflected, for instance, in higher credit amounts and/or
longer periods to repay the credit). In this line, Klapper et al. (2012) found that
smaller firms provide trade credit to larger firms with lengthy maturity. Indeed, a
limitation of using accounts payable, obtained in balance sheet, as a measure of trade
credit is that it is not possible to distinguish between transactional and financing
purposes, nor is it possible to identify the supplier, and consequently establish trade
credit chains.
TANGIBILITY also shows a heterogeneous impact on the different funding sources.
This variable allows us to assess the share of assets that can be pledged as collateral
in credit contracts. For bank credit, as expected, the coefficient is positive (e.g.
in line with Rauh & Sufi (2010)). Tangibility also has a positive coefficient for
shareholder or intra-group loans. For trade credit and tax liabilities, the coefficient
is negative. The highest impact is recorded on bank credit equation. This result is
in line with the idea that fixed assets should be financed with longer-term funding
and also support the role of collateral in mitigating information asymmetries.
AGE has a negative coefficient in all equations except shareholder loans or intra-
group operations. Older firms appear to be less indebted than younger ones, for
some specific debt components. These results may be related to a firm’s life cycle,
as firms tend to have higher financial needs in the beginning of their activity (e.g.
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they have lower levels of accumulated capital, and higher investment needs).
Model 2, in the same table, presents the results for the specification including
time dummies also as explanatory variables. The time dummies capture differences
that affect all the firms simultaneously, such as macroeconomic and financial devel-
opments. The inclusion of these variables in the analysis is crucial, given that the
sample period includes different phases of the economic business cycle: years of eco-
nomic activity growth and years of severe economic recession. Moreover, the time
dummies also allow us to control the impact of the changes recorded in IES’ reports
and accounting schemes mentioned above that took place in 2010 and affected all
firms.
The results obtained in this specification are broadly the same. The main change
occurs in SALES GROWTH. In this specification, when statistically significant, it has
a positive coefficient. This result may signal some financial needs, since sales growth
should be related to a firm’s growth opportunity. However, the economic impact is
relatively small (based on standard-deviation changes).
Looking at the time dummies variables, in the bank credit equation, the re-
sults suggest that there was an increase in the average share of this funding up to
2009/2010 (taking 2007 as reference), and thereafter fell slightly. For trade credit
the coefficients are negative, but for the last years of the sample period they suggest
a relative stability. For tax labilities the coefficients are always negative, but with
smaller magnitudes. The effects of changes in the accounting schemes and IES’s
templates seem to be underlying the shareholder or intra-group loans, which were
the funding sources that had the highest series break, looking at the descriptive
statistics.
Finally, Model 3 presents the results with the inclusion of business dummies in
the specification. The literature emphasizes the importance of controlling for the
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business sector of firms, in particular in the analysis of funding issues (e.g. Fisman
& Love (2003), and Fabbri & Menichini (2010)). For simplicity, the coefficients of
these variables are not reported in the table. In general, the conclusions described
above continue to hold.
All in all, the results highlight the heterogeneous impact of some firms’ charac-
teristics on different funding sources. The exception is profitability, which presents
negative relationships with all of the funding sources under analysis. Profitability is
also within the variables with higher economic impact across the different funding
sources (assessed by standard-deviation changes).
The econometric results obtained afford us some first insights on the relations
between some key firm characteristics and debt composition, which may contribute
to a better understanding of corporate funding.
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2.5.2 Delving deeper into firm activity
The previous analysis explored the key variables discussed in the capital structure
literature. In order to look into the composition of funding in more detail, it may also
be important to control for additional firm characteristics that can be influencing the
use of the different funding sources. Therefore, we include in the analysis measures
related to the firm’s activity as explanatory variables, namely variables related to
inventories, credit granted by firms to customers, and turnover. We also include a
variable related to the business risk, given that this characteristic may affect the
type of funding that the firm can obtain. The results of the new specification are
presented in Table 2.6. Given the relevance of time and business dummies observed
in the previous sub-section, only the estimates with these variables are presented.14
According to the results obtained, the new variables seem to contain additional
information in the analysis of funding structure. INVENTORIES present positive and
statistically significant coefficients, with the exception of tax liabilities, in which the
coefficient is negative. This means that firms with a higher proportion of inventories
have a higher share of bank credit, shareholder or intra-group loans, and trade
credit. The higher impact occurs in the latter funding source: an increase of one
standard-deviation implies an increase of 2.7 percentage points on trade credit. The
variable ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE also shows positive coefficients for the funding
sources under analysis, with exception of tax liabilities. These results may be related
to firms’ intentions to adopt a suitable cash management policy, allowing for a better
match between cash inflows and outflows. This relationship is especially important,
as expected, for trade credit. An increase of one standard-deviation implies an
increase by 4.7 percentage points. The impacts on the other funding sources are
significantly lower.
14Nevertheless, for simplicity, the coefficients of these variables are not included in the tables.
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The relevance of some indicators more directly related to firm’s activity is in line
with some qualitative evidence for Portuguese firms. For instance, according to the
results of the Bank Lending Survey conducted in Portugal, inventories and working
capital have been reported as an important driver underlying bank loan demand in
the corporate segment.
TURNOVER, which captures the volume of a firm’s activity, is also statistically
significant. It has negative coefficients for bank credit and shareholder or intra-group
loans and positive coefficients for trade credit and tax liabilities. These results seem
to be in line with the argument that firms exploit payments schemes and “grace
periods” provided by suppliers and tax regimes.
The proxy for the business risk shows positive coefficients in all equations, i.e.
firms with higher volatility in their cash flows (SD CASHFLOW) tend to rely more on
the funding sources under analysis rather than on the “omitted funding sources” in
the equation system. Note that equity is a key component of this omitted category.
The positive relationship suggests that firms with more unstable performances need
more external resources to finance their activity. For bank credit, this result may
be somewhat counterintuitive. Nevertheless, the results suggest that the ability of
riskier firms to obtain bank credit seems to be lower in comparison to the other
funding sources under analysis, given the significant difference in the magnitude
of the coefficients. For riskier firms, tax liabilities seem to represent an important
funding/liquidity management tool. Indeed, a one standard-deviation increase im-
plies an increase by around 2 percentage points of these liabilities. Loans granted
by shareholders or intra-group operations also seem to play an important role for
riskier firms, even though to a lesser extent.
Regarding the other variables included in the specification, the results described
in the previous sub-section remain broadly the same. Therefore, based on the results
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Table 2.6: Additional regressors: Activity indicators
Model 1
Bank Trade Tax Shareholder
Credit Credit Liabilities & Intra Group
PROFITABILITYt-1 -0.1573*** -0.2321*** -0.1089*** -0.1553***
(-74.04) (-120.01) (-98.80) (-86.54)
SALES GROWTHt-1 0.0023*** 0.0052*** -0.0006 0.0068***
(2.74) (6.68) (-1.26) (9.52)
SIZEt-1 0.0262*** 0.0156*** -0.0134*** -0.0162***
(120.09) (78.49) (-118.49) (-87.81)
TANGIBILITYt-1 0.1955*** -0.0101*** -0.0544*** 0.0580***
(132.72) (-7.52) (-71.21) (46.66)
AGE -0.0204*** -0.0359*** -0.0089*** 0.0005
(-46.59) (-90.05) (-39.30) (1.25)
INVENTORIESt-1 0.0870*** 0.1211*** -0.0583*** 0.1052***
(55.06) (84.19) (-71.17) (78.82)
ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLEt-1 0.0204*** 0.2013*** -0.0146*** 0.0116***
(13.24) (143.40) (-18.28) (8.91)
TURNOVERt-1 -0.0060*** 0.0281*** 0.0057*** -0.0098***
(-21.28) (109.60) (38.70) (-41.05)
SD CASHFLOWt-1 0.0420*** 0.0653*** 0.1597*** 0.1067***
(17.65) (30.17) (129.48) (53.11)
Ec. Group yes yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes yes yes
Business sector yes yes yes yes
Nr. 434,100
R2 0.120 0.215 0.226 0.185
Note: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance levels at 1, 5, and 10 per cent, respectively. The t-statistics are
in parentheses. The results were obtained running a SUR, with robust standard errors and clustering at firm level.
Firm’s characteristics were included as regressors with a lag, with exception of the variable Age. All specifications
included a constant term.
obtained, across the different funding sources under analysis, profitability and size
are among the variables with greater impact. Nevertheless, for bank credit the main
driver is tangibility (a one standard-deviation increase implies an increase of around
4.5 percentage points in these liabilities). For trade credit, accounts receivable should
also be highlighted (4.7 percentage points). For loans from shareholders or intra
group operations, inventories also show considerable impact (2.4 percentage points).
For tax liabilities the main impact is related to the proxy for business risk (around
2.1 percentage points).
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2.5.3 Banking lending relationships
Bank credit is the main financial funding source of Portuguese firms, and one of
the main external funding sources, in general. Against this background, we ran
some additional specifications with the purpose of investigating how the relationship
between firms and banks may affect the funding sources under analysis. Thus, in
line with the banking lending relationship literature, variables related to the number
of banking relationships, their length, and the availability of credit lines are also
included as regressors.
This analysis is conducted for a sub-sample of the data set analyzed previously,
namely excluding from the sample firms without any linkage with the financial
system. Model 1 in Table 2.7 shows the results of the specification presented in the
previous sub-section for this sub-sample.15 Model 2 presents the estimates for the
specification with the new set of variables.
Based on Model 2, looking at bank credit we find a negative sign with the number
of banking relationships. This result can be related to the arguments that the
number of banking relationships may be a signal of a firm’s credit quality: firms
with lower credit quality tend to establish more bank relationships, in order to
obtain additional funds (e.g. Degryse & Ongena (2001), and the empirical findings
described in Chapter 1). In turn, we observe that the duration variable presents
a positive coefficient (greater knowledge between borrowers and lenders), in line
with the Petersen & Rajan (1994) and Harhoff & Korting (1998). Additionally, the
availability of credit lines also has a positive impact on the share of bank credit.
For the other funding sources under analysis, we also find some correlations. In
particular, firms with unused credit lines tend to present lower levels of the remain-
ing funding sources. The number of banking relationships also presents negative
15In order to understand the impact on the results driven by the reduction of the sample.
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coefficients, with the exception of loans from shareholders or intra-group opera-
tions. These findings support the argument that this variable may be related to
firm’s credit quality. Firms with longer lending relationships also present lower
trade credit, and shareholder loans or intra-group operations. The negative rela-
tionship between the banking variables under analysis and trade credit might be
evidence for the substitution effect between these two funding sources, as argued by
some authors in the literature (e.g. Atanasova & Wilson (2004)). For tax liabilities
the coefficient of lending relationship’s duration is positive, but the magnitude is
very low.
It is noteworthy that bank decisions (that are reflected in the set of bank rela-
tionships variables) may be influenced in some way by the other firm characteristics
included in the analysis. Therefore, the analysis conducted in this sub-section al-
lows to identify some possible relationships between funding sources and the banking
variables, but it should be interpreted with due care.
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Table 2.7: Banking lending relationships and credit quality
Model 1 Model 2
Bank Trade Tax Shareholder Bank Trade Tax Shareholder
Credit Credit Liabilities & Intra Group Credit Credit Liabilities & Intra Group
PROFITABILITYt-1 -0.2112*** -0.2512*** -0.1078*** -0.1529*** -0.2112*** -0.2515*** -0.1083*** -0.1530***
(-84.78) (-115.41) (-89.71) (-79.88) (-87.39) (-115.62) (-90.31) (-80.30)
SALES GROWTHt-1 0.0047*** 0.0049*** -0.0014*** 0.0064*** 0.0138*** 0.0065*** -0.0011** 0.0041***
(5.09) (6.12) (-3.14) (8.96) (15.32) (8.03) (-2.52) (5.82)
SIZEt-1 0.0188*** 0.0131*** -0.0130*** -0.0143*** 0.0066*** 0.0116*** -0.0125*** -0.0106***
(78.09) (62.59) (-112.52) (-77.24) (26.59) (52.03) (-101.48) (-54.27)
TANGIBILITYt-1 0.1784*** -0.0210*** -0.0517*** 0.0527*** 0.1591*** -0.0240*** -0.0518*** 0.0579***
(108.14) (-14.58) (-64.93) (41.53) (98.96) (-16.59) (-64.91) (45.64)
AGE -0.0175*** -0.0349*** -0.0079*** -0.0005 -0.0387*** -0.0387*** -0.0087*** 0.0046***
(-35.78) (-81.88) (-33.48) (-1.27) (-73.29) (-81.39) (-33.11) (11.05)
INVENTORIESt-1 0.0829*** 0.1082*** -0.0575*** 0.0978*** 0.0669*** 0.1059*** -0.0574*** 0.1024***
(46.74) (69.79) (-67.18) (71.76) (38.80) (68.22) (-67.01) (75.26)
ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLEt-1 -0.0043** 0.2020*** -0.0163*** 0.0100*** -0.0371*** 0.1973*** -0.0161*** 0.0195***
(-2.46) (133.95) (-19.56) (7.57) (-21.95) (129.80) (-19.25) (14.61)
TURNOVERt-1 -0.0060*** 0.0308*** 0.0052*** -0.0092*** -0.0069*** 0.0308*** 0.0056*** -0.0088***
(-18.71) (110.32) (34.03) (-37.36) (-22.23) (110.24) (36.02) (-35.88)
SD CASHFLOWt-1 0.0742*** 0.0726*** 0.1623*** 0.1042*** 0.0830*** 0.0738*** 0.1619*** 0.1020***
(26.78) (29.97) (121.42) (48.94) (30.85) (30.47) (121.17) (48.08)
BANKING RELATIONSHIPt-1 -0.1219*** -0.0197*** -0.0070*** 0.0380***
(-116.64) (-20.90) (-13.41) (46.15)
CREDIT LINEt-1 0.0223*** -0.0024*** -0.0121*** -0.0092***
(31.11) (-3.68) (-33.94) (-16.30)
LENGHT BANKREL.t-1 0.0456*** -0.0116*** 0.0026*** -0.0105***
(83.39) (-13.35) (9.63) (-24.40)
Ec. Group yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Business sector yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Nr. 375,329 375,329
R2 0.113 0.224 0.213 0.175 0.165 0.225 0.216 0.182
Note: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance levels at 1, 5, and 10 per cent, respectively. The t-statistics are
in parentheses. The results were obtained running a SUR, with robust standard errors and clustering at firm level.
Firm’s characteristics were included as regressors with a lag, with exception of the variable Age. All specifications
included a constant term.
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2.6 Heterogeneity by firm size
In this section we investigate if the determinants of the funding sources change for
different groups of firms, based on firm’s size. Thus, we run the first two sets of
specifications presented in this Chapter for four size cohorts: micro, small, medium,
and large firms.16
According to the results obtained, presented in Table 2.8, PROFITABILITY pre-
serves the negative coefficient in all funding sources regardless of the cohorts in
the analysis. However, the impact on the funding sources is heterogeneous across
groups. For instance, for micro and small firms the greatest effect occurs in trade
credit, while for medium and large firms the greatest effect occurs in bank credit
equation. Looking at TANGIBILITY, the relationship recorded for the whole sample
continues to hold, i.e. the coefficients are positive for bank credit and shareholder
or intra-group loans and negative for the two other funding sources. The results for
AGE are also in line with those of the full sample for micro and small firms: the
coefficients are positive for shareholder or intra-group loans, while for the remaining
funding components the signs are negative. For medium firms, the coefficients are
all negative, while for large firms the coefficient is positive for bank credit. Broadly,
these results are in line with asymmetric information hypothesis, and the higher
capital level of older firms. In turn, there are differences concerning SIZE and SALES
GROWTH variables in some funding sources, in comparison to the full sample.
Looking at the specifications with activity indicators, Table 2.9, INVENTORIES
preserve, in general, the same relationship described for the whole sample. The coef-
ficients are negative for tax liabilities and positive for the other funding sources. The
exceptions are loans from shareholders or intra-group operations in medium firms
16Firm size defined according to the European Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC,
presented previously.
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segments (not statistically significant), and for large firms (for which this variable
presents a negative coefficient). The variable ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE shows posi-
tive and statistically significant coefficients, regardless of firm size, for bank credit
and for trade credit. The impact is quite strong for the latter funding source. For
tax liabilities, when significant, the relationship is negative. Looking at shareholder
or intra-group loans, the results are mixed. TURNOVER presents some heteroge-
neous impact. Consistently across size cohorts, it presents a positive relationship
with trade credit (which is in line with firm’s activity).
Finally, as far as business risk is concerned, SD CASHFLOW, the positive coefficient
recorded for the whole sample in all of the funding sources under analysis remained
for micro and smaller firms. For medium and larger firms, the coefficient of this
variable is negative for bank credit, which is in line with what we would expect
regarding firm’s risk and the availability of external sources (especially bank credit).
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2.7 Robustness tests
We ran some additional specifications in order to test the sensitivity of the results
obtained to some of the hypotheses adopted. The results of the robustness tests are
presented in the Appendices Section of this Chapter.
First, due to the changes recorded in 2010 (IES’s templates and accounting rules),
which required some hypotheses and some adjustments in the data, in this section
we split the sample period into two sub-periods: 2006-2009 and 2010-2012. We
re-estimate the specifications for the two sub-periods. Tables II.3 and II.4 in the
Appendices Section present some descriptive statistics for firm characteristics for
each sub-period. The econometric results are presented in Tables II.5 and II.6.
The main conclusions obtained for the full sample period do not change when we
analyze the results for the each of the two sub-periods. Even though the magnitudes
of the coefficients estimated are different, as expected, the relationships observed
between firm’s characteristics and funding sources persist. Nevertheless, there are
some changes that are worth mentioning. Looking at the results in Table II.6, the
coefficient of SALES GROWTH does not preserve the positive coefficient after 2009 for
some funding sources. Additionally, ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE has a varying impact
over the sample period, namely for bank credit (it is not statistically significant in the
period before 2009, and it is positive thereafter) as does for loans from shareholder
or intra-group operations (with opposite coefficients in the two sub-periods, positive
and negative, respectively).
Another robustness exercise was the restriction of the data set to observations
with positive figures for the four funding sources under analysis. Under this frame-
work, the data set was limited to around 91,000 observations. The results are
presented in Tables II.7 and II.8.
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Generally, the results are in line with those obtained previously. Nevertheless,
there are some differences. Focusing on the results with the larger set of explanatory
variables, Table II.8, one of the main differences is in ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE. In
this setup, the coefficient is positive only for trade credit. For the remaining funding
sources the relationship is negative. SALES GROWTH is now statistically significant
for tax liabilities, with a negative coefficient, but the magnitude of the coefficients
remain small. In turn, AGE presents negative and statistically significant coefficients
in all funding sources. TURNOVER presents positive coefficients, but in loans from
shareholders or intra group operations.
Finally, in an additional robust test, we restrict the data set to a balanced panel
data, which limited the number of observations in the dataset to around 284,000.
In this framework the results (presented in Tables II.9 and II.10) remained broadly
similar to those discussed in the previous sections. The main difference was related
to AGE in loans from shareholder or intra-group operations, now showing a negative
coefficient in all equations. This result may be an intrinsic consequence of the
particular features of this data set (i.e. a balanced panel data), as all firms in the
data set became older in the sample period.
2.8 Final Remarks
Funding is crucial for a firm’s activity. The analysis of firm’s capital decision (equity
versus debt) is an important topic, but it is also valuable to explore the composi-
tion of corporate funding. Different types of debt have different characteristics and
consequently different requirements for firms.
This study analyzes firm’s funding components. In addition to bank credit and
trade credit, two meaningful finance sources, we also include in the analysis tax lia-
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bilities and loans granted by shareholders or intra-group operations. These funding
sources are important in some corporate segments and raise several questions due
to their specific characteristics. Tax liabilities may be related to a firm’s liquidity
management, exploiting the payment scheme, while loans from shareholder or intra-
group operations suggest there are some differences on how owners finance their
firms, i.e. through debt rather than equity. Therefore, this study sheds some light
on these debt components, which are especially important for smaller and younger
firms, segments that typically face more constraints in accessing to external finance.
In the first part of this study we explore the relevance of the main variables
highlighted in the capital structure literature, such as variables related to bankruptcy
costs, agency issues, and tax shields. However, given the specificities of some funding
sources included in the analysis, we also explore indicators related to firm’s activity
and business risk as explanatory variables. Consistently across all specifications,
profitability presents a negative relationship to the funding sources under analysis.
Moreover, it is within the variables with sizable economic impact across the funding
sources. The results also suggest that the variables related to firms’ activity contain
additional information for the analysis. In particular, activity indicators seem to be
a relevant factor for different type of funding, even for bank credit and shareholder
or intra-group loans. For riskier firms, tax liabilities, and, to a lesser extent, loans
from shareholder or intra-group operations seem to play a role.
This study presents some important relationships between firm characteristics
and the respective debt composition. The definition of a casual inference between
the two dimensions is not easy. Nevertheless, this analysis contributes to increase the
knowledge about the structure of corporate debt, and the main drivers of different
funding sources (heterogeneous impacts). It also allows to see how these relation-
ships may change across firms’ size cohorts. Given the different characteristics of
each debt component, the analysis also helps to identify potential vulnerabilities of
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firms to economic and financial developments.
A better understanding of corporate funding may improve the analytical frame-
work to define and assess policy measures. This may be especially important as
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Table II.1: Variables definition
Variables Definition
Funding sources
BANK CREDIT Bank debt over total assets
TRADE CREDIT Accounts payable over total assets
TAX LIABILITIES Tax liabilities over total assets
SHAREHOLDER & INTRA-GROUP Loans granted by shareholders and loans from
firms in the same economic group over total assets
Firm’s characteristics
PROFITABILITY Net earnings before provisions and depreciation over total assets
SALES GROWTH Year-on-year change rate of sales
SIZE Natural logarithm of real total assets
TANGIBILITY Tangible assets over total assets
AGE Natural logarithm of (1 + years)
INVENTORIES Inventories over total assets
ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE Accounts receivable over total assets
TURNOVER Sales over total assets
SD CASHFLOW Standard deviation of cashflow over total assets
ECONOMIC GROUP Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm belongs to an economic group
BUSINESS SECTOR Dummy variables of business sector (13 sectors)
Banking relationships
BANKING RELATIONSHIP Number of banking relationships defined at the banking group level,
based on the weight of each group in firm’s total bank debt
CREDIT LINE Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm has unused credit lines
LENGTH BANKINGREL Natural logarithm of (1+ years of the longest
banking relationship that a firm presents)
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Chapter 2. Corporate funding
Table II.3: Summary statistics - Firm characteristics - 2006-09
Nr. mean sd p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
PROFITABILITY 398,136 0.05 0.17 -0.09 0.01 0.06 0.12 0.21
SALES GROWTH 334,054 -0.01 0.32 -0.35 -0.14 -0.01 0.12 0.33
TANGIBILITY 398,136 0.27 0.24 0.02 0.07 0.20 0.41 0.64
SIZE 398,136 13.05 1.57 11.20 12.00 12.93 13.95 15.05
AGE 398,136 2.41 0.89 1.10 1.95 2.48 3.04 3.47
ASSET TURNOVER 398,136 1.50 1.19 0.40 0.72 1.19 1.89 2.96
INVENTORIES 398,136 0.19 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.30 0.56
ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE 398,136 0.24 0.23 0.00 0.01 0.20 0.41 0.59
CASHFLOW VOLATILITY 387,523 0.11 0.15 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.13 0.26
BANKING RELATIONSHIP 398,136 0.61 0.36 0.00 0.36 0.63 1.00 1.00
LENGH BANKREL. 398,136 1.52 0.92 0.00 0.69 1.95 2.30 2.48
CREDIT LINE 398,136 0.56 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Note: sd stands for standard deviation. p10, p25, p50, p75, and p90 stand for, respectively, the percentiles 10, 25,
50, 75, and 90 of the distribution of each variable.
Table II.4: Summary statistics - Firm characteristics - 2010-12
Nr. mean sd p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
PROFITABILITY 257,051 0.02 0.17 -0.15 0.00 0.04 0.10 0.17
SALES GROWTH 234,396 -0.06 0.31 -0.41 -0.18 -0.04 0.09 0.27
TANGIBILITY 257,051 0.26 0.24 0.01 0.06 0.19 0.41 0.65
SIZE 257,013 13.11 1.57 11.27 12.07 12.99 14.01 15.12
AGE 257,051 2.63 0.74 1.61 2.20 2.64 3.18 3.53
ASSET TURNOVER 257,051 1.45 1.20 0.36 0.67 1.12 1.81 2.89
INVENTORIES 257,051 0.17 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.26 0.51
ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE 257,051 0.26 0.24 0.00 0.02 0.21 0.42 0.61
CASHFLOW VOLATILITY 251,406 0.11 0.14 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.12 0.23
BANKING RELATIONSHIP 257,051 0.57 0.35 0.00 0.31 0.55 0.99 1.00
LENGH BANKREL. 257,051 1.75 0.97 0.00 1.10 2.08 2.56 2.71
CREDIT LINE 257,051 0.65 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Note: sd stands for standard deviation. p10, p25, p50, p75, and p90 stand for, respectively, the percentiles 10, 25,
50, 75, and 90 of the distribution of each variable.
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Chapter 2. Corporate funding
Table II.8: Additional regressors: Activity indicators - All funding positive
Model 1
Bank Trade Tax Shareholder
Credit Credit Credit & Intra group
PROFITABILITYt-1 -0.2407*** -0.2343*** -0.1253*** -0.3325***
(-45.61) (-52.09) (-53.75) (-64.12)
SALES GROWTHt-1 0.0071*** 0.0025* -0.0030*** 0.0052***
(4.18) (1.69) (-4.02) (3.07)
SIZEt-1 0.0194*** 0.0047*** -0.0109*** -0.0296***
(41.25) (11.66) (-52.37) (-64.14)
TANGIBILITYt-1 0.1134*** -0.0424*** -0.0410*** 0.0169***
(32.56) (-14.28) (-26.67) (4.95)
AGE -0.0119*** -0.0280*** -0.0019*** -0.0025***
(-12.50) (-34.56) (-4.40) (-2.65)
INVENTORIESt-1 0.0615*** 0.0570*** -0.0460*** 0.0807***
(17.30) (18.80) (-29.29) (23.08)
ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLSt-1 -0.0419*** 0.1877*** -0.0131*** -0.0568***
(-11.21) (58.93) (-7.96) (-15.48)
TURNOVERt-1 0.0019*** 0.0345*** 0.0066*** -0.0116***
(2.70) (56.94) (21.11) (-16.68)
SD CASHFLOWt-1 0.1113*** 0.1278*** 0.1405*** 0.2189***
(20.07) (27.03) (57.34) (40.16)
Economic Group yes yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes yes yes
Business sector yes yes yes yes
Nr. 91,365
R2 0.0970 0.2353 0.2066 0.2000
Note: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance levels at 1, 5, and 10 per cent, respectively. The t-statistics are
in parentheses. The results were obtained running a SUR, with robust standard errors and clustering at firm level.
Firm’s characteristics were included as regressors with a lag, with exception of the variable Age. All specifications
included a constant term.
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Chapter 2. Corporate funding
Table II.10: Additional regressors: Activity indicators - Balanced panel data
Model 1
Bank Trade Tax Shareholder
Credit Credit Credit & Intra group
PROFITABILITYt-1 -0.1820*** -0.2283*** -0.0736*** -0.1434***
(-63.45) (-90.60) (-59.32) (-61.43)
SALES GROWTHt-1 0.0066*** 0.0138*** 0.0003 0.0083***
(-5.55) (-13.14) (-0.6) (-8.57)
SIZEt-1 0.0240*** 0.0141*** -0.0114*** -0.0138***
(-93.41) (-62.71) (-103.00) (-66.24)
TANGIBILITYt-1 0.2068*** -0.0075*** -0.0381*** 0.0534***
(-117.81) (-4.83) (-50.21) (-37.36)
AGE -0.0220*** -0.0340*** -0.0042*** -0.0014***
(-38.86) (-68.37) (-17.02) (-3.05)
INVENTORIESt-1 0.0824*** 0.1196*** -0.0395*** 0.0998***
(-42.18) (-69.65) (-46.73) (-62.72)
ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLEt-1 0.0362*** 0.1992*** -0.0079*** 0.0090***
(-19.5) (-122.1) (-9.83) (-5.97)
TURNOVERt-1 -0.0050*** 0.0318*** 0.0080*** -0.0095***
(-14.68) -106.17 -54.58 (-34.21)
SD CASHFLOWt-1 0.0273*** 0.0375*** 0.1465*** 0.1095***
(-7.99) (-12.47) (-98.97) (-39.31)
Economic Group yes yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes yes yes
Business sector yes yes yes yes
Nr. 284,591
R2 0.1258 0.2282 0.1785 0.2244
Note: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance levels at 1, 5, and 10 per cent, respectively. The t-statistics are
in parentheses. The results were obtained running a SUR, with robust standard errors and clustering at firm level.
Firm’s characteristics were included as regressors with a lag, with exception of the variable Age. All specifications
included a constant term.
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Chapter 3
Lending relationships and the real
economy: evidence in the context
of the euro area sovereign debt
crisis
Abstract: The recent euro area sovereign debt crisis put the financial sector under
pressure and imposed several challenges, mainly in the countries most affected by the
crisis. The sovereign-bank linkage can negatively affect the economic activity, especially
by bank-dependent firms. This study explores the heterogeneity across banks in their
funding structure, sovereign exposures, solvency, and availability of collateral, with the
aim of investigating the effect of the crisis on firms’ investment and employment decisions.
Exploring a detailed database that covers virtually all bank loans granted to Portuguese
firms, for the period 2007-2012, the results suggest an impact on investment and employ-
ment paths for firms whose lenders depend more heavily on interbank and market funding.
Moreover, the results also stress the importance of assets eligible as collateral in mone-
tary operations conducted by Central Bank. The findings suggest how a deterioration in
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sovereign creditworthiness can affect the real economy via the banking sector.
JEL Classification: G21, G31, E22, E24, E44, E51
Keywords: Sovereign debt crisis, heterogeneity firm’s lenders, firm’s investment and
employment
3.1 Introduction
Financial intermediation ensures the flow of capital from savers to firms (or other
agents), which is crucial for economic activity and growth. The recent financial and
sovereign debt crises implied severe dysfunction in the international financial mar-
kets, with repercussions on financial institutions. These events raise the discussion
of how the crisis affects financial intermediaries’ ability to grant credit, and empha-
size the importance of understanding how shocks to credit suppliers affect the real
economy.
The financial crisis in 2008 imposed huge losses for financial institutions world-
wide, and led to a dry-up in the interbank markets. Later, the Greek bailout in
mid-2010 marked the onset of the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area. The unprece-
dented and unexpected nature of this event changed the assessment and perception
of sovereign credit risk by market participants. The sovereign bond yields of other
euro area countries increased considerably, especially for Ireland, Portugal, and to a
lesser extent, Spain and Italy, while other financial markets were also affected (e.g.
Benzoni et al. (2015)).
The sovereign debt crisis and the tensions in financial markets in general were
transmitted to credit institutions through several channels. A direct link was the
negative impact on the net worth of sovereign debt securities held by institutions.
These losses weakened the balance sheets position, which made those institutions
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appear to be riskier. Sovereign debt market developments also fueled the perception
that Governments would have lower financial ability to support the national banking
systems if needed. This too had severe implications for financial institutions. Indeed,
the sovereign-bank linkage implied a marked increase in the funding cost for the
institutions hosted or exposed to the stressed countries. Some institutions even
lost access to the international financial markets in this period. This environment
imposed several challenges to financial institutions and their activity.
This study investigates the effects of the sovereign debt crisis and financial market
disruptions on corporate decisions in Portugal, namely firms’ investment and em-
ployment, exploring the heterogeneity of firms’ lenders. In particular, we compare
investment and employment outcomes of firms that borrow from financial institu-
tions with heterogeneous exposures to the sovereign and financial market develop-
ments.
Portugal figures as an interesting case study for several reasons. First, Portugal
was at the core of the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area (Figure III.1, in the
Appendices Section of this Chapter), which led to its rescue via International Fi-
nancial Assistance in April 2011. Second, there were severe negative consequences
on the Portuguese banking system, driven by the sovereign-bank linkage. Due to
the increasing tensions and risk aversion in financial markets, Portuguese banks
have faced daunting liquidity challenges since 2010 (Figure III.2, in the Appendices
Section). This fact is especially relevant as the banking system plays a critical role
as a funding source to the Portuguese economy, notably to the corporate sector.1
Portuguese firms, comprising mainly small and medium sized-firms (SMEs), present
high leverage ratios, making them more vulnerable to changes in credit institutions’
financial positions. Moreover, SMEs have less access to alternative financial instru-
1In Portugal, and broadly in Europe, banks play an important role in financial intermediation,
in contrast with other economies, such as that of the USA, where wholesale markets are also
important, as discussed in Langfield & Pagano (2015).
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ments. Finally, it is worth mentioning that the initial shock was exogenous to the
Portuguese banking system, and not driven by developments in the corporate sec-
tor.2 Indeed, the increases in the Portuguese sovereign bond yields, in opposition to
other countries, such as Ireland and Spain, were not driven by the Government sup-
port to the banking system or a price bubble in the real estate market. In fact, it was
related essentially to the higher concerns, following the Greek bailout, related to the
Portuguese macroeconomic imbalances, namely the weakness of Portuguese public
finance (excessive debt levels and high deficits). These factors are important in the
analysis, as banks did not anticipate the developments recorded from mid-2010 on,
and the resulting loss of access to the international wholesale debt markets.
This study contributes to the literature that analyzes the impact of bank-sovereign
linkage on a firm’s decisions. To perform the analysis, we use detailed micro
databases for Portuguese firms and financial institutions, which allows us to match
firm-bank, to explore the intensity of these relationships, and to cover different
segments of the corporate sector. We investigate if there are differences in firms’
investment and employment decisions based on firm-lenders relationships and the
characteristics of respective lenders. Namely, we characterize firms’ lenders, based
on several key indicators, and identify those relationships that could be more vul-
nerable to the negative shock recorded in international financial markets in 2010.
To the best of our knowledge, the paper most similar to ours is the recent work
of Bottero et al. (2015). However, in this study we explore alternative channels
of transmission from banks to firms that may be helpful in identifying banks more
vulnerable to adverse financial developments.
According to the results obtained, the key lenders’ characteristics that affect
firms’ decisions are related to banks’ market funding positions, with a negative
2As mentioned in Banco de Portugal (2011b), “Portuguese banks’ liquidity difficulties resulted,
to a large extent, from a contagion effect deriving from disturbances in sovereign debt markets and
not directly from intrinsic problems of solvency or profitability”.
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effect on both investment and employment. As the dependence of banks on these
funding sources increases, their borrowers tend to present lower investment and
employment paths. In turn, assets eligible as collateral in monetary operations seem
to have a favorable impact on both firms’ decisions. Looking at banks’ sovereign
debt exposures and regulatory capital ratios, the results are mixed.
This Chapter is structured as follows: Section 3.2 presents a brief review of related
literature. Section 3.3 presents the main facts regarding the Portuguese banking sys-
tem under the International Financial Assistance Programme to Portugal. Section
3.4 describes the data sources, and the data set used in the analysis. Section 3.5
shows the empirical strategy adopted and presents some summary statistics for the
variables under analysis. Section 3.6 presents the empirical specification and the
econometric results. Section 3.7 explores an alternative empirical approach. Section
3.8 shows some robustness tests. Finally, Section 3.9 presents the main conclusions.
3.2 Related literature
The value of the banking system and its impact on the real economy is not a new
topic in economic and financial literature. For instance, Bernanke (1983) discussed
the relevance of banks’ balance sheet channel. He showed that shocks to banks’
financial positions affect lending and consequently borrowers’ decisions and real
activity. Holmstrom & Tirole (1997) presented a model of financial intermediation
in which firms and intermediaries could be capital constrained. They emphasized
the role of the financial intermediaries, in addition to the wholesale market, showing
that some firms have access only to external funds through those institutions or
given their monitoring function. Moreover, the authors show how changes in banks’
capital positions affect their credit supply, which is particularly important to less
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capitalized firms.
The link between the real economy and the financial sector was also emphasized
in papers related to the so-called “financial accelerator”. This literature argues
that due to the existence of imperfections in the credit markets the general finan-
cial conditions account for the intensity and persistence of the economic business
cycles (e.g. Bernanke & Gertler (1989) and Bernanke et al. (1999)). The asym-
metric information on credit markets is especially important to smaller, younger, or
less transparent borrowers, contributing to a greater sensitivity of this segment of
firms to changes in the credit supply (e.g. Mark Gertler (1994)). King & Levine
(1993), for instance, found evidence that the financial system can promote economic
growth. Namely, financial developments are related to GDP growth, physical capital
accumulation, and efficiency, as well as to the future evolution of these variables.
The credit market imperfections and the impact of financial frictions/conditions on
firms’ decisions have also been a central topic in corporate finance research, both in
theoretical and empirical perspectives (e.g. the seminal paper Fazzari et al. (1987),
or Love (2003)).
Given its place in the financial system, bank credit has attracted intense interest
in the financial literature, notably the firm-bank relationships. According to this
literature, in the borrowers’ perspective, there is evidence that the number of lending
relationships and the length of these relationships may affect the availability of credit
and contracts conditions, e.g. Petersen & Rajan (1994), Ongena & Smith (1998),
Boot (2000), and Berger & Udell (2006). An important point in this literature is the
acquisition of soft information through repeated interactions between borrowers and
lenders (e.g. Diamond (1984)), which helps to minimize asymmetric information
issues. Nevertheless, this information acquisition, and the reliance on only a few
lenders, may also contribute to hold-up problems for firms (for instance, information
rents, as explored by Rajan (1992)), or switching costs (as discussed in Kim et al.
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(2003), and recently in Chodorow-Reich (2014)). Under financial distress episodes,
Hoshi et al. (1990) showed that Japanese firms with a main bank-lending relationship
have been found to obtain lower costs of overcoming those events. Bae et al. (2002)
explored adverse events that affected the Korean banking system during the Asian
crisis in the late 1990s, and showed that adverse shocks to a firm’s main lender have
a negative knock-on effect not only on the value of the bank but also on the value
of the firm itself.
More recently, the literature on financial-real economy linkage recorded a new
wave, exploring the impact of the financial and the euro area sovereign debt crises
on credit institutions and firms’ decisions. While the financial crisis directly affected
banks’ financial health and the functioning of the interbank markets, the sovereign
debt crisis may have affected financial markets and the financial institutions through
several channels. Sovereign debt tensions had a direct negative impact on the market
value of sovereign debt securities. Moreover, financial systems were also perceived as
more vulnerable as the sovereign capacity to provide financial assistance decreased.
In this context, banks’ funding costs also increased. In a second round, the increases
in sovereign yields may have induced changes in banks’ decisions, contributing to
portfolio adjustments, such as an increase in sovereign holdings for less risk averse
institutions. These securities presented higher returns (which improve profitability),
while they did not imply additional capital needs (zero risk weights in terms of
capital requirements). This strategy may reinforce the bank-sovereign linkage. It
may also imply a decrease in credit supply to other economic segments (i.e. a
crowding out effect).
Some of the most recent research has assessed the impact of the crisis on banks’
credit supply. Empirical evidence suggests a decrease in credit to firms, due to
negative shocks in financial markets. Iyer et al. (2014) analyzed the impact of the
financial crisis in 2008 on the credit supply in Portugal, exploring data from the
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Central Credit Register. They found that banks more dependent on the interbank
market restricted credit to firms to a greater extent than did banks less exposed
to that market. Bofondi et al. (2013) investigated a similar research question for
Italy during the sovereign debt crisis. Based on the distinction between foreign and
domestic banks, as the latter were affected by Italian sovereign yield increases, they
found that domestic banks decreased credit supply more than did the foreign ones.
In turn, Popov & Horen (2015), and Adelino & Ferreira (2016) centered their analy-
ses on the impact of the sovereign debt crisis on credit, evaluated through syndicated
loans. Popov & Horen (2015) showed that banks with greater exposures to stressed
countries recorded greater credit cuts. Exploring banks’ rating downgrades as a con-
sequence of respective sovereign ratings revisions, Adelino & Ferreira (2016) found
that those banks revealed a greater impact on credit supply than did institutions
that were not subject to this effect.
Another strand of the recent literature explores the potential impact of recent
crises on firms’ decisions, given the impact on the financial system and the rel-
evance of bank credit as an external funding source to the corporate sector, in
particular in Europe. The variables of interest are related to real decisions, such
as employment and investment, as well as financial indicators, as leverage and sales
growth. In general, the results suggest that there are differences in the path of firms’
outcomes between firms less and more exposed to the financial and sovereign debt
crises through their lenders. Based on syndicated loans, Chodorow-Reich (2014)
first found that less healthy banks (exploring several metrics) reduced more credit
than other banks during the financial crisis in the US.3 He also found that firms that
had pre-crisis relationships with weaker banks reduced more employment than did
firms whose lenders were healthier. Similarly, Bentolila et al. (2015) found an impact
on Spanish firms’ employment policies. Firms that relied on weaker banks (in this
3Banks’ position were assessed by alternative measures related to exposures to Lehman Broth-
ers, exposures to toxic mortgage back securities, and some balance sheet indicators.
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setup, bailout banks) showed greater employment drops than firms with relation-
ships with healthier banks. Also in the context of the financial crisis, Cingano et al.
(2013) found that Italian firms whose lenders were more dependent on interbank
funding reduced their investment more than firms less dependent on such banks.
In the context of the European sovereign debt crisis, Bottero et al. (2015), also
based on Italian data, found that banks with higher exposures to Italian sovereign
debt tightened more credit supply to firms. Moreover, they found that smaller and
riskier firms were not able to overcome this fact, recording a reduction in invest-
ment and employment. De Marco (2016) and Acharya et al. (2016) analyzed the
impact of sovereign debt crisis on firms’ decisions, exploring syndicated loans data.
On average, firms whose lenders were more exposed to sovereign debt of stressed
countries (in De Marco (2016)) or firms whose lead lender was from those countries
(in Acharya et al. (2016)) presented a more adverse path for some firms’ outputs
than firms with other lending relationships.
The impact of bank credit on firms’ decisions may also depend on firms’ abil-
ity to substitute bank relationships or/and bank credit with other funding sources.
Adjustments in firms’ debt components may minimize the effects of bank credit
shocks. Some papers have explored this dynamic, but the empirical results are
mixed. Becker & Ivashina (2014) and Adrian et al. (2012), exploring debt market
as alternative funding sources, argued that there were no real effects that could be
related to banks’ lending paths. In turn, Carvalho et al. (2015) found that the access
to public debt markets did not offset the impact of bank distress on firms’ decisions.
In turn, Almeida et al. (2016) explored the direct negative spillovers of sovereign
rating downgrades on firms’ ratings, which has a negative effect on firms’ funding
costs. Their results suggest that firms that recorded a rating downgrade due to the
sovereign ceiling policy, i.e. firms should not present higher ratings than the respec-
tive sovereign (firms’ downgrade were not directly related to firms’ fundamentals),
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showed greater impact on their decisions than did the other firms.4 However, as
mentioned, public debt markets are not available for all firms. Even firms that try
to adjust funding within the banking system may face some important constraints.
For instance, Ivashina & Scharfstein (2010) found evidence that borrowers of weaker
banks could not switch to healthier banks during the financial crisis.
The present study contributes to the empirical literature that explores how the
sovereign debt crisis affected financial intermediaries and corporate decisions. Look-
ing at empirical literature, there are some papers with similarities to this analysis.
Some of them analyze a similar time window, namely the euro area sovereign debt
crisis, while others explore analogous databases, with special emphasis on the Cen-
tral Credit Register. This database avoids the bias to larger firms that characterize
some studies, such as those based on syndicated loans. Indeed, small and medium
firms (SMEs) are a significant fraction of the corporate sector, and account for
much of the economic activity and employment in several countries, such as Por-
tugal. SMEs usually do not have access to the syndicated loan markets. They
are typically more dependent on bank credit, and consequently more vulnerable to
changes in bank credit supply. This study is also in line with papers that explore
corporate decisions.
Combining all these features, to the best of our knowledge, the paper most similar
to this one is the recent work of Bottero et al. (2015). The two papers investigate
the impact of the sovereign debt crisis, exploring the Central Credit Register. This
database allows a direct firm-lender match, and simultaneously an exploration of cor-
porate heterogeneity. However, in this paper we directly explore several dimensions
of a firm’s lenders that may be relevant in the environment under analysis. Accord-
ingly, in this study possible channels other than the direct exposure to sovereign
debt securities are explored in more detail. For instance, we examine the structure
4In the Portuguese case there are few firms with rating notes and access to the wholesale
funding. As a result, this direct impact is not sizeable.
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of banks’ liabilities, and especially the availability of collateral to gain access to the
monetary operations conducted by the ECB, which has not deserved much attention
in the literature in this context.
3.3 The Portuguese International Economic and
Financial Assistance Programme: Main facts
on the banking system
The international financial crisis following the US sub-prime mortgage crisis and
the collapse of Lehman Brothers had little direct impact on the Portuguese banking
system as a whole. In general, banks were not exposed to the sub-prime market and
their exposures to “toxic assets” were contained. Moreover, unlike other economies,
Portugal did not record a bubble in the real estate market. Nevertheless, Portuguese
institutions were affected by changes in financial market conditions, in particular
by the dry-up in the interbank market during this period. Those constraints were
minimized by monetary operations conducted by Central Banks and by issuing bonds
with government guarantees (Figure III.3, in the Appendices Section). As a result,
lending to non-financial corporations continued to grow at high rates in Portugal
during this period (Figure III.4, in the Appendices Section).
However, the sovereign debt crisis marked the onset of a new period that saw sev-
eral deleterious effects on the Portuguese economy and the banking system. With
the Greek bailout and the increasing tension in sovereign debt markets in the euro
area, there was a reassessment of sovereign credit risk by market participants. The
yields of Portuguese government bonds rose dramatically. The sovereign-banking
system link and the risk aversion in financial markets posed several challenges to
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Portuguese financial institutions. Given the increased weight of the international
financial markets in the funding structure of Portuguese banks since the early 2000s
(as a consequence of the financial integration in the context of the monetary union),
and the exposure of Portuguese banks to sovereign debt securities, these develop-
ments required sizable adjustments in banks’ funding and business strategies.
Due to the renewal of tensions in the European sovereign debt markets, which
led to an escalation of the Portuguese bond yields, since end-2010, the Portuguese
Government requested international assistance in April 2011. This led to the Inter-
national Economic and Financial Assistance Programme (hereinafter Programme),
defined for a horizon period of three years, and provided by the International Mone-
tary Fund, the European Union, and the European Central Bank. The Programme
focused on three main pillars: structural reforms and competitiveness of the Por-
tuguese economy; fiscal consolidation; and deleverage of the financial and private
sectors.
Looking at the banking system, the Programme sought to ensure an orderly and
gradual deleveraging process and the reinforcement of regulatory capital positions.
Simultaneously, a close assessment of the financial conditions in the economy was to
be conducted, in order to ensure an equilibrium between the necessary deleveraging
adjustment and the financial support to the economic activity. Three fundamental
dimensions should be highlighted: i) the implementation of measures to ensure
sufficient liquidity in the banking system; ii) the design of funding and capital plans
for short and medium terms, to monitor the gradual deleveraging, the reduction of
funding from the Eurosystem, and the path of capital needs; iii) the reinforcement
of capital positions.
In order to achieve a stable funding structure, the Programme set specific targets
for some key indicators. For instance, the Programme established a gradual conver-
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gence to 120 per cent of the loan-to-deposit ratio.5 As far as regulatory capital was
concerned, the Programme imposed higher minimum levels to the Core Tier 1 ratio,
namely 9 per cent by the end 2011 and 10 per cent by the end of 2012.
The Programme included a backstop facility of 12 billion euros to the financial
system (out of the 78 billion euros included in the Programme), in order to face
potential capital needs, due to the new capital requirements and the adverse eco-
nomic and financial environment that was foreseen during the horizon period of the
Programme. Note that low capital ratios, i.e. close to the minimum regulatory
threshold, may have a direct impact on a bank’s activity.
In parallel, due to the general tensions in the sovereign debt markets in the
euro area and the exposure of the European banks to sovereign assets, in 2011 the
European Banking Authority (EBA) imposed the so-called “sovereign capital buffer”
on the major banks in the European Union.6 The “sovereign capital buffer” was
computed taking into account banks’ sovereign debt portfolios and the respective
market value assessed in September 2011. This buffer was to be in place by the end
of June 2012. These new rules imposed additional capital needs on some Portuguese
banks.7
Therefore, banks had to manage their capital positions in order to meet all the
new capital requirements. Against this background some banks realized significant
capital increases over these years. Some of them applied to the financial system
facility included in the Programme, namely BCP, Banco BPI (mostly due to the
“sovereign capital buffer”), and Banif. CGD also increased its capital significantly,
but in a different set up, given that CGD is a state-owned bank. Additionally, in
5However, these targets were revised during the Programme, and they were replaced by guide-
lines aiming at a stable funding structure.
6European banks included in the stress tests exercise conducted by the EBA.
7In Portugal four banks were subjected to EBA’s rules, namely CGD, Banco BPI, BCP, and
ESFG.
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this demanding environment banks were forced to adjust their activity strategies.
3.4 Data and descriptive statistics
3.4.1 Data sources
The data set used in this study combines three different micro databases, available
at Banco de Portugal, namely Central Credit Register (CRC), Bank Supervisory
Data, and the Central Balance Sheet Database.
The CRC contains information on all credit granted by financial intermediaries
operating in Portugal. CRC includes information on the outstanding amounts,
as well as information regarding credit overdue events for each borrower, among
other loan characteristics.8 Institutions are required to report this information on
a monthly basis to Banco de Portugal. Given the low lending threshold required
for this report (50 euros), this database affords high coverage of the credit granted
by the banking system to the corporate sector. It also allows identifying firm-bank
lending relationships at each moment and the exposure of each institution to each
firm.
The second database is the Bank Supervisory Data submitted by financial insti-
tutions to Banco de Portugal for different reference periods. This database contains
financial statements for institutions operating in Portugal and prudential reports for
those institutions under supervision of the Portuguese authorities. Note that some
institutions, due to their typology, do not report all items.9 This database allows
8For further details on the CRC, see Booklet Nr.5 of Banco de Portugal (Banco de Portugal
(2011a)).
9For instance, subsidiaries of European Union institutions are not required to provide infor-
mation on capital adequacy ratios to the Portuguese Bank Supervision Authority.
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us to obtain several financial and prudential indicators of institutions, which will be
important to assess their vulnerability to financial market developments.10
For the corporate sector, we use the Simplified Corporate Information (Infor-
mao Empresarial Simplificada - IES), which was introduced in 2006. IES contains
detailed financial data based on accounting reports, as well as other firm charac-
teristics, such as the industry sector, age, and the average number of employees.
This information allows us to characterize firms over time. It is noteworthy that
IES covers virtually the entire Portuguese corporate sector. This avoids the poten-
tial sample bias that voluntary survey may introduce (the approach in place before
2006), and allows us to explore different firm segments.11
3.4.2 Data set
For credit institutions we restrict the database to those classified as “Monetary
Financial Institutions”. Then, we collected balance sheet and profit and loss account
data, allowing us to analyze the structure of assets and liabilities of institutions and
their respective performance. The detailed data also allow us to determine the weight
of sovereign debt securities portfolios. Based on prudential reports, we obtain the
capital adequacy ratios.
In CRC, we match borrowers and all respective lenders. We define lending re-
lationships at the banking group level, i.e. if a firm borrows from two institutions
that belong to the same group, we define it as a single lending relationship. Then,
we compute the relevance of each group to each firm, taking into account the share
10In this analysis we use data at consolidated level, taking into account that some bank decisions
may be defined at the group level (such as specific portfolios).
11Before 2006 the Central Balance Sheet Database followed a survey approach, based on eco-
nomic activity criteria. After 2005, with IES, it covers virtually the entire corporate sector. For
further details on the IES databases, see Supplement of Statistical Bulletin (Banco de Portugal
(2008)).
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of credit provided by each banking group in the firm’s total bank debt.
As far as IES data are concerned, we impose some criteria (in line with the
procedures followed in the previous Chapters). First, the financial and public ad-
ministration sectors were excluded. We also excluded observations with missing
data for total assets, business volume, number of employees, and age. Furthermore,
firms with fewer than five employees were dropped. Moreover, in order to remove
outliers, we winsorize the top and bottom two per cent of the distributions of the
variables under analysis. Additionally, given the purpose of this study, we collapse
the corporate sample to firms that have records on the CRC.12
After the merger of the three databases and the application of the criteria, we
shrunk the data set to a balanced panel data. We adopted this condition in order
to analyze firms that performed their activity over the crisis period. We obtain a
data set with around 219,000 firm-year observation for the period 2007-2012.
The balanced panel data implies that all firms grow more mature over the horizon
period, which may have some impact on firms’ outcomes. For instance, it is not
expected that firms continue to present high levels of investment or employment
growth over the life cycle. Other assumptions in the definition of the data set could
be adopted, leading to an unbalanced panel data. However, that procedure may
include other effects and events related to the financial and sovereign debt crises, for
instance, the possible relationship between the financial and sovereign debt crises
and firms’ survival or bankruptcy episodes. The balanced option avoids these events,
which are also important issues, but may influence the research question of this
study.
12At this stage this criterion imposed a reduction of around 85,000 observations in the IES data
set.
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3.5 Empirical strategy
The empirical strategy adopted in this study proceeds as follows: we characterize
credit institutions based on their financial and prudential reports. Then, we match
firm-banks and compute a weighted indicator for each firm, based on the financial
and prudential position of all firm’s lenders. The weights applied correspond to
the share of the credit granted by each lender in the firm’s total bank debt. In
other words, for each firm-year observation we obtain a weighted indicator based
on the firm’s lending relationships. The weighted scheme intends to control for the
dependence of firms on each lender, i.e. control for the intensity of each lending
relationship. Hereinafter, the weighted indicator is termed Lenders’ Indicator. Fi-
nally, we analyze if there are significant differences in firms’ outcomes, exploring
firms’ lenders’ characteristics and the respective heterogeneity, controlling for other
firms’ characteristics (that may affect the outcomes).
There is no single criterion by which to classify credit institutions’ vulnerability
to the adverse financial market developments seen during the sovereign debt crisis.
Given the nature of the negative shocks, several banks’ dimensions are addressed.
Due to the tensions in the international financial markets and the value of these
funding sources to Portuguese institutions since the establishment of the euro area,
we explore variables related to banks’ liabilities structure. Therefore, looking at
the funding structure, the indicators are related to banks’ dependence on financial
markets, customers’ resources, and money market (variables computed with balance
sheet data). We also assess the exposure of each institution to sovereigns by the
sovereign debt securities portfolios, given the concerns related to the losses that
institutions may incur due to sovereign yields increases. Moreover, we also explore
the solvency position, since capital ratios are critical indicators for banks, and they
may effectively constrain banks’ activity. It is expected that institutions with greater
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capital buffers should present a greater ability to absorb unanticipated negative
shocks without sizeable constraints on their activity, especially lending.
3.5.1 Variables and summary statistics
This sub-section provides descriptive statistics of variables related to firms and credit
institutions included in the analysis.13
Table 3.1 displays the composition of firms included in the data set. A significant
fraction of the sample corresponds to micro and small firms.14,15 Firm size can be a
relevant indicator in the analysis, as empirical evidence suggests there are differences
in the access to external funding by firms’ size, usually a proxy for asymmetric
information and firms’ credit quality. Namely, the empirical literature suggests that
smaller firms face greater constraints in obtaining external financing, which may
be related to the lack of information available to external agents (less transparent
firms), lower diversified activity (so, lower ability to react to unexpected negative
shocks), or even lower pledgable assets. These firms are therefore the ones that are
potentially more vulnerable to changes in credit supply.
As mentioned, one of the variables of interest in this study is firm’s investment.
For this, we focus on yearly investment flows. Investment (INVESTMENT) is defined
as the flow of investment in tangible and intangible assets of firm i in year t over
13Note that due to missing data regarding some components, the number of observations in-
cluded in the econometric analysis (presented in the next sections) may be slightly different from
the figures presented below. However, this fact has not sizeable impact on major descriptive
statistics.
14Firm size defined in line with the European Commission Recommendation of 6 May 2003
(2003/361/EC), Micro firms are defined as those with fewer than 10 employees and less than 2
million euro of business volume or total assets; Small firms are those with fewer than 50 employees
and less than 10 million euro of business volume or total assets; Medium firms are those with fewer
than 250 employees and a business volume below 50 million euros or whose total assets is lower
than 43 million euros. The remaining firms are considered Large firms.
15Recall that in the definition of the data set, we imposed some criteria. We excluded firms
with fewer than five employees, which affects the micro segment.
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Table 3.1: Sample summary statistics
Total
By firm’s size:
Micro Small Medium Large
2007 36,457 11,829 20,276 3,684 668
2008 36,457 11,306 20,638 3,825 688
2009 36,457 11,546 20,470 3,782 659
2010 36,457 11,412 20,531 3,832 682
2011 36,457 11,938 20,057 3,772 690
2012 36,457 13,394 18,829 3,582 652
Total 218,742 71,425 120,801 22,477 4,039
the total of those assets at the end of the previous year (t− 1).16 The first columns
of Table 3.2 present the path of this variable over the sample period. On average,
investment presents a notable decrease in 2009, a year of economic recession in
several economies, the Great Depression, after the collapse of Lehman Brothers at
the end of 2008. From 2010 on, it continuous a downward trend.17
Table 3.2 also presents similar statistics for employment. IES database includes
some firm characteristics in addition to financial statements, including the average
number of employees. Based on this information we obtain the yearly employment
change, which can be interpreted as a proxy for firm’s employment decisions. Thus,
the employment variable (EMPLOYMENT) corresponds to the change in the average
number of employees of firm i in period t over the average number of employees at
the end of the previous year (t− 1). Broadly, based on mean figures, we observe a
downward trend during the period under analysis.
Table 3.3 presents the summary statistics of firm-level variables that may affect
firms’ decisions. Those variables include profitability, sales growth, size, and the
leverage of firms.
16The results were very similar when investment was defined based only on tangible assets.
17From 2009 to 2010, the significant difference in the average rates should be related to a series
break due to changes in IES’s reports and accounting rules. Nevertheless, this was a transversal
event to all firms included in the sample, so its impact should be captured by time dummies.
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Table 3.2: Firm’s decisions: investment and employment
INVESTMENT EMPLOYMENT
Mean Median Sd Mean Median Sd
2007 0.365 0.090 0.753 0.090 0.000 0.277
2008 0.314 0.103 0.812 0.060 0.000 0.207
2009 0.196 0.086 0.750 0.039 0.000 0.190
2010 0.342 0.041 0.682 0.006 0.000 0.176
2011 0.244 0.085 0.745 0.022 0.000 0.180
2012 0.174 0.044 0.629 -0.002 0.000 0.164
Note: INVESTMENT is defined as the flow of investment in tangible and intangible assets for each in a year over the
total of those assets at the end of the previous year. EMPLOYMENT is defined as the change in the average number
of employees of each firm in a year over the average number in the previous year. sd stands for standard deviation.
The Mean and Median figures are based on the distribution of each variable. Note that there were some changes in
the IES report in 2010, which may be underlying the evolution of investment rate between 2009 and 2010.
Profitability (PROFITABILITY) is defined as net earnings before provisions and
depreciations over total assets. This variable captures the ability of each firm to
generate funds internally, so it may be less dependent on external funding. Sales
growth (SALES GROWTH) is the year-on-year change of real sales, and it is meant to
control for the firm’s growth opportunities.18 Firm’s size (SIZE) is included as the
logarithm of total real assets. Size is usually related to asymmetric information and
credit quality. The leverage of firms is also an important dimension to control for.
We therefore include the bank debt ratio (BANK DEBT), defined as bank debt over
total assets.19
Looking at financial institutions, Table 3.4 shows some descriptive statistics for
different indicators that may identify institutions that are more vulnerable to the ad-
verse financial market conditions, in the context of the sovereign debt crisis. There-
fore, the figures correspond to the distribution of the Lenders’ Indicator, i.e. firm’s
lenders’ positions, weighted by the share of each lender in the firm’s total bank debt,
18In empirical research, firm’s growth opportunities are usually controlled through measures re-
lated to firm’s market value. However, this approach is not possible to implement in the Portuguese
case, as the share of quoted firms is very small.
19The definition of each variable for firms is presented in Table III.1 in the Appendices Section of
this Chapter. Table III.2 presents summary statistics for some other firm characteristics included
in the data set.
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Table 3.3: Sample summary statistics - Firm characteristics
Nr. Mean Sd p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
SIZE 211,741 13.78 1.45 12.11 12.82 13.63 14.58 15.63
PROFITABILITY 211,752 0.09 0.12 -0.01 0.04 0.09 0.14 0.22
SALES GROWTH 211,747 -0.03 0.26 -0.32 -0.14 -0.02 0.09 0.24
BANK CREDIT 211,752 0.66 0.31 0.30 0.47 0.66 0.81 0.93
Note: sd stands for standard deviation, while p10, p25, p50, p75, and p90 stand for the percentiles 10, 25, 50, 75,
and 90, respectively, of the distribution of each variable, for observations included in the econometric analysis.
in the sample period.20
Concerning lenders’ funding structure, the set of indicators includes the central
bank funding (CENTRAL BANK), defined as central bank liabilities over total assets,
interbank funding (INTERBANK), which corresponds to interbank market liabilities
over total assets, and the funding in financial markets (MARKET FUNDING), defined
as the wholesale debt and interbank funding over total assets. It also comprises the
relevance of customers’ resources, through the ratio of customers’ deposits over total
assets (DEPOSITS A), and loans over customers’ deposits (LOAN-TO-DEPOSIT).
We expect to see a positive relationship between the levels of interbank and fi-
nancial markets indicators and the lenders’ vulnerability to market developments.
Higher shares of these funding sources correspond to greater dependence on finan-
cial markets, and consequently institutions may be more exposed to the adverse
developments and conditions recorded in those markets during the horizon period.
For the loans-to-deposits ratio a similar rationale applies: a higher ratio means that
the bank uses funding resources rather than customers’ deposits (perceived as more
stable funding source) to finance their lending activity.21 In line with this percep-
20The definitions underlying each variable are presented in Table III.3 in the Appendices Section.
Table III.4 presents the correlation matrix between firms’ decisions and lenders’ indicators.
21Indeed, in Portugal even during the crisis, customers’ deposits presented a positive path, which
reflected customers’ confidence in the Portuguese financial system. At aggregate level customers’
deposits in the Portuguese banking system increased by around 15 per cent from 2008 to 2012,
mainly since 2010.
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tion, a negative relationship is also expected between deposit-to-assets and bank’s
vulnerability to financial market events. For the central bank indicator, during the
sample period there is no clear “a priori” expectation. On one hand, the relation-
ship may be positive, given that the ECB was crucial as a lender of last resort. On
the other, since it may also identify banks’ liquidity needs, the relationship may have
the opposite sign. The central bank was an important funding source in the period,
due to the constraints in access to alternative finance sources faced by institutions.
Concerning the sovereign exposures (the indicator most used in the recent empiri-
cal literature), we assess the total sovereign debt securities (SOVEREIGN), as the ratio
of sovereign debt securities portfolio over total assets, and the Portuguese sovereign
debt securities (PT SOVEREIGN), which corresponds to the Portuguese sovereign debt
securities over total assets. Given the tensions in the euro area sovereign debt mar-
kets and the extreme increases in sovereign bond yields, institutions with greater
sovereign exposures may be assessed as more vulnerable (which is in line with the
EBA’s decision about the “Sovereign capital buffer” in 2011). For these institutions,
the bank-sovereign linkage is expected to be more important.
Finally, for the solvency position, the analysis takes into account the Total capital
ratio (CAPITAL RATIO), i.e. the total regulatory capital over risk weighted assets.
It also includes the Tier 1 capital ratio (TIER 1 RATIO), defined as the Tier 1 capital
over risk-weighted assets, which became more relevant after the onset of the crisis.
Based on capital ratios, institutions can be seen as weaker, i.e. more vulnerable,
if they present ratios close to the legal threshold. This means that those institu-
tions have lower capital to absorb unexpected negative shocks. Therefore, they have
lower ability to react to those shocks without restrictions on their activity (and) or
increases in their regulatory capital levels.
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Table 3.4: Descriptive statistics - Lenders’ Indicators
Nr. Mean Sd p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
Funding structure:
CENTRAL BANK 211,752 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.12
INTERBANK MARKET 211,752 0.11 0.12 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.12 0.24
MARKET FUNDING 211,752 0.27 0.13 0.13 0.20 0.27 0.35 0.44
DEPOSITS A 211,752 0.45 0.13 0.30 0.38 0.45 0.51 0.60
LOAN-TO-DEPOSIT 211,752 2.31 11.20 0.86 1.05 1.29 1.56 1.85
Debt securities portfolio:
PT SOVEREIGN 211,752 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.06
SOVEREIGN 211,752 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.07
Solvency:
TIER 1 CAPITAL 211,752 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.11
TOTAL CAPITAL 211,752 0.09 0.05 0.06 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.12
Note: sd stands for standard deviation, while p10, p25, p50, p75, and p90 stand for the percentiles 10, 25, 50,
75, and 90, respectively, of the distribution of each indicator. The Lenders’ Indicator corresponds to a weighted
indicator at firm level, based on share of each lender on firm’s total bank debt.
3.6 Empirical results
3.6.1 Empirical specification
The empirical strategy explores firms’ decisions conditioned on their lenders’ vul-
nerability to the adverse developments recorded in the financial markets. Therefore,
in this Section, we run the following reduced-form specification:
yi,t = c+ αXi,t−1 + δzi + φwt + β1LIi,t−1 + β2LIi,t−1 × Crisis+ µi,t (3.1)
where the left-hand-variable, yi,t, corresponds to the decision of firm i in period t,
namely investment or employment decisions. Xi,t−1 is a vector of firm-specific vari-
ables that may affect a firm’s decisions, measured at t− 1.22 zi corresponds to the
firm’s time-invariant components. The firm fixed-effects control for unobserved firm
22The inclusion of control variables with a lag period avoids the contemporaneous effect between
firm’s characteristics and its decisions.
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characteristics that are unchanged over time. wt represents year dummies, which
control for changes in the general macroeconomic and financial environment that
affect all firms simultaneously. LI is the Lenders’ Indicator, the variable that char-
acterizes the position of all firms’ lenders. LIi,t−1 reflects firm i’s lenders’ position,
based on the criterion under analysis, at t − 1. The specification also includes an
interaction term between this variable and the time dummy variable Crisis, that
takes the value one for the period after the onset of the euro area sovereign debt
crisis, i.e. after 2009 (LIi,t−1 × Crisis). Finally, µi,t corresponds to the error term.
Based on equation 3.1, we are interested in the sign of the β2 coefficient, as it
allows us to know if the sensitivity of firms’ decisions to lenders’ characteristics
changed after 2009, when banks suffered the negative shock related to the outbreak
of the euro area sovereign debt crisis, and the spillovers to Portuguese agents and
economy.
As the specification includes fixed-effects at firm level, the identification comes
from the comparison within firms’ changes in employment and investment, for firms
that borrow from lenders with different exposures to the crisis. Moreover, due to




As mentioned, the purpose of this study is to explore if firms that have relationships
with lenders more vulnerable to the adverse environment, i.e. subject to higher
challenges during the sovereign debt crisis and the adverse financial market devel-
opments, present significant differences in their decisions. In this section, we focus
128
Chapter 3. Lending relationships and the real economy
on investment outcomes.
Investment is an important component for firm’s prospects, and, at the aggregate
level, it is closely related to economic growth. In fact, as shown in Amador &
Coimbra (2007) and Almeida & Félix (2006), capital stock developments have made
an important contribution to Portuguese economic growth in the past few decades.
More recently, the low performance of the Portuguese economy has been linked to
a strong fall in investment.23 In general, investment is fundamental in determining
the future productive capacity and economic growth in the long-run (e.g. King &
Levine (1993)).
As mentioned above, we explore alternative indicators to characterize firm’s
lenders’ position regarding funding structure, sovereign credit risk exposure, and
solvency. We also control for the importance of each lender in the firm’s total bank
debt, which allows us to control for the dependence of the firm on each lender. The
higher is the dependence of firms on lenders identified as potentially more vulnerable
to the adverse market conditions, we expect that those firms face higher constraints,
ceteris paribus. This is in line with hold-up issues and switching costs related to
bank lending relationships, i.e. it may not be easy for firms to change lenders.
Indeed, in the context of the financial crisis, Ivashina & Scharfstein (2010) found
evidence that borrowers from weaker banks could not switch to healthier banks. It
is also linked to the empirical evidence toward adjustments in credit supply during
crisis periods, as shown by Chodorow-Reich (2014), Iyer et al. (2014), and Bofondi
et al. (2013).
Table 3.5 presents the results of equation 3.1 for investment. Each column of the
table corresponds to one of the alternative indicators that underlies the character-
ization of firm’s lenders’ vulnerability. For instance, the first five columns of the
23Note that the concept of investment at aggregate level may not match with the investment
measures computed at the micro level.
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table present the results exploring the five funding structure criteria.
According to the results obtained, the coefficient of interbank funding is nega-
tive and statistically significant. The interaction term with the crisis dummy also
has a negative and statistically significant coefficient. These results suggest that
the firms whose lenders had a higher dependence of this funding source presented
a poorer path for investment, and this effect was intensified after 2009. Looking
at market funding, the interaction term also shows a statistically significant and
negative coefficient. This result is in line with the constraints in the access to the
wholesale debt markets that banks faced in that period, and the tensions in the
interbank market. The deposits-to-asset ratio has a statistically significant coeffi-
cient for the interaction term, but with a negative sign. This result contradicts the
a priori expectations, given that a higher ratio corresponds to lower dependence
on alternative funding sources (rather than deposits) to finance lending operations.
The coefficients of the other funding indicators are not statistically significant in
this approach.
As far as lenders’ sovereign debt securities are concerned, in columns 6 and 7, the
empirical evidence does not suggest impacts on firm’s investment. The coefficients of
total sovereign debt securities portfolio, and the Portuguese sovereign debt securities
holdings, are not statistically significant.
Columns 8 and 9 present the results based on Tier 1 and Total capital ratios,
respectively. According to the estimates, there is no statistically significant impact
on firm’s investment influenced by lenders’ capital ratios.
Summing up The empirical evidence suggests that the main dimension that affect
a firm’s investment decision is related to the funding structure of their lenders.
Broadly, according to the results, firms whose lenders depend more on funding
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obtained in the financial and interbank markets present lower investment after 2009,
in comparison with the previous years. We find that, on average, a one standard-
deviation increase in lenders’ interbank funding leads to around 0.7 percentage points
additional decline in firm’s investment after the outbreak of the crisis.
The importance of lenders’ funding structure is in line with Cingano et al. (2013),
who also explored lenders’ funding sources, even though during the financial cri-
sis. However, these results are unlike those in De Marco (2016), who explored the
sovereign debt crisis based on banks’ exposures to sovereigns. However, the anal-
ysis was based on syndicated loans, which are usually biased to larger firms, and
consequently may have influence in the analysis.
Firm control variables Finally, all firms’ control variables included in the spec-
ifications (the Xi,t−1 vector) are statistically significant and present the expected
sign. This confirms that firm characteristics are also important factors underly-
ing firms’ investment. In particular, SIZE shows a negative coefficient, suggesting
that larger firms tend to present lower investment, which should be in line with
the firm’s life cycle (i.e. typically investment is stronger in initial phases of firms).
SALES GROWTH, a variable that seeks to capture the potential growth, shows a pos-
itive coefficient. This suggests that corporate investment is sensitive to the demand
for firms’ products and opportunities to expand. Additionally, firms with higher
indebtedness level (BANK DEBT) tend to present lower investment in the following
year. A possible reason for this result may be the fact that firms with higher debt
ratios tend to face higher financial constraints. In turn, PROFITABILITY presents a
positive and statistically significant coefficient. This suggests that firms use part of
internal funds for investment (which is in line with the “pecking order theory” of
Myers (1984), arguing an optimal hierarchy for funding).
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ii) Employment decisions
Funding is important for investment decisions, but also for other dimension of firms’
activity. Therefore, we perform an analysis similar to that conducted above, but
exploring firm’s employment decisions. Indeed, employment is also an important
firm decision.
Employment can be seen as a complementary input to production, due to the
usual complementarity of physical capital and human resources in the production
function. However, if firms face financial difficulties, they may also adjust this
factor per se to levels more consistent with firms’ current financial position. As
described in the literature section, some papers reported evidence that firms adjust
employment after a shock that affected their lenders negatively, for instance, the
findings of Chodorow-Reich (2014) in the US, Bentolila et al. (2015) for Spanish
firms, and Bottero et al. (2015) for smaller firms in Italy.
IES includes the average number of employees for each firm. Based on this
information, we explore the potential impact of lenders’ exposure to the crisis on
firms’ employment decisions. The econometric results for this analysis are presented
in Table 3.6. The structure of this table follows the previous one, so each column
corresponds to the alternative indicator used to characterize institutions potentially
more vulnerable to the adverse financial market developments, during the sovereign
debt crisis.
For lenders’ funding structure, in general, firms whose lenders are more depen-
dent on the financial market tend to present a higher adjustment in the number
of employees. In particular, the coefficients of interbank and market funding indi-
cators are negative and statistically significant after 2009. The analysis based on
deposits-to-assets ratio presents a positive coefficient after the onset of the sovereign
133
Chapter 3. Lending relationships and the real economy
debt crisis. This result suggests that firms whose lenders finance their activity more
intensively by customers’ resources present a more favorable employment path, re-
inforcing the previous findings regarding market funding. The estimates for the
remaining indicators related to lenders’ liabilities are not statistically significant.
When we characterize institutions based on sovereign debt securities portfolios,
both criteria (total sovereign and Portuguese sovereign securities) present positive
coefficients in the period after the outbreak of the euro area sovereign debt crisis.
If we expect that higher exposures imply higher risk for institutions, and conse-
quently (negative) “differentiation” by investors in financial markets, these results
are somewhat puzzling. However, this may be related to the general position of
these institutions. Note that before the unexpected Greek bailout, sovereign debt
securities were perceived as safe assets, and in that period the returns were high.
Based on the regulatory capital position, the Tier I and Total capital ratios are
not statistically significant.
In terms of magnitudes, the estimates obtained indicate that, on average, firm’s
employment decreases by 0.3 percentage points based on a one standard-deviation
increase in lender’s market funding, after the onset of the sovereign debt crisis. In
turn, a one standard deviation increase in the lenders’ sovereign portfolio leads to
an increase by around 0.6 percentage points in firm’s employment changes.
All in all, looking at firms’ employment decisions, the results are broadly in line
with those observed for investment as far as lenders’ funding position is concerned.
However, in this analysis the results suggest that some other lenders’ characteristics
may also play a role on firms’ employment, namely the sovereign debt securities
portfolios.
134











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Chapter 3. Lending relationships and the real economy
3.6.3 Firms’ decisions sensitivity over time
In this sub-section we replace the iteration term between the Lenders’ Indicator and
the crisis dummy in equation 3.1, by interaction terms between LIi,t−1 and the year
dummies variables, wt. This specification allows us to observe how the impact of
lenders’ characteristics changes year by year on firms’ decisions. Thus, we run the
following specification:
yi,t = c+ αXi,t−1 + δzi + φwt + β1LIi,t−1 + β2,tLIi,t−1 × wt + µi,t (3.2)
Again, yi,t corresponds to investment or employment decisions of firm i in period
t. Xi,t−1 is the vector of firm-specific variables at t − 1, while zi corresponds to
firm time-invariant characteristics. wt corresponds to year dummy variables. LIi,t−1
is the indicator that characterizes lenders of firm i at period t − 1. LIi,t−1 × wt
corresponds to the interaction term between lenders’ characteristics and the year
dummies. µi,t represents the error term.
In this specification we are interested in the sign and path of β2,t coefficients.
These coefficients, in line with the previous specification, allow us to identify the
impact of firms’ lenders’ position on firms’ decisions. Additionally, we can check to
see if this effect changed over the sample period. The results for this specification
are presented in Tables III.5 and III.6 in the Appendices Section of this Chapter,
for investment and employment decisions, respectively.
i) Investment decisions
For investment, we confirm the relevance of firm’s lenders’ funding structure indi-
cators, mainly interbank and market funding. Based on the dependence on interbank
funding, the coefficients of some interaction terms are negative and statistically sig-
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nificant. The negative coefficient in 2009 should reflect the tensions in financial
markets following the Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy, which implied a collapse of
the interbank market worldwide. The coefficients are also negative and statistically
significant in 2011 and 2012, showing higher magnitudes. This suggests an intensi-
fication of this lenders’ characteristic during the sovereign crisis. In turn, looking at
market funding, the interaction terms are statistically significant, with negative co-
efficients, only in 2011 and 2012, when tensions spread to several financial markets.
These results are in line with the constraints that banks faced in that period after
the onset of the sovereign debt crisis. The sovereign debt securities portfolios and
the prudential capital positions remain statistically non-significant in this approach.
ii) Employment decisions
For employment, the results also confirm the relevance of lenders’ liabilities struc-
ture. Based on the interbank indicator, all the coefficients are statistically signifi-
cant. This suggests that this dependence could have been stricter to banks as the
crisis lasts. A similar effect is observed for the market funding indicator. In this
analysis, deposits-to-assets is also statistically significant, with positive coefficients,
in the last year under analysis. This may be related to significant changes recorded
in this period, in particular active policies adopted by banks to capture customers’
deposits, in line the guidelines defined in the Programme to the loan-to-deposits
ratio. Indeed, in the beginning of the Portuguese Programme, there was a sizable
decrease of this ratio through deposits effects, rather than a significant cut in lending
activity. The sovereign exposures present statistically and significant coefficients in
2012, with a positive sign. The capital ratios’ coefficients are positive and statisti-
cally significant in 2009 and 2012.
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3.7 Alternative Approach
In this Section we intend to answer the same research question: are firm’s decisions
conditioned on their lenders’ vulnerabilities to the sovereign debt crisis? However,
we adopt an alternative empirical approach to estimate the impact of the negative
shock due to the unexpected bailout of a euro area country, and its the spillovers to
other countries and financial markets. In particular, in this section we explore the
firm-lenders relationships at the moment precisely before the onset of the sovereign
debt crisis, namely at the end of 2009. In turn, for firms’ outcomes, we focus the
analysis on the investment and employment average figures, before and after the
onset of the crisis.
3.7.1 Alternative empirical specification
The empirical procedure of this alternative approach is similar to that followed
in previous sections. Therefore, taking into account firm-bank relationships and
lenders’ position at the end of 2009, we compute the weighted indicator for each
firm. Then, based on firms’ lenders’ heterogeneity, we compare the path of average
investment and employment changes in the period before the outbreak of the crisis
and the period after it (pre-crisis versus crisis). For the period before the sovereign
debt shock we considered the average investment and employment based on 2008
and 2009 figures, while for the period after the shock the average variables are based
on 2011 and 2012 figures.
In this section we run the following specification:
yi,t = c+ αXi,t−1 + δzi + φCrisis+ βLIi,09 × Crisis+ µi,t (3.3)
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where yi,t corresponds to the average investment or average employment of firm i in
the period t: 2008/2009 and 2011/2012. Xi,t−1 is a vector of firm-specific variables
that may affect the firm’s decisions evaluated at t − 1 (namely 2007 and 2010). zi
corresponds to the firm’s time-invariant components, while Crisis is a time dummy
variable that takes the value one for the period after 2009. In this specification LIi,09
is the Lenders’ Indicator that characterizes all lenders’ positions of firm i at the end
of 2009. Finally, µi,t corresponds to the error term.
In this framework the coefficient of interest is β, which corresponds to the inter-
action term between the Lenders’ Indicator and the time dummy Crisis. The sign
and significance of the β coefficient allows us to check if there were differences in
the firm’s decisions depending on its lenders’ vulnerabilities to the negative shock
recorded in mid-2010. So, we test if firms whose pre-crisis lenders were more vul-
nerable presented higher or lower changes from the period before to the period after
the onset of the sovereign debt crisis.
Given that the key coefficient reflects the interaction between the time dummy
and the Lenders’ Indicator, which is a continuous variable, we can find some similar-
ities between this specification and those that exploit treatment intensity variables.
Exploring firms variation, the set of firms whose lenders present better indicators
(i.e. lower vulnerability to the crisis) can be defined, by analogy, as the control
group. In some way, this approach is in line to the analysis conducted by Acemoglu
& Lyle (2004) about the impact of World War II on the women’s labor market in
the US. The authors explored the “mobilization rate” of men to the war as the key
differential variable, given that this rate was not uniform across states (i.e. the share
of men recruited in each state). So, they explored a continuous treatment variable
rather than the usual binary variable approach.24
24For additional details and discussion about treatment intensity variables, see the Chapter
“Parallel worlds: fixed effects, differences-in-differences, and panel data” in Angrist, Joshua D and
Pischke, Jörn-Steffen (2008).
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In this framework, it is worth highlighting some facts. As mentioned, the key
variable under analysis is defined based on lenders’ positions at the end of 2009
(LIi,09). This position is defined after some firms’ decisions had taken place. How-
ever, this fact should not invalidate the results as long as the events were unexpected
at the time. In other words, before 2010 firms could not anticipate the onset of the
sovereign debt crisis and the tensions in the international financial markets, or the
consequences of these developments to their lenders. The same applies to financial
institutions, i.e. institutions’ decisions and financial positions at the end of 2009
did not reflect the coming events. Both arguments seem reasonable in the setup
under analysis. Actually, the Greek bailout, i.e. the bailout of a euro area country,
was not expected by agents and it changed considerably the assessment of sovereign
credit risk by investors and the dynamics in international financial markets. More-
over, this approach allows us to exclude from the analysis potential effects related to
lenders’ decisions driven by the changes in the economic and financial environment,
following the Greek bailout.
Lenders’ characteristics
In this approach, we continue exploring the indicators used in the previous section
to characterize banking institutions. However, as we characterize firm’s lenders only
at the end of 2009, we include some additional indicators in the analysis. These
indicators allow us to explore other dimensions that may help to characterize banks’
vulnerability to the crisis or their potential ability to overcome the adverse market
conditions.
Based on the prudential liquidity reports, we obtain information about the liq-
uidity position of each institution, such as the liquidity gap. This indicator takes
into account the maturity (mis)match between assets and liabilities for different
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time windows. In this analysis we consider the liquidity gap for 6 to 12 months.
This indicator therefore identifies the funding needs for the second half of 2010, the
semester following the Greek rescue.
As financial markets dried up for Portuguese institutions during 2010, funding
from the central bank, the lender of last resort, was crucial for some institutions to
overcome liquidity shocks during this period. As presented in Figure III.3, in the
Appendices Section, a sizable increase in credit from ECB operations occurred in
mid-2010. However, gaining access to these operations requires pledging collateral.
Therefore, we include in the analysis a variable related to the availability of assets
eligible for monetary operations, i.e. assets that could be pledged as collateral in
monetary operations conducted by the ECB, if needed.25
A negative liquidity gap, LIQUIDITY GAP, means that liabilities with maturity
between 6 and 12 months are higher than the assets with similar maturity. The
indicator ELIGIBLE ASSETS was defined as the share of assets that can be pledged
as collateral in monetary operations over total assets. Based on these indicators, we
expect that institutions showing higher indicators should be in a better position to
face the negative shock recorded in 2010.
Table 3.7 presents some descriptive statistics for Lenders’ Indicators (in line with
the analysis of Table 3.4), assessed at the end of 2009 and including the additional
variables.
25This key indicator is available only since 2009, with the introduction of new items in the
prudential liquidity report.
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Table 3.7: Descriptive statistics - Lenders’ Indicators at end-2009
Nr. Mean Sd p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
Funding structure:
CENTRAL BANK 36,408 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05
INTERBANK MARKET 36,408 0.11 0.10 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.12 0.21
MARKET FUNDING 36,408 0.31 0.12 0.18 0.26 0.30 0.38 0.46
DEPOSITS A 36,408 0.43 0.13 0.29 0.34 0.42 0.49 0.54
LOAN-TO-DEPOSIT 36,408 1.42 2.47 0.91 1.16 1.33 1.50 1.79
LIQUIDITY GAP 36,408 -10.00 11.27 -19.60 -12.43 -9.66 -6.34 -1.99
Debt securities portfolio:
PT SOVEREIGN 36,408 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04
SOVEREIGN 36,408 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05
Collateral:
ELIGIBLE ASSETS 36,408 0.10 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.10 0.11 0.17
Solvency:
TIER 1 CAPITAL 36,408 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.10
TOTAL CAPITAL 36,408 0.09 0.05 0.06 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.12
Note: sd stands for standard deviation, while p10, p25, p50, p75, and p90 stand for the percentiles 10, 25, 50,
75, and 90, respectively, of the distribution of each indicator. The Lenders’ Indicator corresponds to a weighted
indicator at firm level, based on share of each lender on firm’s total bank debt.
3.7.2 Econometric results
Tables 3.8 and 3.9 present the results of this alternative approach for firms’ invest-
ment and employment decisions, respectively. The new indicators are presented in
the last two columns of each table.
As mentioned, the β coefficient in equation 3.3 is the key variable in this approach.
Due to the characteristics of the data set, the econometrics procedure includes robust
standard errors.
i) Investment decisions
Looking at funding structure, only the specifications with interbank and market
funding indicators present statistically significant coefficients, with negative signs.
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These results suggest that firms whose lenders were more dependent on these funding
sources at the end of 2009 presented lower (average) investment after 2010. The
sovereign exposures and solvency indicators remained statistically non-significant in
this set up.
Looking at the new indicators, the coefficient of the variable related to liquidity
gap, presented in column 10, is not statistically significant. The availability of
assets eligible as collateral, column 11, presents a positive and statistically significant
coefficient for the interaction term with the crisis dummy. This suggests higher
average investment for firms whose lenders showed greater ability, assessed at the
end of 2009, to gain access to the ECB operations.
According to the results obtained, a one standard deviation increase in lenders’
market funding corresponds to a reduction of 0.7 percentage points in average in-
vestment between the period before and after the onset of the sovereign crisis. A
change of similar magnitude in lenders’ eligible assets indicator has approximately
the inverse impact.
ii) Employment decisions
Concerning employment decisions, and looking at lenders’ liabilities structure, in-
terbank lending, market funding, and the deposits-to-assets ratio are statistically
significant. The last presents a positive coefficient while the other two indicators
show negative signs. Therefore, average employment changes show less favorable
path for firms whose lenders were more dependent on financial markets (or with
lower share of customers’ deposits) at the end of 2009.
Under this framework the indicators related to banks’ exposure to sovereign debt
securities continue presenting positive coefficients, i.e. firms whose lenders have
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Chapter 3. Lending relationships and the real economy
higher sovereign debt securities holdings at the end of 2009 tend to reveal more
favorable employment changes over time. Looking at capital adequacy ratios, the
results do not suggest an impact on the average employment changes.
In line with the results observed for investment, the liquidity gap is not statis-
tically significant. The variable eligible assets presents a positive coefficient. This
suggests that banks with greater capacity to borrow from the Central Bank, mea-
sured by the assets available to pledge as collateral in monetary operations, are in
a more favorable position to overcome adverse financial market developments.
The results indicate that firm’s average employment change decreases by around
0.2 percentage points for a one standard-deviation increase in lenders’ market fund-
ing. In turn, a one standard-deviation increase in lenders’ sovereign securities port-
folio or in eligible assets indicator implies an increase by around 0.24 percentage
points in firm’s average employment change.
Summing up In this analysis we explore the exposure of firms to adverse shocks
through their lenders’ positions defined at the end of 2009, before the onset of the
sovereign debt crisis. In this Section, in particular, as the key variable is continuous
and we analyze firm’s outcomes in two periods (pre-crisis versus crisis), we can
differentiate firms among those with high and low exposures to the negative market
developments through their lenders’ position. Thus, the interaction term between
the Lenders’ Indicator and the Crisis dummy can be compared to a treatment
intensity variable. Consequently, even though the empirical approach adopted in
this Section is not a “pure” differences-in-differences model, it retains the main
features of that models.
Broadly, the main findings discussed in the previous sections continue to be valid
under this empirical approach, such as the importance of lenders’ funding positions.
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Chapter 3. Lending relationships and the real economy
Additionally, the results highlight the relevance of collateral to overcome tensions
in the financial markets, through the ECB monetary operations.
3.8 Robustness
In this study, we analyzed firms’ outcomes exploring the heterogeneity on firm’s
lenders’ exposure to the adverse developments in financial markets, in the context of
the sovereign debt crisis. The variable of interest was Lenders’ Indicator, measured
by several alternative criteria. Following the specification presented in Section 3.7.1,
we run some additional regressions, in order to assess how the results change due to
some adopted hypotheses.
First, we replace the firm-fixed effects component (zi), in equation 3.3, with
interaction terms between firms’ business sector and the time dimension. These
variables allow us to control, in some way, changes in firms’ activity sector over
time, which may influence firms’ credit demand and decisions. In particular, we run
the following specification:
yi,t = c+ αXi,t−1 + φCrisis+ βLIi,09 × Crisis+ δSi × Crisis+ µi,t + µi,t (3.4)
where Si × Crisis corresponds to the interaction term between firm i’s business
sector, Si, and the time dummy Crisis. The remaining variables, both on right-
hand and left-hand sides in the equation, are defined as described in Section 3.7.1,
namely: yi,t corresponds to the average investment or average employment of firm i
in the period t (2008/2009 and 2011/2012); Xi,t−1 is a vector of firm-specific variables
evaluated at t−1; LIi,09 is the Lenders’ Indicator based on all firm’s lenders i at the
end of 2009; while µi,t corresponds to the error term. The results obtained under
this set up are in line with those discussed above.
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The next test comprises the inclusion of other lenders characteristics as explana-
tory variables in equation 3.3. Hence, in addition to the Lenders’ Indicator, which
remains the key variable in the analysis, we include measures related to leverage,
profitability, and size of firms’ lenders.26
In this robustness exercise, we run the following specification:
yi,t = c+ αXi,t−1 + δzi + φCrisis+ βLIi,09 × Crisis+ ϕLCi,09 + µi,t (3.5)
where LCi,09 is the vector of additional variables for lenders of firm i, assessed at
the end of 2009 (lenders’ control variables). The remaining variables included in the
specification preserve the same definition as described in Section 3.7.1.
According to results obtained, the general conclusions continue broadly to hold
under this conjecture. Nevertheless, there are some adjustments in the estimated co-
efficients related to Lenders’ Indicator, but they are not sizable. The results obtained
under this framework are shown in Tables III.7 and III.8, in the Appendices Section
of this Chapter, for firms’ investment and employment outcomes, respectively.
Therefore, even replacing firm-fixed effects by other firms’ controls, or including
some lenders’ control variables, the empirical evidence continues to identify some
impact on firms’ decisions related to lenders’ dependence on interbank and financial
markets, as well as the availability of assets eligible as collateral in ECB operations.
Looking at employment changes, in addition to these lenders’ features, lenders’
sovereign debt securities portfolios have also impact on firms’ outcomes.
26The procedure adopted to compute lenders control variables at firm level followed the approach
of Lenders’ Indicator, i.e. a weighted average of firm’s lenders’ characteristics. The definitions of
the control variables are presented in Table III.3 in the Appendices Section.
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3.9 Final Remarks
Recent years have seen unprecedented events. First, the financial crisis related to
the US sub-prime mortgage market, the collapse of Lehman Brothers, and the se-
vere worldwide economic recession in 2009. Afterwards, the euro area faced several
challenges due to the onset of the sovereign debt crisis in mid-2010. Those events
dramatically affected the international financial markets and had consequences for fi-
nancial systems. Indeed, following those events, financial intermediaries were forced
to revise their funding and business strategies, taking into account a new and more
demanding regulatory framework. Simultaneously, financial systems in some coun-
tries recorded additional constraints imposed by the international rescue programs.
Against this background, the discussion on the transmission of the financial position
of intermediary institutions to the real economy, in particular the corporate sector,
became a topical issue in the economic and financial literature for academics and
policy-makers.
Portugal was one of the countries especially affected by the sovereign debt crisis,
which led to the International Financial Assistance Programme in April 2011. The
sovereign-bank link also had significant negative spillovers to the Portuguese banking
institutions, which play a crucial role as financial intermediary for the Portuguese
economy.
This study investigates the potential differences in firms’ investment and employ-
ment decisions, taking into account all firm-bank relationships and the vulnerability
of firms’ lenders to the adverse financial market developments, in the context of
the sovereign debt crisis. We compute the Lenders’ Indicator, which is a weighted
indicator for each firm based on lenders’ characteristics and the share of each lender
in the firm’s total bank debt. Higher and lower Lenders’ Indicators represent dif-
ferent vulnerabilities to the negative shock. In other words, we compare the path of
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investment and employment for the period 2007-2012, exploring firm’s lenders’ het-
erogeneity. The results obtained highlight the relevance lenders’ funding structure.
In particular, firms whose lenders depend more on market funding present a poorer
investment and employment path. This suggests that there was some transmission
of lenders’ vulnerabilities to the corporate sector. This result is reinforced when we
assess lenders’ positions at the end of 2009, before the unexpected negative shock
on sovereign debt markets. The results also show the relevance of eligible assets to
pledge as collateral in monetary operations, measured at end-2009, in overcoming
negative shocks. We found a positive impact of this indicator on average investment
and employment decisions after 2010. However, based on other lenders’ character-
istics, namely the sovereign debt securities portfolios or even solvency position, the
results are not so conclusive. While the results suggest that there was no impact on
firms’ investment decisions, there is some evidence of the impact of lenders’ sovereign
securities exposures on employment outcomes.
The different results observed in the investment and employment analysis may
be related to the fact that investment reacts more quickly to the economic activity,
uncertainty, or agents’ confidence. Investment was already affected by the financial
crisis and the economic recession in 2009. In turn, employment tends to present a
higher lag of adjustment to adverse environments.
The empirical findings of this study suggest that the linkage of banking institu-
tions and sovereigns could play an important role for corporate activity, and conse-
quently for economic developments. The results also illustrate the need to improve
the general economic analytical tools, taking into account the link between economic
agents, financial system, and sovereigns. This is especially important for a small and
open economy, mainly when it is highly dependent on international savings flows,
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This figure presents the Portuguese 10 year bond yields and the respective spread
against comparable German bonds.
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Sources: Bloomberg and Thomson Reuters.
This figure shows the CDS spreads of some major Portuguese banks, and the comparison
with the CDS spread of iTraxx, that includes other banking institutions.
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Source: Banco de Portugal.
This figure shows the credit obtained by resident banks in ECB monetary operations
since 2008 and the first years of the sovereign debt crisis in the euro zone.
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Source: Banco de Portugal.
This figure shows annual growth rate of bank loans granted to non-financial private
sector from 2006 to 2014.
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Table III.1: Variables definition - Firms
Variables Definition
Dependent variables
INVESTMENT GROWTH Flow of investment in tangible and intangible assets for each firm
in a year over the total of those assets at the end of the previous year
EMPLOYMENT GROWTH Change in the average number of employees of each firm
in a year over the average number in the previous year
Firm’s characteristics
PROFITABILITY Net earnings before provisions and depreciation over total assets
BANK CREDIT Bank debt over total assets
SALES GROWTH Year-on-year change rate of sales
SIZE Natural logarithm of real total assets
NUMBER RELATIONSHIPS Number of banking relationships defined at the banking group level,
based on the weight of each group in firm’s total bank debt
Lenders’ Indicator
LI - LENDERS’ INDICATOR Interaction term between all firm-lenders’ characteristics (based on
indicators present below) and the respective weight in firm’s total bank debt.
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Table III.2: Sample summary statistics - Firm characteristics
Nr. Mean Sd p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
SIZE 211,741 13.78 1.45 12.11 12.82 13.63 14.58 15.63
PROFITABILITY 211,752 0.09 0.12 -0.01 0.04 0.09 0.14 0.22
SALES GROWTH 211,747 -0.03 0.26 -0.32 -0.14 -0.02 0.09 0.24
BANK CREDIT 211,752 0.66 0.31 0.30 0.47 0.66 0.81 0.93
ASSETS GROWTH 211,752 0.04 0.23 -0.18 -0.08 0.01 0.12 0.30
WORKING CAPITAL 211,752 0.16 0.35 -0.26 -0.02 0.18 0.39 0.57
ACCOUNTS PAYABLE 211,752 0.19 0.16 0.02 0.06 0.16 0.28 0.42
ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE 211,752 0.28 0.22 0.00 0.08 0.25 0.43 0.59
TANGIBILITY 211,752 0.28 0.23 0.03 0.09 0.23 0.42 0.64
INVENTORIES 211,752 0.18 0.21 0.00 0.01 0.10 0.27 0.49
ASSET TURNOVER 211,752 1.33 1.01 0.41 0.70 1.09 1.65 2.47
CASHFLOW 211,752 0.06 0.26 -0.20 -0.03 0.07 0.18 0.33
CASH AND EQUIVALENTS 211,752 0.29 0.62 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.26 0.72
AGE 211,752 19.72 13.31 7.00 10.00 17.00 25.00 35.00
NUMBER RELATIONSHIPS 211,752 3.24 2.24 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 6.00
Note: sd stands for standard deviation, while p10, p25, p50, p75, and p90 stand for the percentiles 10, 25, 50,
75, and 90, respectively, of the distribution of each variable, for observations included in the econometric analysis.
Looking at the variables presented, SIZE is the natural logarithm of real total assets; PROFITABILITY is defined as
net earnings before provisions and depreciation over total assets; BANK CREDIT is defined as bank debt over total
assets; SALES GROWTH is defined as Year-on-year change rate of sales; ASSETS GROWTH corresponds to the growth
rate of total assets; WORKING CAPITAL is defined as current assets net of short term liabilities over total assets;
ACCOUNTS PAYABLE is defined as accounts payable over total assets; ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE is defined as accounts
receivable over total assets; TANGIBILITY corresponds to tangible assets over total assets; INVENTORIES is defined as
inventories over total assets; ASSET TURNOVER is defined as sales over total assets; CASHFLOW corresponds to the
ratio of cashflow over total assets; CASH AND EQUIVALENTS is defined as cash and equivalents over total assets; AGE
is defined in years. NUMBER RELATIONSHIPS reflects the number of banking relationships defined at the banking
group level, based on the weight of each group in firm’s total bank debt.
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CENTRAL BANK Central bank funding over total assets
INTERBANK Interbank market over total assets
MARKET FUNDING Wholesale and interbank markets over total assets
DEPOSITS A Customers’ deposits over total assets
LOAN-TO-DEPOSIT Loans over customers’ deposits
LIQUIDITY GAP Gap between assets and liabilities mismatch for 6-12 months
Debt Securities Portfolio
PT SOVEREIGN Portuguese sovereign debt securities over total assets
SOVEREIGN Total sovereign debt securities over total assets
Collateral
ELIGIBLE ASSETS Assets eligible as collateral in monetary operations
with central banks
Solvency
TIER 1 RATIO Tier 1 capital over risk weighted assets
CAPITAL RATIO Total regular capital over risk weighted assets
Control variables
LEVERAGE Capital over total assets
PROFITABILITY Returns on total assets
SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets
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